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Abstract 
The objectiye of this dissertation is to analyse some important 
aspects of the issue of the usefulness of accounting to trade unions. 
This issue raises fundamental questions as to whether trade unions must 
plan for or simply represent the interests of employees in the modern 
business enterprise. 
The analysis presented suggests that trade union use of accounting 
information, within the business enterprise will be restricted so long 
as they pursue re-active, oppositional policies within a context 
established by management strategic planning practices and consequently 
will have little influence on events. Both a theoretical review of the 
principles of strategic planning and an examination of recent economic 
history shows that management do not plan to promote the interests of 
employees, and that managerial control of the strategic planning 
process is of vital importance. In consequence, I argue that the power 
latent in trade unions can only be harnessed if they reconceptualize 
their central 'organizing principles' around challenging management 
strategic planning ~atives, by developing an independent ability to 
plan. 
Previous research into the usefulness of information to trade 
unions has not recognized this planning requirement and has, in 
consequence, been highly restricted in perspective and has under 
estimated the usefulness of information 
methodology of this thesis is qualitative. 
to trade unions. The 
By collecting unstructured, 
in-depth data from a major case study, it has been possible not only to 
assess the usefulness of accounting information to trade unions, but 
also, crucially, to analyse it within the context of problems which 
trade unions confront in developing a constructive response to economic 
change. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse some important aspects 
of the issue of the usefulness of accounting to trade unions. 
Accounting information has been primarily developed to support 
management control of the business enterprise. Its potential value to 
trade unions is a question which has a relatively short history. 
In Britain company information disclosure as a specific trade union 
'issue' can be traced back only to 1960 (Jackson-Cox, et a1. 1984), 
when the TUC submitted evidence to the Jenkins' Committee on Company 
Law Reform (Board of Trade, 1962) in which it was argued that "work 
people have a legitimate interest in the affairs of the organization on 
which they rely for their livelihood", and that employee rights to 
information should be recognised in company law. This initial attempt 
to establish the disclosure of company information as a trade union 
issue in the field of company law reform was unsuccessful. However, in 
the late 1960's and early 1970's, subsequent to the Donovan Commission 
(1968) on Industrial Relations, an apparent consensus emerged on the 
desirability of employers providing more information to employees and 
trade unions. Both Conservative and Labour Governments identified 
'information disclosure' as an element in their strategies for 
reforming the British system of industrial relations. Plans for 
statutory provision for greater disclosure to unions were first 
outlined in In Place of Strife (HMSO, 1969) and were contained in the 
Labour Government's 1970 Industrial Relations Bill. Very similar 
provisions reappeared in the Conservatives' Industrial Relations Act 
1971, supplemented by a Code of Industrial Relations Practice and a 
report on disclosure from the Commission ~n Industrial Relations 
(1972). These provisions, only slightly amended, were then re-enacted 
in the Employment Protection Act and were backed up by a new Code of 
Practice from the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(A.C.A.S, 1977). The fact that both major political parties, certain 
employers and unions have· all to some degree favoured the idea of 
information disclosure owes much to the fact that the 'national' 
economic circumstances at that time required the co-operation of the 
trade union in the 'social contract' and that the concept can mean 
different things to different people. Also, although different 
expectations appeared to be held as to the possible effects, these 
differences were often concealed by common generalisations about the 
role disclosures would play in securing "an improvement in industrial 
relations". 
Conservative Governments and employers have supported greater 
disclosure because they believed it would improve industrial relations 
to their advantage. They say they believe that greater disclosure will 
improve 'communications' thereby promoting 'rational' bargaining; 
encourage approaches favourable to productivity improvement; improve 
morale, workmanship and cost-consciousness, as well as creating a 
greater sense of 'involvement' and 'identification' with the firm. 
These developments are seen in no way to undermine management 
prerogative to manage but, on the contrary, to enhance the 'legitimacy' 
of management authority in the organization. 
On the other hand, Labour Government support for greater disclosure 
is premised partly on the belief that companies should justify their 
decisions to employees and embrace participative practices which would 
enhance the status of working people in industry. Disclosure is seen 
as a means of extending trade union influence in organizations by 
widening the scope of collective bargaining, particularly via trade 
union involvement in the formulation and monitoring of tripartite 
planning agreements. However, legislative provisions enacted by Labour 
Government have, in fact, been much more restricted in their scope, as 
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is evidenced by the fact that a Conservative Government, committed to 
curbing 'union power', has left the law on disclosure virtually intact. 
In contrast to the post-Donovan consensus, whereby trade unions 
were assigned a legitimate role in colective bargaining, British trade 
unions are currently under siege. Mass unemployment has revealed their 
inability to provide employees with job protection, whilst public 
opinion polls consistently demonstrate a popular belief that unions are 
too powerful. Utilizing its so-called popular mandate, the re-elected 
Conservative Government of 1983 has advanced legislation designed to 
deal with what some see as 'over-mighty' subjects (Burkitt, 1981). A 
continuation of present policies envisages a limited role for trade 
unions in organizational decision-making. Management decision 
prerogatives are to be preserved, and the communication aspects of 
disclosure are re-emphasised. The rationale has been well-expressed by 
Armstrong, the Industrial Relations Director of B.L. In his view: 
" ••• (t)he answer cannot lie in a return to the veto 
power of the shop steward. It has to lie in a more 
comprehensive two-way communication and consultation 
with employees as well as with their representatives 
•••• members prefer management to give the lead, taking as 
we do, full account of the interests and views of the 
people affected" (Financial Times, 27 August, 1982). 
In these circumstances, trade unions would need little information, 
and that required would be provided by management. However, this is 
recognised to be an extreme view. Another, held by industrial relation 
pluralists (eg, Fox, 1966) is that organizations are a coalition of 
interests in which management act as a neutral arbiter of conflicting 
interests. This view thus allows planning to remain a management 
prerogative but enhances the rights of trade unions to contest 
management decision-making within a collective bargaining context. 
This position is premised on the belief that collective bargaining is 
alrecrly an advanced form of industrial democracy which has provided 
'W=== 
employees with significant benefits. Thus Hugh Clegg (1960), a 
prominent industrial relations academic, has argued that: 
" there is no effective alternative to collective 
bargaining as a means of promoting the interests and 
rights of workers in industry" (p. 113). 
In these circumstances, trade union information requirements would 
be directly related to their needs in collective bargaining. 
Alternatively, there is a radical perspective. This rejects the 
coalition model of the pluralist, arguing that irreconcilable conflicts 
of interest exist within the business enterprise, and that collective 
bargaining only provides a marginal accommodation to employee 
interests. For radicals, conflicts of interest between employees and 
shareholders can only be 'resolved' if 'management expertise' is 
completely replaced by 'democratic practice'. To achieve this, the 
radical advocates the abolition of the capitalist system of production 
and little concern is given to establishing a detailed understanding of 
current management practice. For example, Scargill (1978), now 
President of the NUM, has argued that the profit-orientation of 
business can lead workers to adopt inappropriate values, which divert 
them from trade union objectives. Commenting on worker involvement in 
the coal industry, he states: 
"In my own industry we have had an example of how workers 
themselves can be conditioned to be actively concerned 
not only with our organization, but with the perpetuation 
of the existing system. They begin to work with a view 
that is management-orientated. They begin to look at 
statistics rather than people" (p. 4). 
To promote democratic practice, the radical rejects the need to 
prescribe information use for trade unions as it would be an emergent 
aspect of the process of democratic change. 
This thesis provides a context for evaluating these three 
viewpoints by detailing the respective roles of management and trade 
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unions as decision makers and information users in the business 
enterprise. After an extended analysis of the major background issues, 
the main focus becomes a longitudinal case study of a major redundancy 
decision at Lucas Electrical Ltd, the aim of which is to evaluate the 
'effectiveness' of trade union policy-making and through this attempt 
to assess the potential for the effective use by trade unions of 
accounting information. Following a period of participant observation, 
during which the redundancy decision was implemented, I collected 
background data to assess whether it was a shortage of information or 
other problems that prevented an effective trade union response. To 
this end, the redundancy decision is set within an historical 
perspective based upon the strategic policy options available to Lucas 
Electrical during the previous five-year period. This involved both 
library and field research, a fundamental revelation being that the 
decline in UK vehicle production output, the major management 
justification for the 1980 redundancy had been publical1y documented as 
early as 1975. Yet, the strategic decisions developed in response to 
this situation had never been effectively evaluated from a trade union 
perspective. Until management declared 3,000 redundancies in June 
1980, the trade unions were not aware of how management's strategic 
policy had evolved, or its likely impact on employee interests. Not 
only does the case study highlight the reactive nature of trade union 
policy making, it also raises questions about the interests advance by 
management's strategic planning. As the case study will show, 
management's control of the strategic planning process is of vital 
importance to industrial relations because trade union challenges to 
management prerogatives are highly prescibed when set within a 
collective bargaining context under management control. In these 
circumstances, it will be argued that, contrary to public opinion, 
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trade unions will not for see ably ever provide a powerful counterforce 
to the interests of shareholders. 
The analysis presented poses a number of questions which have to be 
evaluated in assessing the potential usefulness of accounting 
information to trade unions. A question of fundamental importance 
involves the process by which employee interests are to be identified. 
Can trade unions continue to respond to issues wi thin an industrial 
relations context or must they develop an independent ability to plan, 
as a prerequisite of being able to identify decisions in which 
employees have an interest? If the latter, how are management 
strategic planning practices to be changed and what are the information 
consequences? Another issue is whether changes in planning practices 
and disclosure can arise from bilaterally agreed changes between 
management and trade unions, or whether this is best seen as a question 
of unilateral trade union action? Finally, it is necessary to consider 
whether there is any major conflict between extended information use 
and the development of planning expertise in trade unions and 
democratic practice. 
In a limited sense, the thesis is written as a contribution to a 
'political economy of accounting' at least as that is outlined by 
Cooper and Sherer (1984). It is 'normative' (p. 219) 'descriptive' (p. 
220) and 'critical' (p. 221). 
Cooper and Sherer (op cit) argue that all research is normative in 
the sense tha.t it contains the researcher's value judgement of how 
society should be organized. For many researchers this is an implicit 
value judgement since research is undertaken within the context of a 
particular paradigm (Kuhn, 1970). In their view, accountants have 
traditionally provided accounting information to support corporate 
management decision making under the control of private investors and 
their capital market agents. The relationship between these interests 
and other interests in society is rarely articulated, and the priority 
~ 
given to investor interests is never justified because it is usually 
unrecognised and remains an implicit value judgement. The norma ti ve 
aspect of my research follows from my decision to view trade unions as 
information users, as the 'client' of the research, rather than 
managers of any other user group, and this is reflected in the 
recommendations which are made. 
The research is also descriptive in that the case study methodology 
employed inevitably involves describing 'accounting in action'. The 
case-study provides a description and interpretation of how accounting 
was used in a situationa11y specific set of instituationa1, social and 
political structures. This description allows me to critique other, 
more conventional, approaches to the study of industrial relations and 
information disclosure to trade unions in three main areas: 
Firstly, decision analysis within a case study requires the 
researcher to understand the role of management in organization. Both 
a theoretical review of the principles of strategic planning and an 
examination of recent economic history (of which the case study 
examines part) show that management is not a neutral arbiter of 
multiple interests in the organization, as presumed by those holding a 
unitary and pluralist perspective, but an agent for one particular 
interest group, shareholders. The research, therefore, criticizes the 
view that the 'divorce of ownership and control' (Berle and Means, 
1932) has led to a 'socially responsible' management, which, if it had 
been the case, would have allowed trade unions to pursue their 
objectives within a strategic planning context controlled by 
management. 
Secondly, and in consequence of the above, a major issue of 
descriptive analysis is how management seeks to perpetuate their 
control of business organizations. As the case study will show, 
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management's control of the strategic planning process is of vital 
importance. In the case study, management were unwilling to discuss 
strategic issues with the trade unions involved and, moreover, sought 
to deny trade union access to information and outside advice. More 
widely, management's rejection of joint decision making approaches 
within the business enterprise, such as the 'Bullock' (1977) proposals 
for worker directors, indicates that management wish to maintain an 
'uncontested terrain' in the area of strategic decision making. This 
suggests that control issues, and trade union objectives, cannot simply 
be confined to management-employee relationships at the point of 
production (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979), which has previously 
provided the main focus of trade union activity. 
Thirdly, given the importance of strategic decision-making at 
company level, and the failure of trade unions to organize at this 
level, the researcher is forced to evaluate trade union ability to 
represent employee interests. Although trade unions have changed 
greatly (eg, the rise and decline of specific unions, the importance of 
different union officers etc), the significance of these changes should 
not be overstated, since in other fundamental respects they have 
remained unchanged. Both the case study and a historical review of 
trade unionism show that there are major limitations to the re-active, 
oppositional policies on which trade unions have relied to date. Such 
policies do not require trade unions to monitor changes in the business 
environment in the process of evaluating employee interest and, as the 
case study will show, 
allow for this either. 
the process of collective bargaining does not 
The implied requirement that trade unions must 
develop an ability to undertake strategic planning, as a means of 
promoting employee interests, not only requires an evaluation of trade 
union information needs, but also raises the issue of how business 
expertise can be reconciled with trade union practice. This problem 
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has previously been avoided, by confining trade union activity to non-
strategic issues within an industrial relations context. 
The thesis concludes with a major critique of academic research in 
this area. Aca4emic researchers have rarely bee~ prepared to engage 
in case study analysis, preferring to adopt apparently more respectable 
quasi-scientific methods, based on interview and questionnaire surveys 
that avoid consideration of management decision issues. Much has been 
written about the structure and evolution of collective bargaining 
within the UK, and the associated relationships between management and 
trade unions, but this approach is literally restricted to the 'logging 
of procedural change' (Storey, 1983a, p. 194). Studies which have been 
undertaken outside this general framework have largely been concerned 
to establish which specific issues are subject to bargaining (Storey, 
1980; Cressey and McInnes, 1980) and no attempt has been made to 
provide in-depth studies of the issues themselves. This even occurs 
when studies of industrial conflict are documented (Bats tone , 1977; 
Hartley et aI, 1983), the research generally being confined to the 
activities surrounding the process of negotiation. 
Recently there has been an increasing tendency to give more 
attention to management as active participants in industrial relations 
(Thurley and Wood, 1984; Purcell and Sissons, 1983). However, other 
than in exceptional cases (Bryer et aI, 1981), the substance of 
management policy is not subject to detailed review and evaluation. In 
effect, researchers have failed to adopt 'positive' research methods 
and have therefore failed to describe 'accounting in action' (Cooper 
and Sherer, 1984, p. 220). 
Management are criticized for promoting a belief that there is 
• 
'only one way' of organizing business acti vHy, and that strategic 
planning can only be developed by promoting the profit interests of 
shareholders. In contrast to trade unions, management are dedicated to 
10 
'organizing principles' which lead to the concentration of power 
amongs t a small eli te. However, we shall see that management are 
prepared to manipulate the trade union democratic ideal to facilitate 
the implementation of their own plans and policies. However I shall 
. . 
also argue that trade unions must also be criticized for allowing 
management to perpetuate sectionalist divisions amongst workers by 
failing to engage in the process of strategic planning by which the 
interests of employees as a whole could be identified. 
My policy recommendation to trade unions on the basis of the 
research is that they organize around the concept of 'strategic 
unionism' as a major departure in analysing and securing the 
potentialities of trade unions as organizations dedicated to the 
pursuit of their members' collective interests. I argue that the power 
latent in trade unions can only be harnessed if they reconceptualise 
their central 'organizing principles' around challenging management's 
strategic planning prerogative. Historically, trade unions have 
accommodated to management strategic planning, and although they have 
challenged their results they have rarely tried to challenge the 
process by developing their own capability. Management are pro-active, 
trade unions are re-active (Ackoff, 1970). Management build primary 
organizations; trade unions are 'secondary' organizations (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1980). Trade unions are in many respects captives of their 
own history. They have been 'dis-educated' by their subservience to 
management, and we shall see that modern management processes are 
anathema to their cultures and organization. 
Prospects for improving the organizational effectiveness of trade 
unions are not good, but it is important that the case for strategic 
unionism is stated as clearly as possible because a key problem for 
trade unions is education. 
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Three main conclusions arise from this dissertation: 
1) The issue of information disclosure to trade unions exposes an 
important contradiction between their objectives and between their 
organization and behaviour. Trade unions generally display a 
disinterest in planning .information and the strategic planning 
process, yet decisions arising from this process are the single 
most important influence on employee interests. Whilst management 
evaluate alternatives by developing an evolving plan for the whole 
organization based upon a collective approach to decision-making, 
trade unions are organized sectionally and devolve decisions to 
individuals without providing an overall framework for decision-
making wi thin which collect! ve interests can be identified, let 
alone pursued. 
2) An analysis of the basis of management control in strategic 
planning and the information deficiencies of trade unions suggests 
that a solution to the trade unions' problem would be to organize 
around the concept of strategic unionism, which would require trade 
unions to monitor management strategic planning activities whilst 
developing alternatives of their own, based upon the collective 
interests of employees. 
3) Although the issue of information disclosure to trade unions is 
part of the problematic of both industrial relations and 
accounting, neither of them has adequately dealt with it. In fact 
the research highlights weaknesses in both disciplines. The basic 
weakness of industrial relations research is its failure to 
understand economic reality; the basic weakness of accounting 
research is its failure to understand political reality. 
Part 1 presents a review of business planning within the modern 
business enterprise to provide an understanding of the roles played by 
management and trade unions in these organizations. Chapter 2 examines 
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how strategic planning has been developed to enhance organization 
learning and control. It will be shown that planning is a fundamental 
concern of management and that the practice of planning has been 
developed to promote decision-making based on profit criteria. Chapter 
3 reviews claims that management within organizations act to balance 
various 'stakeholder' interests and critically evaluates arguments that 
management strategic planning promotes employee interests. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of management strategies of control and 
argues that control of strategic planning is a principal management 
prerogative and the source of organizational control. Chapter 4 
reviews the historical development of trade unionism to show that 
neither .'official' nor 'unofficial' challenges to management strategic 
decision-making prerogatives have ever been made. Furthermore, none of 
the other proposals for institutional reform supported by the TUC, such 
as those made by the Bullock (1977) report, have ever effectively 
allowed management's strategic planning prerogatives to be challenged. 
Chapter 5 outlines the major structural changes that occurred in the UK 
economy over the last twenty years and we see how 11 ttle influence 
trade unions had on these developments. Not once did they directly 
challenge management's strategic decision-making powers. 
In Part 2, the case study is presented. Chapter 6 outlines the 
research methodology and in so doing describes how a classification 
model of trade union policy options was developed in the process of 
research. Chapter 7 reviews the strategic policy options and choices 
available to Lucas Electrical over a five year period, which culminated 
in management's decision to declare 3,000 redundancies in June 1980. 
Chapter 8 describes the negotiations between management and trade 
unions which resulted in the 'settlement' of the redundancy decision in 
September 1980. Chapter 9 reviews the case study to identify how 
management maintained their strategic planning prerogatives and the 
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limitations associated with the policies adopted by trade unions at 
Lucas Electrical. 
In Part 3, the conclusion argues that trade union information use 
will be limited so long as trade unions remain committed to re-active 
opposi tional policies. To date, research in this area, based on 
'pluralist' assumptions has argued that collective bargaining can 
provide 'bilaterally 
disclosure. However 
agreed standards' regarding information 
this dissertation will show that the conflict 
between shareholder and employee interests is not 'reconciled' by 
management within the process of strategic planning and that, 
consequently, a major policy objective of management is to limit the 
issues of collective bargaining to the non-strategic. Not 
surprisingly, recommendations arising from 'pluralist' analyses that 
management extend the scope of collective bargaining by extending 
information disclosure have been ignored. In contrast, I argue that 
trade unions must engage 1n the process of strategic planning as a way 
of developing their own organizations, so that they are better able to 
match the strategic decision-making capabilities of investors. An 
alternative style of research conceptualizes the accountant's role as 
an 'information educator' (Cooper, 1984), whose job is to show that 
alternative interpretations can be assigned to fundamental concepts 
such as 
The aim 
'financial viability'. 
of this thesis is 
This type of work has barely begun. 
to analyse and illustrate the great 
difficulties that confront would-be reformers in this are b aut, 
hopefully points them in the right direction. We start from the given: 
the modern business enterprise and trade unionism. 
Part 1. The Modern Business Enterprise and Trade Unionism 
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Chapter 2. The Evolution of Modern Strategic Planning. 
Over the last century the business enterprise has been radically 
transformed as the size of typical organizations has increased. In 
essence, the mul ti -di visional company has replaced the small owner-
managed firm as the dominant form of business organization. Modern 
organizations co-ordinate the work efforts of thousands of employees to 
satisfy many different markets, often in different countries. These 
changes have required the adoption of new management practices to 
attempt to ensure that the actions of individuals are consistent with 
the formal objectives of the organization as a whole. 
The management of large scale organizations has been the subject 
of considerable research. According to Etzioni (1964) large 
organizations can be distinguished from other social units by the 
extent to which they are "consciously planned, deliberately structured 
and restructured with a membership which is routinely changed" (p. 3). 
In my view the 'conscious planning' or strategic development of an 
organization is the most important management function since it 
involves taking decisions about the objectives to be pursued by the 
organization and establishing possible ways of achieving these 
objectives. This all-embracing nature of management strategic planning 
is suggested in a review of corporate strategy in theory and practice 
by l~ssey (1983). As he says: 
"... a process of corporate planning is an approach to 
the total management task. It is a future orientated, 
integrated way of running an organization. Its job is to 
plan, organize, motivate, co-ordinate, communicate and 
control" (p. 59). 
Planning is centred around the control· of strategic decisions 
(Ansoff, 1965) which concern the major ' threa ts' and 'opportunities' 
facing the organizations, and they usually involve resource allocation 
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decisions which are likely to have long term· implications for the 
organizations. These decisions can be considered independently, or 
they can be co-ordinated by an overall plan of action, the essence of 
the term strategy. For example, for Mintzberg (1973) "strategy making 
can be defined simply as the process by which significant 
organizational decisions are made and interrelated" (p. 77). Strategy 
or strategic planning is, thus, the core management function by which 
coherence is established amongst the various functions of large scale 
enterprises. 
In the UK, trade unions are well established within organizations, 
and in their attempts to defend and promote employee interests conflict 
often arises when management attempt to implement their plans. In 
contesting management control of the enterprise, trade unions generally 
limit their policies to 'industrial relations' issues. This focus 
places a major restriction on the influence which trade unions can 
expect to exert in the employing organizations, because their activity 
is set within a framework determined by the strategic planning 
practices of management. This limitation would not be serious if 
management planning was directed to the enhancement of employee 
interests, but we shall see that trade unions have no real appreciation 
of management planning practices and have, consequently, failed to 
adjust their own organizing principles, as management practice has 
evolved. This chapter reviews the development of business organization 
to show how management planning practices have changed through time and 
outlines a simpUfied model of the planning process as appUed to the 
multi-divisional enterprise. The criticisms that have been made of 
these planning models will be reviewed since, if vaUd, trade unions 
might be able to disregard them. In short, this Chapter will evaluate 
the functions of planning 1n the modern business enterprise. 
1.0 
The Corporate Development Process and Strategy. 
Chandler (1962), studied the development of four major USA 
corporations (Dupont, General Motors, Standard Oil and Sears Roebuck). 
He argued that the success of these organizations was linked to the 
development of organizational structures which allowed top management 
to concentrate on strategic decisions. The main function of these 
executives was to develop organizational strategy which he defined as 
the determination of the basic long term goals 
and objectives of the -enterprise, and the adoption of 
courses of action, and the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals" (p. 13). 
Scott (1971) has presented a model that attempts to outline the typical 
path of organizational development that was analysed by Chandler in his 
seminal work on the historical development of the multi-divisional 
company. Scott's three-stage model (Table 2.1 below) illustrates how 
organizational structure and modes of operation change as the business 
organization adopts different product/market policies. Stage 1 firms 
are owner-managed and are concerned with selling one product within 
1imi ted sales areas. The problems of co-ordination and control are 
limited and a centralization of decisions by the owner-manager is 
feasible. Stage 2 firms arise when growth of output (often based on a 
geographical expansion of sales) leads to functional specialisms within 
the firm and the owner-manager has to employ 'professional' managers to 
implement operational decisions. Centralized control of strategic 
decision is still maintained, and direct control of activities is 
maintained by utilizing technical and cost criteria as measures of 
performance. Where continued growth is achieved by product or 
geographical diversification, the functional organization proves to be 
inadequate and the divisional structure of ~tage 3 firms is adopted. 
Centralized control resides with the corporate headquarters through its 
decisions on resource allocations between divisions. As the business 
Company 
characteristics 
Product line 
Distribution 
Organization 
stucture 
Product service 
transactions 
R&D Organization 
Performance 
measurement 
Rewards 
Control system 
Strategic choices 
._._._--------------------------, 
Table 2.1. The three stages of organizational develo~ent. 
Stage 1 
Single product 
or single line. 
One channel or set 
of channels. 
Little or no formal 
structure; one man show. 
Not applicable. 
Not institutionalized: 
guided by owner manager. 
By personal contact and 
subjective criteria. 
Unsystematic and often 
paternalistic. 
Personal control of both 
strategic and operating 
decisions. 
Needs of owner versus 
needs of company. 
Stage 2 
Single product line. 
One set of channels. 
Specialization based on 
function. 
Integrated pattern of 
transactions. 
A -- B --- C 
Markets 
Increasingly institutional-
ized search for product 
or process improvements. 
Increasingly impersonal, 
using technical and/or cost 
criteria. 
Increasingly systematic 
with emphasis on stability 
and service. 
Personal control of strategic 
decisions and increasing 
delegation of operating 
decisions through policy. 
Degree of integration, 
market share objective, 
breadth of product line. 
Stage 3 
Multiple product lines. 
Hultiple channels. 
Specialization based on 
product market relationships. 
Non-integrated pattern of 
transactions. 
ABC 
Markets 
Institutionalized search for 
new products as well as for 
improvements. 
Increasingly impersonal 
using n~rket criteria 
(return on investment and 
market share). 
Increasingly systematic with 
variability related to 
performance. 
Delegation of product 
market decisions within 
existing businesses, with 
indirect control based on 
analysis of results. 
Entry and exi t from 
industries; allocation of 
resources by industry; rate 
of growth. 
Source: Bruce R Scott, Stages of Corporate Development (Case Clearing 1I011se, Harvard Business Sch001) 
--... -_._---------_._---
...... 
..., 
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organization develops through these successive stages, the nature of 
strategy development beGomes more complicated as the range of factors 
that have to be taken into account by management multiply. 
At Stage 1, the owner-managers can develop strategy without 
explicitly formulating goals and objectives and plans of action. 
Limited markets and areas of competition mean that the business 
environment can be easily monitored and understood. Manufacturing or 
related problems are of central concern since these influence the 
firm's ability to supply the market at a competitive price. Hofer and 
Schendel (1978) state that at this time organizations' goals, 
strategies and policies consisted of a set of intuitive notions 
(held by the owner-manager) about the nature of the market and how to 
compete in it" (p. 13). 
According to Hofer and Schendel (1978) as Stage 1 firms evolved 
into Stage 2 firms, the process of establishing organizational control 
becomes more difficult on two accounts. Firstly, as the average size 
of firms grows, and as the areas and means of competition widen, the 
business environment becomes more uncertain by becoming more complex 
and more variable. Secondly, as the internal structure of the firm is 
differentiated by functional area, the possibility arises that 
functional managers can pursue policies that are inconsistent with each 
other, and in conflict with the formal objectives of the organization 
as a whole. In consequence there is a need explici tly to plan the 
future of the organization taking into account the changes that are 
occurring in the business environment, drawing upon the knowledge of 
functional managers to determine how the firm could best compete in the 
existing circumstances. The aim of the plan,or business strategy is to 
answer the question - How are we going to compete in our business? By 
obtaining agreement between functional managers of this over-riding 
objective, resource allocation decisions between functional areas can 
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be made, thereby reducing the possibility that functional managers will 
act without reference to the business strategy. To be effective the 
planning horizon has to allow time for major changes to be made to the 
firms product/market positions and to effect changes in the firms 
production systems. This may require the acquisition or disposal of 
resources. As part of the plan or strategy, functional area policies 
can be developed to ensure a consistency of action between the 
departments. 
Stage 3 firms have become increasingly important since the 1950s 
as firms continued to grow by diversifying into industries which 
allowed technical expertise or existing customer relationships to be 
exploited in wider areas of activity (Hofer and Schendel, 1978). The 
multi-divisional structure of Stage 3 firms is now the dominant form of 
organization in the western world and is regarded as the appropriate 
structure for handling the organizational control problems that arise 
in a diversified firm. The primary concern of senior management or the 
'dominant coalition' (Cyert and March, 1963) is now to decide how the 
resources of the organization will be deployed between the various 
divisions, so as to achieve organizational objectives. Decisions 
regarding the business strategies of individual divisions can no longer 
be centrally controlled in detail, and these remain the responsibility 
of divisional managers. However, in allocating resources between 
divisions to achieve the most efficient allocation of capital, the 
various business strategies have to be evaluated and this becomes the 
central problem of corporate strategy. In broad terms corporate 
strategy seeks to answer the question "What set of businesses should we 
compete in"? Hussey (1982) has describe~ the corporate strategy 
problem as follows: 
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"The question top management face is no longer how to 
exploit a particular opportunity, but which of many 
opportunities to· exploit. The difficulty is in seeing 
the total corporate plan as a whole, rather than as a 
consolidation of the intentions of various divisions. It 
is in choosing a portfolio of activities that balance 
growth and decline, cash flow contributions and cash 
hungry products, risk and the long term objectives of the 
company that the difficulties occur" (p. 55). 
The corporate strategy is supposed to decide how resources are to 
be allocated between divisions, and provides each division with major 
strategic objectives so that all divisional managers are working 
towards agreed long term aims by means of agreed sets of strategies. 
According to Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) the multi-divisional form 
of organization is effective because it allows a division of labour 
within management based on a time horizon: 
"The divisions were responsible for short term operating 
decisions, the central office was responsible for 
strategic long run decisions. The central office was to 
be staffed with general managers who were not responsible 
for the short-run operating results and were therefore 
given the time and psychological commitment necessary for 
long term planning in the interest of the corporation as 
a whole" (p. 14). 
The need for this division of labour not only reflects the 
differing approaches adopted at strategic and operating level but is 
also necessary since decisions affecting divisions can be against their 
interests. This is recognised by Tricker (1967) when he states: 
"Only the businessman at the strategic level is really 
in a position to determine which of the available 
courses of action the meta system will adopt. Planning 
initiated low in the hierachy is valuable, if given the 
teeth of qualification and used as a control and 
motivational mechanism. It can never address the 
problems that face the strategist of determining 
directions in an increasingly complex and rapidly 
changing environment. A division, for example, is 
never going to propose that it be closed down over the 
next five years, and the funds re-invested in another 
venture-yet this may be to the ultimate benefit of the 
meta system·' (p. 180). 
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Strategy making in the multi-divisional business is, therefore, a 
complex process which aims to facilitate overall organizational 
development by allowing the highest level of management to take 
strategic decisions which set the context within which divisional 
managers operate and also trade unions. To facili ta te this process, 
models of strategy making have been evolved, and these will be 
discussed in the next section. 
Strategic Planning Models 
The practice of strategic or corporate planning has prinCipally 
been developed within major business enterprises, especially in the 
USA. Its development within the UK has not been systematically 
researched, the only major survey being that conducted by the Society 
of Long Range Planning (1974), which involved 386 organizations. This 
shows that 86% of the organizations employing Society members produced 
a corporate plan. Nonetheless, in the view of Hussey (1982), an 
important contributor to strategic planning research, such practices 
were being implemented by major UK companies from the early 1970's. He 
states: 
"It is difficult to say exactly when corporate planning 
began, but certainly by the mid-1960s there was a very 
evident trend to planning by major companies on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Until about 1965 the companies 
which were attempting a planning process were like a 
small stream. By 1970 they had become a fast flowing 
torrent, and virtually every company that considered 
itself advanced in its management thinking had flirted 
in some way with the concept of corporate planning·' 
(p. 49). 
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Academic research has sought to identify the conditions which 
promote or inhibit effective planning (Taylor and Irving, 1971; 
Ringbakk, 1971; Bhatty, 1981), a major objective being to identify 
'best practice'. This research attempts to refine models of business 
and corporate strategy by undertaking inter-company comparisons of 
their use. Argenti's Corporate Planning: A Practical Guide provides a 
convenient exposition of the 'conventional wisdom' and focuses 
attention on basic aspects of the strategy process. Subsequent 
chapters will suggest that trade unions do not conceptualize the 
planning process at this level of sophistication. 
As has been seen, within the multi-divisional enterprise, strategy 
development takes place at two levels. Corporate strategy is the 
highest level of decision-making in that it is concerned for example 
with making resource allocation decisions between divisional companies, 
(i.e., answering the question - What set of businesses should we 
compete in?). However, since divisional managers are responsible for 
the detailed operation of subsidiary companies, corporate involvement 
at this level is limited, and in consequence the corporate strategist 
does not have the detailed knowledge and information required to 
develop business strategies (i.e., answering the question - How are we 
going to compete in our current business activity?) which are an 
essential input into the corporate strategy making. Corporate strategy 
evaluations therefore incorporate and extend the business strategy 
models developed at the divisional level. Most research has taken 
place at the level of business strategy, and since this is a pre-
requisite for undertaking corporate strategy, the discussion which 
follows will first outline a model of .business strategy before 
extending the discussion to incorporate 
perspective. 
the corporate strategy 
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A model of business strategy: 
The strategic planning activities identified below form part of a 
continuous process within an organization, the aim of which is to 
provide an evolving plan which will guide organizational development 
over a long period of time. Thus Tricker (1967) states: 
"Corporate strategy is not the annual assembly of a set 
of planning documents into a neatly bound folder, it is a 
year round process carried out by the strategic level of 
management. Certainly the process can be assisted by 
documentation of forecasts, standards, and targets - but 
attempts to capture long term trends in a static plan 
overlook the dynamic nature of the environment. At best, 
the strategist is attaching probabilities to an array of 
possible outcomes" (p. 178). 
Figure 2.1 below is provided to indicate the various stages of 
strategy analysis, and provides a view of the inter-linking and 
continuity amongst the various stages in the process. 
1. Establishment of objectives and targets: 
All organizations are established by some person or persons to 
pursue an objective, which validates its existence and its actions. 
Objectives therefore are means of judging organizational performance, 
according to the standards of these persons who control the 
organization. Argenti (1980) identifies objectives as having three 
elements: 
a) The intended beneficiaries i.e. those for whose benefit 
the organization exists. 
b) The benefit that they expect has to be described. 
c) The level of performance that is acceptable to them has 
to be specified. 
Whilst the purpose of the business organization is a subject of 
debate, Argenti makes no apologies for explicitly stating the 
capitalist objective as follows: 
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"For most companies in capitalist nations there will be 
no difficulty in agreeing that the sole purpose is to 
generate a return on capital, subject to a vital 
constraint, namely the manner in which the company 
discharges the obligations imposed upon it by society and 
its own ethos •••• It is vital to understand that the 
corporate objective is the aim, everything else is a 
possible means. Turnover, market shares, mergers, 
margins, products, factories, subsidiary companies - all 
these are pawns to be moved with one aim in mind, namely 
to achieve a return on shareholder capital" (p. 54). 
Others, such as Hofer and Schendal (1978) allow for the possiblity 
of setting objectives for other stakeholder interests (eg employees, 
customers, society). However, where objectives cannot be achieved 
simultaneously they allow for the possiblity of ranking and revision. 
In practice, one might anticipate this ranking reflecting the wishes of 
those in control. 
Research findings in this area suggest that profit based 
objectives remain the primary concerns of top management and corporate 
planners. Grinyer and Norburn (1974) studied strategic planning in 21 
U.K. companies. Table 2.2 shows the ranking ordering of objectives: 
Table 2.2 Setting Company Objectives -
91 Directors in 21 Companies I 
I 
Stated by Agreed by 
Individual Directors 2/3 of Board 
Profitabili ty 21 19 
Market Penetration 15 3 
Product Development 14 3 
Market Development 13 2 
Company Image 9 1 
Corporate Productivity 7 0 
Customer Service 7 0 
Industrial Relations 7 1 
Liquidity 6 1 
Others 33 5 
Source: Grinyer & Norburn 1974 
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It should be noted that the setting of objectives cannot be 
divorced from the institutional context in which the organization 
operates. As will be shown in Chapter 3, managers of business 
organizations are not free to pursue objectives of their own choosing, 
the primacy of the profit objectives reflects a pOSition where 
management act as agents for shareholders. 
These objectives are important on two principal accounts. The 
first relates to how they influence the search process by which policy 
alternatives are identified. The second is reflected in how evaluation 
procedures are developed to assess the alternatives identified. As we 
will see these objectives are generally of central concern, and are 
normally unidimensionally related to the profit generating process. 
Once the nature of the objective has been stated, it can often be 
expressed as an index of success (or as a combination of indices). 
Argenti (1980) suggests that to satisfy the objective of 'making a 
return on shareholder capital' a threefold index is required, which 
embraces growth in earning per share, growth in profits and return on 
shareholder capital. This is basic financial analysis. Financial 
indicies are set as standards of future performance and become targets. 
To be operational they must be specified quantitatively and given a 
time dimension. Various procedures are recommended for target-setting, 
since they can only be a guide for action when they have been 
established 'realistically'. The setting of single figure targets is a 
difficult task, and as a consequence, range targets can be set which 
specify minimum and satisfactory levels of performance. This has the 
added advantages of allowing strategies of different risks to be 
evaluated in a more open manner than would be the case with a single 
figure target. 
~I 
2. Forecast of performance: 
The aim of the forecast is to state the firm's profit performance 
assuming no change to the current business strategies. Forecasting 
techniques can be used to extrapolate past performance making 
allowances for changes in the environment which are likely to affect 
future performance levels. Where company models have been developed 
they may be used to provide this forecast. 
3. Identification of performance gap: 
The performance gap is simply the difference between the target 
set and the forecast of performance detailed above. It represents what 
Argenti (1980) terms, the 'strategic gap', which has to be filled by 
the adoption of policies identified in revising the firm's business 
strategy. 
4. Identification of policies to fill performance gap: 
This is often viewed as the creative stage of strategy formation, 
since the time-span of planning should allow for any realistic idea to 
be evaluated with a view to implementation. Idea generation can be 
prompted by a variety of practices. Argenti (1980) identifies five 
possibilities brainstorming, opinion surveys, logical methods, 
imi tat ion and by seeking answers to such questions as "What business 
are we in?" These practices supplement the policies that are 
identified in undertaking evaluations of company performance in terms 
of strengths and weaknesses, and by evaluating environmental threats 
and opportuni ties. (These evaluations having previously informed the 
performance forecast, and will subsequently aid the strategy selection 
process.) 
4a. Evaluation of company performance: 
. 
Company performance has to be reviewed in all major areas (e.g. 
finance, production, marketing, research, purchasing, manpower 
management) with the aim of identifying those features which give or 
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deny the company a differential advantage in the market. Various terms 
have been employed to characterize these features: 'common thread' 
(Ansoff 1965), 'strengths and weaknesses' (Argenti 1980). Having 
identified these features, policies. are developed to try to overcome 
weaknesses or to further develop strengths. Policies that are 
incorporated into the final business strategy are evaluated with this 
perspective in mind. According to Argenti (1980) the internal 
appraisal of the firm is concerned with: 
". •• identifying those features of the company itself 
which will have a major bearing on the choice of 
strategy features that the company itself has 
deliberately developed or that have been endowed upon it 
by past events, features that can be said to be part of 
the company its~lf" (p. 121). 
4b. Evaluation of the environment: 
The aim of the environmental appraisal is to identify the ways 
that changes outside the firm will influence the company's ability to 
continue with current srategies, or which will have implications for 
the implementation of possible future strategies. Appraisals covering 
competititve, political, economic, social, technological and legal 
trends at various levels (e.g. local, national, international) will 
have to be undertaken. The significant trends identified in these 
appraisals can be grouped systematically within an opportunities and 
threats framework and policies can be generated either to exploit or 
counter-act the trends observed. The information developed will be 
used to undertake sensitivity analyses of various strategies to assess 
their risk levels. The environmental analysis attempts to identify 
those developments which if not countered would lead to the 
organisation's demise, and more positively, identify those developments 
. 
which if responded to would help secure future prospects. 
Z':J 
5. Sel~ction of business strategy: 
The prior stages of the strategy development process have aimed at 
providing a systematic method for elaborating organizational targets 
and identifying possible courses of actions which would allow these 
targets' to be realized. (The range of possible policy options can be 
guaged from the conceptual scheme developed by Hofer (1976), see Table 
2.3 below.) The selection process aims to identify a·set of policies 
which form a coherent whole, and which have a high probablili ty of 
achieving the targets established. Argenti (1980) states that normally 
there exists : 
..... a number of interlinked policies usually not more 
than two or three, that form the absloute essence - the 
kernel, the core - of the corpora te plan for the long 
term destiny of any company" (p. 167). 
Possible policies are ranked according to the profit impact that 
can be anticipated. The policies are also evaluated to see whether 
they build upon company strengths and exploit identified 
oppportuni ties, or overcome company weaknesses and respond to 
identified threats. A limited number of possible policy combinations 
will be evaluated testing for consistency, feasibility, completeness 
and sensitivity in terms of financial risk. A critical aspect of any 
strategy is its "robustness" since predicting future outcomes is 
obviously subject to uncertainty; and this can lead to the development 
of contingency planning. 
Argenti (1980) argues that it is possible to identify two kinds of 
strategies. Primary strategies are concerned with (1) policies 
defining the product/market positioning of the firms based upon its 
distinctive competence in those areas and (2) policies in the 
production/technological areas which support and arise from the 
product/market orientations identified in (1). Secondary strategies 
Table 2.3. Some Major Functinal Area Policy Options Available to Businesses 
Source: Hofer (1976, p. 5). 
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are generally resource acquisition/disposal policies based on the 
primary strategies. 
To aid the evaluation of primary stategies. management have 
developed conceptual decision making aids. In the area of business 
strategy, 'product Ufe cycle' decisions are seen to be of critical 
importance to investment and divestment decisions, and the use of 
portfolio matricies is recommended. An example of such an aid is that 
developed by Hofer (1977), as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below • 
. 
Figure 2.2. Recommended Investment Strategies at The Business Level. 
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Management are encouraged to identify the position of their 
various products on the matrix. When prospects are good and a strong 
competitive position is held, share-increasing growth or profit taking 
strategies are recommended. Divestment and asset reduction strategies 
being encouraged when the above favourable circumstances do not 
prevail. 
The evaluation processes described above obviously reflect the 
objectives set at an earlier stage in the strategic planning process. 
As was indicated then, these are essentially profit orientated, 
although non-quantifiable aspects will be incorporated in the decision 
process. 
6 Action plans and monitoring: 
Once the major strategic policies have been identified they must 
then be detailed in the form of action plans and budgets, so that the 
policies become part of 'actual practice. As policies are implemented 
their effectiveness must be monitored, as must assumptions regarding 
the information which was used to formulate the strategy, especially 
environmental assumptions. These evaluations should be on a' feed-
forward' basis so that strategic policies can be amended as 
circumstances dictate. Profit forecasts and departmental plans have to 
be developed on the basis of the business strategy, thereby becoming 
the primary input into the long range planning system. 
In single industry companies, business strategies form the basis 
of resource allocation decisions within the firm. However, as was 
indicated above, in multi-divisional companies, resource allocation 
decisions have to be made between divisions, and business strategies 
have to be set in this wider framework. The discussion will be widened 
to take account of this perspective. 
Corporate strategy: 
The corporate strategy process follows a pattern similar to that 
of business strategy. However, in this case the aim is to identify 
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which industries and businesses should be supported via divisional 
companies rather than deciding how those companies can compete in their 
chosen products and markets. The problem can be compared with a 
shareholder's portfolio decision as to the distribution of his 
shareholdings between different companies. As with business strategy 
the controlling objective is to provide a target return on shareholder 
capital, and to do this by allocating resources between existing 
subsidiary companies and by creating or acquiring new companies. The 
stages of strategy formation are as outlined for business strategy, the 
main variation arising in the procedures adopted at the selection 
stage. At this stage, divisional businesses and their future business 
strategies have to be evaluated In terms of the attractiveness of the 
industries in which they operate. In order to facilitate the inter-
business comparison, various constructs have been developed. For 
example, Figure 2.3 below shows General Electrics "business screen". 
Figure 2.3 General Electric Business Screen 
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On the matrix the various divisional businesses are located along 
two dimensions, industry attractiveness and competitive position. On 
the screen the circles are proportional to the size of the industries 
in which the various businesses compete. The. pie slices wi thin the 
circles reflect each business's market share. Consequently their areas 
are proportional to the sizes of the business they represent. Present 
and future matrices can be developed to evaluate various portfolio 
OPtions, and in certain instances they can reveal Possible 
inconsistencies within business strategies. For example, in the case 
of Divison A, why is the market share so low given the strong 
competitive rating? Divisions that are located to the bottom right of 
the matrix are candidates for disposal unless business strategies can 
be developed to improve their levels of performance. A corporate 
strategy is simply a statement about the future portfolio balance to be 
established. Argenti (1980) provides the following as an example of a 
corporate strategy. 
"We believe that the group as a whole is vulnerable to 
too many risks. We feel it is essential to reduce our 
exposure to political changes in Asia. Therefore 
division E will be closed down and divsions A, B & D 
will be expanded. We shall search for a sister company 
for division C" (p. 180). 
As with the business strategy statement, detailed evaluations 
support these decisons, and these evaluations form the basis upon which 
action plans and policy guidelines for divisions are constructed. 
Argenti suggests that if corporate strategy is to be effective, the 
strategy has to be presented at divisonal level in a way that can guide 
action. He recommends that targets should be established that state 
the volume of capital to be utilized, and the eXpected return on 
. 
capital employed. The target should be accompanied by statements which 
indicate the direction of development to be pursued by the division 
e.g. move 'up market', achieve leadership in technology, etc. These 
directions should not be too specific so as 
freedom to develop their own strategies, 
]5 
to allow divisions the 
especially since the 
responsibility for profit generation is to be located at this level. 
The formalization of planning procedures along the lines described 
above has been greatly facilitated by developments in communications 
and information technology which allow top levels of management to co-
ordinate activities not only across divisional boundaries but also 
national and international boundaries. Such systems of planning and 
their associated systems of control provide flows of information which 
allow for individual discretion in decision making whilst providing an 
overall framework which is consistent with objectives of the 'dominant 
coali tion' • 
Certain organizational theorists have questioned whether planning 
systems of the kind described above do in fact fulfil the functions 
described. An examination of these criticisms is necessary, because if 
they are well founded, trade unions would not need to concern 
themselves with the planning practices of management. 
Criticisms of Rational Models of Strategic Planning 
Strategic planning models of the kind presented above form the 
heart of corporate strategy at the present time and conform to what 
Mintzberg (1978) has described as the "planning mode" of strategy, a 
mOdel of action which he describes as " ••• highly ordered, and neatly 
integrated ••• with strategies explicated on schedule by a purposeful 
organization" (p. 934). 
Models of rational decision-making of the kind described above are 
open to the criticism that they are idealized models which do not take 
sufficient account of the uncertainty associated with modern business 
affairs. Criticisms at a general level are often acknowledged within 
the corporate strategy literature, most modern advocates being aware of 
Simon's (1957) distinction between "optimizing" and "satisficing" as 
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the objective of planning (Hussey, 1982) and, moreover, there is wide 
recognition of the dangers of adhering to a plan which has been 
invalidated by changes within and or outside the organizations. 
Advocates of strategic planning maintain that without a framework of 
the kind described· above, it is improbable that any kind of effective 
planning, (intuitive or formal; satisficing or optimizing) could be 
undertaken in the complex organizations which are the concern of this 
study. 
More specific criticism have been dirE;!cted at strategic planning 
models. Two main areas can be identified. 
The first critique comes from the writings of Karl Weick (1969; 
1979) and those who have developed the 'enactment' view of 
organization. Ever since Child (1972) drew attention to the important 
role of strategic choice in influencing the nature of organization -
environment relations, it has increasingly been recognized that 
organizations influence as well as respond to their environments. The 
enactment view suggests that the idea of an organization 'adapting' to 
its environment is over-simplified. In reality managers within 
organizations are responsible for the enactment of their environment. 
Management choose the domains in which they are to operate, and tend to 
see those domains through socially-constructed concepts, which are 
embedded in the language which characterizes 'market segmentation' or 
the nature of a particular 'industry' and traditional characterization 
of 'threats' and 'opportunities', and they can be so powerful that they 
can hinder adaptation to a given environment. The enactment argument 
is that organizations make their own environment rather than simply 
adapt to them (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Smircich and Powers 1985 
. , 
forthcoming; Weick, 1979). 
The implications of this enactment view for corporate strategy are 
important because they show how organizations may have a lot more power 
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in dealing with the demands of the environment than is commonly 
realized. However, in the view of some theorists, such as Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) and Aldrich (1979) the enactment theorists have over-
stated the freedom available to organisations to enact their 
environment through the process of strategic choice, because of their 
failure to recognise structural factors, such as sunk capital costs, 
legal and other barriers of entry to new domains, unavailability of 
relevant information, all of which inhibit managers' ability to choose 
the domain in which the organization shall operate. Moreover, as the 
Lucas Electrical case study will show, the financial context in which 
divisional managers operate is such that policy choices are, in their 
view, dictated by financial constraints beyond their control. Despite 
these arguments, the enactment view still stands as an important one, 
because, as Miles and Snow (1978) show, managers should be more aware 
of the way they view their environments. They identify four principal 
perspectives to characterise how managers perceive organization-
environment relationships: 'prospector', 'analyser', 'defender' and 
're-actor'. The appropriateness of each conception depends upon the 
nature of the environment, when evaluated in terms of uncertainty. 
They argue that perceptions of the environment developed by 
prospectors, analysers and defenders can prove viable in 
uncertain/turbulent environments, the effectiveness of the chosen 
approach depending upon a variety of factors. However, the re-actor in 
such an environment (the normal policy stance of trade unions) is 
unlikely to succeed, and in consequence the alternative perspectives 
are recommended and management encouraged to critically appraise the 
perspectives that are current within their own organizations. 
The second critique within the literature is inspired by the 
work of Bateson (1972; 1979) and has recently been developed into a 
cybernetic critique of strategy, e.g. as developed by Morgan (1983) and 
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Gadalla and Cooper (1978). This cri tique argues that organizations 
interested in surviving in turbulent environments can best do so by 
attempting to avoid negative states rather than to search for positive 
states, such as those commonly expressed in the form of specific 
targets and goals, which they then attempt to achieve (the traditional 
corporate planning view). The thrust of this perspective is that 
organizations should scan their environments to spot potential 
'noxiants' that may eliminate or damage them in significant ways, as 
illustrated in the famous fruit and vegetable canning firm confronted 
by new frozen food technology in Emery and Trists (1965) study - 'The 
Causal Texture of Organizational Environments'. The cybernetic approach 
attempts to develop an approach to corporate strategy adequate for 
dealing with ,turbulent environments and social conditions. ~~ile 
providing useful insights, in a way which could do much to refine the 
practice of corporate strategy, this particular theory adopts a 
normative rather than a descriptive stance, specifying a logical 
argument about the conditions which are conducive to a firm's survival, 
rather then providing empirical evidence as to its success in practice. 
Both critiques are normative and reflect the goal of theorists in 
this area to improve the strategic planning process by providing 
alternative perspectives on the practice of strategic planning (see 
Taylor, 1982). Mintzberg (1978) has argued that theory cannot be dis-
associated from practice, and warns of the dangers which can arise from 
developing elegant planning models that become dysfunctional for 
practice. He believes that strategy formulation cannot be separated 
from strategy implementation and therefore adVocates a case-study 
approach to research in this area. His o~ analYSis of two case 
studies leads to the recognition of three kinds of strategy: 
1) Intended strategies that get realized i.e. deliberate strategy, 
the case outlined above. 
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2) Intended strategies that do not get realized, perhaps because 
of unrealistic expectations, misjudgements about the 
environment, or changes in either during implementation i.e. 
unrealized strategies. 
3) Realized strategies tha.t were never intended, perhaps because 
no strategy was intended at the outset or perhaps because as 
in (2) those that were, got displaced along the way i.e. 
emergent strategies. 
Figure 2.4. Different Types of Strategies 
ltd d ~ Realized n en e "'>~ __________________________ ~~ 
Strategies V Strategies 
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Source: Mintzberg (1978) 
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Mintzberg's analysis, which emphasises the fact that the 
realization of a deliberate strategy in a complex and changing 
environment is an unlikely outcome, may seem to discredit the rational 
planning process presented above. This viewpoint is strengthened by 
other research (Eliasson, 1976; Sarrazin, 1977) which indicates that 
corporate plans were rarely implemented and moreover that corporate 
planners were often excluded from strategic decision making. Such 
findings can lead to the view tha "planning is a myth" and therefore of 
little importance to an organization. But this is a misconception of 
the purpose of planning in uncertainty, which can only be to decide 
what to do next (Ackoff, 1970; Schumacher, .1973). The next section 
will show that planning within the modern organization serves a number 
of functions, and that the production of ~ formal plan is only part of 
a wider process of organizational development and control. 
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The Functions of Planning 
The position adopted here is that despite the critiques which have 
been levelled at the strategic planning process in both theory and 
practice, the activities of strategic planning have brought substantial 
gains to modern firms. Although the traditional theory provides an 
idealistic or normative view of strategic planning in practice, and is 
limited from this point of view, this weakness becomes less important 
if it is recognised that strategic planning is not simply of importance 
for planning resources, but for other reasons as well. Specifically, 
strategic planning is important as much for its latent, as for its 
manifest functions (Merton, 1948). 
Strategic planning can be viewed first as a learning process which 
provides strategic decision makers with a framework for formulating and 
assessing alternative courses of action in a way that is consistent 
with the interests which they regard as important. Secondly, strategic 
planning provides a means for controlling the decisions of others, who 
work within the context established by the strategic decision-makers. 
Planning As A Learning Process: 
Mintzberg's (1973) research into management practice shows that 
management tasks as specified by classical organizational theorists 
e.g. Fayol's to 'organize - plan - command - co-ordinate - and control' 
(Fayol, 1949), were not distinguishable activities in diary 
investigations as to how managers spent their time. His research 
supports the view that management is a process of making and taking 
decisions, which involves the gathering and processing of information. 
The development of multi-divisional enterprises has led to more 
complex patterns of organization-environment, interactions which has 
required the formalization of strategy making procedures. In short, 
intuitive entrepreneurial initiatives have been replaced by formal 
planning procedures. These procedures emphasise the importance of 
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acquiring information with respect to both· the organization and its 
environment, and establishes a division of labour in decision making at 
corporate and divisional levels. Here one may recall Galbraith's and 
Na~hanason's view, that a principal advantage of the multi-divisional 
company was the transference of longer term decisions to a corporate 
staff who were responsible for planning the evolution of the 
corpora tion as a whole. In discharging this function, the strategic 
planning practices, as described above, are an essential feature of the 
process by which decision makers develop models for understanding the 
demands placed upon the organization. Such models can be seen to 
fulfil what Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) see to be the first requirement 
of an effective organization: 
to have an adequate model of the reality within 
which you operate. Without an adequate model of the 
world, effective action is certainly unlikely" (p. 60). 
They go on to state 
"Whether one is going to respond to the environment, or 
change it, effective action is more likely if the 
context is accurately perceived. Both the responsive 
and discretionary roles of management, then emphasise, 
the importance of the information processing task, and 
the criticality of the accuracy of the manager's 
perception: his or her model of reality" (p. 267). 
The strategic planning practices of management are vitally 
important for developing these kinds of understanding and the fact that 
the models developed do not embrace the full complexity of the decision 
environment is not a fundamental criticism. March and Simon (1958) 
have observed that given the limits of human problem solving capacity, 
that simplified models are required, which capture the main features of 
the problem without capturing all its complexity. They state: 
• 
"The growing complexity of ••• (a) problem can only be 
matched against the finite powers of the individual if 
the problem is dealt with in grosser and more 
aggregaUve form" (po 150). 
PiP" 
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The strategic decision maker has a complex task to undertake in 
identifying and evaluating the courses of action available to the 
organization, and in assessing the probabilities of possible outcomes. 
It seems inconceivable that it is possible to undertake such de.cision 
making without engaging in the strategic planning practices of the kind 
described above, since without this activity, the decision maker has no 
way of reducing the complexity with which he is faced. However, given 
the acknowledged uncertainty regarding both the organization and its 
environment, one would be mistaken to believe that strategic planning 
can provide plans or blue-prints for action. The purpose is better 
conceived as a learning process that allows the strategic decision 
maker to react purposefully to situations as they unfold. This view 
has been recognised by Hussey (1983) in his description of strategy 
making: 
"The wrong way to see a corporate plan is as a form of 
blue-print to be followed to the letter. For many 
years, thinking corporate planners have argued that a 
main purpose of planning is to chart a potential map of 
the future, highlighting decision paths. Again the 
emphasis is on built-in flexibility rather than a 
prescriptive course of action" (p. 4). 
This view of the strategy making process and the purpose of making 
plans begins to recognise the value of planning as an adaptive or 
innovative process in which the value of preparing the plan is more 
important than the production of a plan (Ackoff, 1970). Mumford and 
Pettigrew (1975) have also described this viewpoint as follows: 
"Innovative planning recognises that the process of 
producing a plan is rather more important than the plans 
themselves. The outcome is subsumed by the process. It 
is participation in the process, not the consumption of 
the product, which is critical, not only because the 
nature of the process of production, will critically 
affect the degree of commi tment to the plan, but also 
because the process is an important mechanism for 
learning to learn, and without this no system under 
change can hope to develop the adaptive capacity to cope 
with future organizational uncertainty" (pp. 223-4). 
43 
This interpretation of the importance and purpose of planning has 
been supported by Rhenman (1973) in his investigations into strategic 
planning practices in Scandanavia: 
"... the real planning process can best be described as 
a learning process in .which the goals and methods of 
achieving them are changing all the time, and where the 
goals depend very much on successive insights into the 
alternatives available" (p. 25). 
Thus, strategic planning practices provide strategic decision 
makers, with a framework for identifying the interests Which they can 
pursue, and allow for the evaluation of possible alternative courses of 
action. 
Note that strategic decision makers are not omniscient in all 
their decisions, because mistakes occur. However, by setting such 
decisions in a strategic planning framework the decision maker is able 
to learn form his mistakes. McMillian (1973) in reviewing the 
contemporary importance of the multi-national enterprise identifies 
this ability to learn as a major strength of management planning 
practices in multi-nationals: 
" ••• When innovation and change is institutionalized, as 
in the multinational firm, a mistake is a lesson learnt, 
and such lessons can provide future dividends beyond the 
cost of tuition. It is the ability to learn, to adapt, 
which makes the multi-national firm such a successful 
institution ••• " (p. 42, emphasis added). 
Planning As A Basis For Control: 
The multi-divisional enterprise has a multiplicity of decision 
centres, and for the dominant coalition there is a need to relate these 
individual decisions to ensure that they are mutually consistent, or at 
the very least, to ensure that they are not contradictory (at least not 
in outcomes). The strategic planning practices of management are 
important for establishing coherence between the various levels of 
decision within the multi-divisional enterprise in three principal 
ways: 
• 
Firstly, the formalization of planning procedures provides the 
dominant coalition with a review of the activities at divisional level 
before their policies have a history which might make them difficult to 
reverse. Bower (1970), for example, in his investigation of how 
capital investment decisions were controlled in divisional companies 
argues that corporate planning procedures are a more effective form of 
control than the formal capital budgetting systems developed for this 
purpose. He states : 
conventional capital budget systems provide top 
management with little effective control of capital 
expenditure, largely because they attempt to impose an 
evaluation after division managers have become committed 
to the project. the use of corporate planning 
procedures can provide better control over capital 
expenditure because the process enables management at 
corporate headquarters to influence the divisional 
strategy, and to suggest that options might be 
considered before an investment decision is adopted as 
the "one best way" (p. 54). 
Success in this matter would do much to ensure that subsequent 
decisions taken at divisional level are consistent with corporate 
strategies. For as Simon (1969) argues, the control of strategic 
decisions provides the context for controling subsequent decisions. 
Secondly, strategic planning practices provide a system by which 
standards of performance can be set for each division. Eliasson 
(1976), in his investigation of corporate planning practices in 
America, has argued that control is a principal objective of planning. 
He states that: 
"The ultimate purpose of planning is to identify and 
pinpoint responsibilities in precise terms and to 
exercise remote control and impose pressure without 
unduly inhibiting initiative and reducing flexibility" 
(p. 34). 
As this statement makes evident, the intention is not to deprive 
divisions of their decision making role, rather the objective is to 
allow the maximum initiative at divisonal level, whilst retaining 
flexibility at corporate level, so as to promote a loosely-coupled 
organization (Weick, 1979), which is responsive to changing 
circumstances, yet provides for accountability to higher decision 
makers. 
Thirdly, strategic planning practices are important in determining 
the "premises· (March and Simon, 1958) on which deCisions are taken, 
and are therefore part of a system of unobtrusive control (Blau and 
Schoenherr, 1973) that binds members to an organisation. As was 
indicated in the discussion of strategic planning objectives and 
evaluation practices, the primary criteria for judging rational action 
was profit generation which provides participants with "vocabularies of 
motive" (Mills, 1967) that support the objectives of the strategic 
deciSion makers, the dominant coalition. 
In these three ways, strategic planning is important in 
establishing a basis for the continuous control of deciSions within the 
multi-divisional enterprise. It is not suggested that such control is 
ever complete, for as research has shown, deciSions are never entirely 
rational and are often subject to political processes (Pettigrew, 
1973), and moreover managers inevitably exercise some discretion. Thus, 
strategic plans are unlikely ever to produce blue-prints for fiction. 
Nonetheless, they remain important to the strategic decision-maker for 
the control that is exercisable through the production of plans, and 
this explains why large corporations continue to produce strategic 
plans, even though they are rarely, if ever, 'implemented'. SarraZin 
(1977) explains the continued support given to planning departments in 
large French companies, on their importance for the dominant coalition: 
"The men who run large corporations have every 
reason to keep the plan in effect, cost what it will 
, 
because to them it represents a privileged means toward 
integration and coherence among strategic deCiSions 
taken at all levels of the organisation" (p. 51). 
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Conclusions: 
Strategic planning is the process whereby significant 
organizational decisions are made and interrelated. It is the most 
important management function. Within large scale multi-divisional 
enterprises this process, which was formerly a matter of intuitive 
entrepreneurial decision, is now the subject of formalized planning 
procedures. These processes and associated strategy models help 
promote 'corporate' decision making based on profit generation. 
Strategic planning is part of a continuous process within the 
organization whereby the 'dominant coalition' attempt to develop an 
evolving plan which is used to direct organizational development over a 
long time period. Strategic planning, although subject to certain 
criticisms, does nonetheless have a significance for management 
practice, especially in terms of the latent functions that underlie the 
planning process. It promotes learning and control within the multi-
divisional enterprise and has played an important part in promoting the 
growth of multi-divisional enterprises over the last two decades. It 
involves a pro-active stance to change whereby alternatives are 
evaluated against objectives as a first step in realizing a preferred 
alternative. It allows time for al ternati ves to be developed, and 
allows organizations to be evolved by a progressive reconciliation of 
interests. It provides information to control and further develop 
(learn) the objectives sought by the planner. 
The next chapter will show how profit orientated planning is 
perpetuated in the business 
planning does not directly 
enterprise, despite the fact that such 
seek to advance the interests of the 
majority of its members, Ie the employees. 
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Chapter 3. Management Planning and Strategies of Control 
Many managers and academic theorists (eg., Argent!, 1980) argue 
that strategic planning based on prof! t generating principles is a 
precondition of being able to satisfy the various claims of 
'stakeholders' in the organization. Iri this chapter, a review of the 
relationship between shareholders and managers will establish that 
management does not act as a neutral arbiter of interests as suggested 
by those who claim that a 'divorce between ownership and control' 
allows for 'socially responsible management' (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Thereafter, an examination of planning based on profit generating 
principles will show that these practices often if not invariably 
conflict with the interests of employees. In conclusion, it will be 
argued that employees and trade unions, to advance their interests, 
must challenge the process of management strategic planning, since this 
sets the context for all other organizational activities. 
Ownership and Control 
The control of the early capitalist firm was the sole 
responsibility of the owner-manager, and in these circumstances the 
objectives of business were unambiguously recognised as profit 
generation and capital accumulation. However, the growth of the multi-
divisional enterprise has resulted in two potentially significant 
developments with respect to the control of such organizations. 
Firstly, as business enterprises have grown and become organizationally 
and technologically more complex there has been an increasing reliance 
on specialist managers, whose objectives' need not necessarily be 
consistent wi th those of the owners. Secondly J the growth has also 
involved an increase in the issue of share capital and the resulting 
relative fragmentation of ()wnership might make it more difficult for 
shareholders to exercise control over management actions. 
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The separation of ownership and administration could conceivably 
allow managers to pursue objectives contrary to those associated with 
the traditional capitalist enterprise. This possibility has been 
Widely debated, since Berle and Means (1932) argued that the modern 
corporation represented. a qualitative break with older forms of 
individual enterprise, and that such enterprises would adopt radically 
different policies. According to Berle and Means: 
"It is conceivable, indeed it seems almost inevitable 
if the corporate system is to survive - that the 
'control' of the great corporations should develop 
into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety 
of claims by various groups in the community and 
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on 
the basis of public policy rather than private 
cupidity" (po 356). 
Berle' and Means foresaw a situation whereby a specialist management 
enjoying condi tions in which they did not have to maximise returns to 
shareholders would be able to balance various economic and social 
objectives to act in a socially responsible way. The acceptance of 
this role for managers led Kaysen (1957) to characterize the modern 
business enterprise as the 'soulful corporation' (p. 314) controlled by 
Socially-minded managers. 
The above hypothesised developments are used by management in 
modern business enterprises to legitimize their authority (Maisonrouge, 
1977), however, an examination of 'the divorce of ownership from 
control' thesis reveals three major misconceptions within the analysis. 
Firstly, it gives undue significance to the fragmentation of 
shareholder interests. Whilst shareholder ownership has become more 
widespread this has not diluted ownership control. Large shareholders 
owning as little as 5% of shares (Francis, 1980) can maintain control. 
, 
the large mass of small shareholders being' dis-enfranchised by the 
combination. Nyman and Silberston (1978) estimate that more than a 
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quarter of the largest 250 British firms are potentially controlled by 
private shareholder interests. The power of the large shareholder is 
re-inforced by a system of interlocking directorships (Scott, 1979) 
which extends their influence to other organizations particularly 
financial ones, upon which the managers of a business enterprise may 
rely. The emergence of corporate ownership of shares via insurance 
companies, pension funds, investment and unit trusts, reverses any 
previous trend towards fragmentation because these organizations 
concentrate control on behalf of investors, their ~ shareholders who 
exercise ownership rights over company affairs (Bryer et aI, 1984a). 
It is clear that concentration of ownership remains the norm, despite 
widespread beliefs to the contrary. 
Secondly,. it failed to recognise the major correspondence of 
interests and attitudes between managers and shareholders, so that a 
'neutral technocracry' has not evolved. The evidence suggests that top 
industrial decision-makers' values in industry do not differ greatly 
from those of the traditional owner-manager. Nichols' (1969) survey of 
managerial attitudes suggested that profit motive is central and has 
not been replaced by notions such as social responsiblity. According 
to Crompton and Gubbay (1977) top managers had similar social 
backgrounds to shareholders, and in consequence had shared values. 
Moreover, share ownership by managers provides a direct interest in 
profit generation, since such ownership can be significant in personal 
terms even though this ownership is not large in comparison with major 
shareholders. Nichols (1969) found that among 89 large companies the 
nominal value of the average directoral shareholding in 1951 was 
£20,719, although this figure is influenced by the very large 
shareholdings of a few investors. 
Thirdly, the theorists of the 'managerial revolution' failed to 
appreciate that the issue of managerial behaviour is not in any case 
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reducible to the personal preferences of managers. The policies and 
actions of top management are not unconstrained but are subject to 
certain external disciplines which operate regardless of their 
attitudes and motivation. Of particular importance here is the market 
in corporate control (Marri's 1964). This maintains shareholder 
influence over the firm in an indirect manner, since low profit 
performance and corresponding low stock market valuation invites a 
take-over bid from more profit conscious managements and makes the 
raising of capital difficult. According to Hill (1981): 
"If the market for corporate control is working 
effectively, the top management is compelled to take 
account of shareholder interests in order to protect 
themselves" (po 75). 
The above reasons largely explain why the 'soulful corporation' has 
not emerged despite more widespread share ownership. Shenfield's 
(1971) research of 25 large British companies indicates that profit 
based decision making is the norm. She states: 
"None of these companies had any doubt that the 
primary objective was to be efficient and profitable 
and that being socially responsible would serve no 
useful purpose if it hindered these overall company 
goals" (p. 164 ). 
Arguably, the modern organization's ability to pursue the prof! t 
objective has been enhanced by the employment of specialist managers. 
According to Baran and Sweezy (1966) the modern business corporation 
employing sophisticated management techniques is in a far better 
position to seek out profit opportunities than the classical 
entrepreneur of early capitalism. Storey (1983ij states: 
"Evidence is lacking that managers have been able or 
willing to adopt markedly different pbjectives from 
entrepreneurial predecessors. The pursuit of profi t 
remains an undiminished guiding force. It is the 
underlying principle defining 'rational' action. Even 
the supposed alternative goals of growth and higher 
market share can be viewed as interlinking ones which 
allow a sounder base for profitability. Moreover, it 
can be argued that the more sophisticated specialists, 
professional managers and analysts merely provide more 
refined analytical techniques for an attuned 
responsiveness to market forces" (pp. 21-22). 
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The above suggests, that despite many observable changes in modern 
business enterprises, profit generation has remained a primary concern 
for organizational controllers. The next section will conSider how 
planning on this basis conflicts with employee interests. 
Management Planning and Employee Interests 
A system of profit generating views payments to labour as a cost, 
and in consequence a major objective of management planning is to 
identify and implement policies which reduce them. Massey and Meegan 
(1982) in their analysis of job loss in the UK between 1968-73 identify 
three management strategies which aim to increase the return to capital 
by increasing labour productivity through changes in production 
arrangements - intensification, technical change and rationalization 
via di~vestment. Management's quest to increase labour productivity by 
such policies conflict with employee interests in two major areas: job 
security and wage-effort bargain. 
Job Security 
The security of an employee's job is likely to be a major priority, 
since without a job all other aspects of the employment contract are 
irrelevant. This is not only important for the individual who requires 
security of employment to plan his personal life without the anxieties 
associated with redundancy and periods of unemployment (Martin and 
Fryer 1973), but is also important for trade unions as organizations of 
employees. Having a job is a pre-requisite- for fighting to keep it. 
Moreover, a trade union's a bili ty to oppose the redundancy plans of 
management can be critically weakened when threats of further 
redundancy can be used by management to divide employees between those 
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who are to retain their jobs and those who are to lose their jobs. 
These divisions inhibit any co-ordinated opposition to redundancy plans 
as will be illustrated in the Lucas Electrical case study. 
Management often. present redundancies as the inevitable outcome of 
tehnological change, whereby· capital is substituted for labour, a 
process which is seen to benefit society as a whole. This view of 
capital-labour substitution is challenged by the Council for Science 
and Society (1981) in its evaluation of new technology. The Council's 
report argues that productivity can be analysed on three levels. 
Firstly, capital investments that lead to a reduction in effort needed 
to accomplish essential work for survival and convenience is a benefit 
to society as a whole since labour time is freed for non-work 
activities or to increase output with fixed resources. Secondly, the 
idea of the productivity of a company or a commercial enterprise, which 
reduces costs by demanding greater efforts of employees is not 
necessarily beneficial, especially if the capital labour substitution 
reduces labour costs by de-skilling and the displacement of employees. 
The latter displacement is central to an evaluation of the third level 
of productivity at national level, where increases in welfare can only 
be registered where such individuals are redeployed. Given this wider 
perspective, the Council questions the validity of management plans 
which promote the second kind of productivity, whilst ignoring other 
aspects. The Report states: 
"Because of the differences between the 
interpretations of productivity, the efforts of an 
enterprise can fail to bring benefits to society, and 
may instead being disadvantages. They can result in 
one part of the population working long hours under 
high pressure at uninteresting jobs r while another 
part is unemployed. An improved competitive situation 
of the enterprise may also fail to be reflected in an 
equivalent improvement in national competitiveness. 
If it is achieved by an increase in unemployment, it 
throws a burden on the nation which largely cancels 
the benefit" (p. 95). 
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Gold (1979) has argued that management are often naive about the 
benefits of substituting capital for labour and argues that the 
conventional wisdom implied by such practices needs to be questioned. 
In their study of British Steel Corporation's (BSC) strategic plans, 
Bryer et al (1981) argue that this was a factor that led BSC management 
to try to impose a Japanese-style industry in Britain where it was 
inappropriate. In a subsequent study, Bryer et al (1984a) show that 
the consequences of these mistakes were compounded (in terms of 
employment effects) when shareholders in UK manufacturing industries 
adopted divestment policies which led to a 14% fall in UK manufacturing 
output between 1979-81. 
Bryer et al (1984a) argue that divestment strategies are consistent 
with profit generation as a measure of shareholder wealth, but are 
contrary to national interests when measured in output maximization for 
the economy. They argue that from a national viewpoint, profit 
measures are at best partial, and that in consequence it is not 
necessarily in the national interest that either average labour 
productivity or profitability be inc~eased. The promotion of national 
interest is seen to require the maximization of consumption 
Possibilities, which are best represented in financial terms by seeking 
to increase net value added per employee (gross value added minus 
investment, as per Morley, 1978). Their analysis shows that if 
investment decisions had been based upon this criterion, rather than 
profitability, then the contraction of output and associated 
redundancies (estimated at an initial 1.2 million) could have been 
avoided, thereby benefiting not only employees, but the 'nation as a 
whole'. They argue that shareholder investment strategy throughout the 
1970's had been to leave UK manufacturing on'a 'care and maintenance' 
basis, whilst directing new, investments overseas. From the point of 
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"iew of the UK as a whole ( and especially employees) this strategy was 
unattracti'\7e for two principal reasons. Firstly, the long-term returns 
of income from overseas in'\7estment do not compensate for the direct 
loss of wealth to the UK from not in'\7esting here: in particular, the 
wage payments go to O'\7erseas workers rather than to Bri tish workers 
(Dunning, 1970). Secondly, as the UK's manufacturing industry becomes 
old and technologically backward, it becomes increaSingly vulnerable to 
major economic changes, especially competition from overseas. 
The contradictions in the above strategies of investors and 
managers are highlighted for employees when increaSing levels of 
unemployment are associated with increaSing company profits as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. Gi'\7en an employee's wish for security 
of employment, a planning system which results in this level of labour 
displacement cannot be viewed favourably. In pursuing profit 
Objectives, management gi'\7e priority to shareholder interests O'\7er 
those of employees. 
Wage-effort bargain: 
The work contract between an employer and an employee is of an 
indeterminate nature and the negotiation and control of the wage-effort 
bargain is a continuing concern of both employers and managers. 
Employee interests are not only of a monetary kind, but also involve 
issues of job and social satisfaction. Employee interests in the 
latter respects are principally influenced by the process of 
technological change, a process which is controlled by management. 
Planning based on profit generation not only accepts the creation of 
unemployment through the replacement of labour by capital, but also in 
seeking least cost producti'\7e methods, management promote technology 
which cheapens labour, and increases managem~nt's control of the 
production process (Braverman, 1974; Elliott and Elliott, 1976). 
j 
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Figure 3.1. Movements in UK Trading Profits and Levels of Unemployment 
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Braverman (op cit) argues that the capitalist organisation of 
production is geared not to maximize output but to extract more labour 
from workers at the lowest possible wages per unit of effort. The 
difference between wages and productivity, or 'surplus value', not the 
maximization of output is the key variable. This requires a technology 
which cheapens labour as well as increasing labour productivity. 
Braverman and others (Marglin, 1976; Shaiken, 1982) argue that 
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management develop work organizations, including the use of machines, 
which de-skill the employee, so that skilled employees can be replaced 
by cheaper unskilled employees. Braverman comments on the division of 
labour under capitalism: 
"In so far as the labour process may be dissociated it 
may be separated into elements some of which are simpler 
than others, and each of which is simpler than the whole. 
Transferred into market terms, this means that the labour 
power capable of performing the process may be purchased 
more cheaply as dissociated elements than as a capacity 
integrated in a single worker ••• The capitalist mode of 
production systematically destroys all-round skills where 
they exist, and brings into being skills and occupations 
corresponding to this need. Technical capabilities are 
henceforth distributed on a 'need to know' basis. The 
generalized distribution of knowledge of the productive 
process among all its participants becomes from this 
point on not merely 'unnecessary' but a positive barrier 
to the functioning of the capitalist system" (p. 51). 
Braverman claims that managers, in seeking profit, must control 
labour and have achieved this by developing production technologies 
based on 'Scientific Management' principles (Taylor, 1947). He 
identifies three principles as being of particular importance. The 
first is that the work or labour process should be divorced from the 
skill and autonomy of the individual worker. Secondly, that manual and 
mental labour should be dissociated, separating conception from 
execution and removing 'brain work' from the shop floor. Thirdly, that 
managers should have a monopoly of knowledge to control every step of 
the labour process and its manner of execution. He argues that work, n 
consequence, has been degraded by a continuous process of deskilling, 
which removes all elements of knowledge, responsibility and discretion, 
leaving the worker to undertake simple repetitive tasks under 
management direction. The deskilling process is typified by the 
assembly line where work is preplanned and ordered by management, the 
work rate being determined by the 'speed of the line'. He states: 
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machinery offers to management the opportunity 
to do by wholly mechanical means that which it had 
previously attempted to do by organizational and 
disciplinary means" (p. 195). 
Despite criticisms which can be made of Braverman's analysis, such 
as its over concentration on scientific management and its failure to 
consider the effect of worker resistance (Friedman, 1977; Edwards, 
1979), the work degradation process highlighted by Braverman is 
nonetheless important. Hill (1981), for example, concludes that: 
"Managers introduce new production techniques in order to 
maintain or increase profitability and their assessments 
of new methods may contain no conscious evaluation of the 
control potentiaL What are important are the 
internalized design values and unconscious assumptions 
about what constitutes 'progress', which managers and 
engineers bring to bear when they apply scientific and 
technical knowledge to industry. These embody a central 
feature of conventional capital production, that control 
is one condition of profitability" (p. 122). 
He shows that engineers and managers share a design philosophy of 
producing machines which eliminates as far as possible the 'human 
factor' in order to achieve the regularity and predictability that 
managers regard as necessary for profitable operation (see also, 
Cherns, 1973). 
Obviously, for employees, technological developments on this basis 
cannot simply be accepted as necessary cost reductions, as they 1mpOse 
costs on them. Such costs are generally intangible, eg the loss of 
skill, fatigue and illness resulting from increasing speeds of work and 
shift working etc, (Wood, 1982; Wedderburn, 1979). These changes are 
incorporated into the production technology of capitalist 
organizations, which seek to increase labour productivity at the 
expense of other values. Cooley (1981), at the time an active trade 
unionist, expressed the contradictions in 
employees: 
"Productivity becomes more important than 
Discipline outweighs freedom. The product 
more important than the producer ..... (p. 47). 
this process 
fraternity. 
is in fact 
for 
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Cooley argues that the concern with productivty is essentially 
linked to profit based decision-making. He states: 
"The division of labour and fragmentation of skills is of 
course absolutely rational if 
units of production, and are 
maximization of' the profit 
Indeed, from that premise" it 
also scientific" (p. 35). 
you regard people as mere 
concerned solely with the 
you extract from them. 
is not merely rational but 
In planning technological development, and the consequent wage-
effort bargain, trade unions could not accept labour cost minimization 
as the principal criterion of rationality. Although it is in their 
interests to take account of costs, their orientation would be to 
reduce costs by aligning advancement in employees skills wi th the 
development of an appropriate technology. Gossard (1975) illustrates 
this possibility in the development of computer-aided machine tools. 
Under a profit-orientated management, technological developments in 
this area have led to a deskilling of employees, whereby the operator 
has simply to load and unload the machine and monitor movements of the 
tool, these movements having been pre-programmed by management via the 
Computer. Rosenbrock and others at the Machine Tool Division of the 
Universi ty of Manchester's Insti tute of Science and Technology have 
Sought to design a similar system, which allows the operator to 
undertake the computer programming, thereby promoting the 'computer-
aided craftsman'. It is claimed that when developed this system will 
be economically superior to the existing alternatives. 
Rosenbrock and others (eg., Boon et aI, 1981) are seeking to 
provide tangible evidence to show that technology need not deskill 
employees whilst improving labour productivity. The Council for 
Science and Society (1981) argue that a technology which is based on 
the values of 'scientific management' can limit' technological advance 
by reduCing the number of employees actively engaged in seeking 
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improvements to existing practice. They provide a numerical example 
(p. 79) to show' that short-term optimizing criteria reflecting profit 
based decision-making can over subsequent time periods limit the 
innovative process, and thereby retard longer term growth in 
productivity. Moreover, the short term optimizing decisions of a 
profit based system have other costs, most noteably those associated 
with industrial conflicts arising from the deskilling process (Brown, 
1981). Such costs are rarely taken into account in evaluations of 
technology, and Winkler (1974) in his study of director attitudes found 
that the 'logic' of industrial society in the UK has led to: 
" ••• the triumph in the board room of accountancy over 
economics and social psychology, not to mention more 
humanistic considerations ••• For all the directors 
labour was simply a cost to be minimized" (P. 198). 
The adoption by trade unionists of a value-added planning system 
which views labour costs as a distribution from value added would not 
place the same emphasis on cost minimization as is current with a 
shareholder prof! t seeking system of planning. Gi ven thi s change, 
productivity would remain a major concern; however, employees would be 
able to take account of the costs which deskilling place upon 
themselves. This might· result in a slowing down of the deskilling 
process (or even its reversal), or alternatively employees might demand 
full reward for the intangible costs imposed on themselves from 
deskilling and increased work effort. The willingness of certain trade 
unionists to question the current trend in technological development 
has been expressed in a demand for a planning system based on social 
need rather than profit. For example Shop Steward Combine Committees 
(1981) are critical of proposals to re-align British industry into 
'high technology' industries in which Britain can be 'competitive': 
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"We believe that the kind of technology and work 
organization required to make British-based companies 
competitive in this way will lead to further 
redundancies, even where trade union organization is 
strong, and to increasingly inhuman conditions for those 
who remain at work. These 'high technology' industries 
can be competitive with, as the TUC puts it 'successful 
economies such as Japan and West Germany' only if the 
enormous costs of the new technologies are justified by 
an enormous leap in productivity. That will mean an 
increased tempo of work, a spread of shift working, a 
further fragmentation of skills, and a destruction of 
trade union controls over the work place. This has been 
a trend not only in economies like Japan, and West 
Germany, with which we compete, but also in those British 
corporations which are in a strong competitive position·' 
(p. 9). 
These trade unionists argue that to promote the interests of 
employees, planning must be directed to the achievement of full and 
more rewarding employment which utilizes the industrial skills of 
employees to meet social as well as market-dictated needs, although 
these categories may not be distinct. Planning based upon the 
generation of profit, and a market definition of need is rejected. 
Competitiveness remains an objective but of a more limited kind. It is 
stated: 
.. this requires competitive industries in the minimal 
sense of covering costs and balancing payments 
nationally" (p. 8). 
Management planning based on profit generation principles clearly 
does not give priority to employee interests in the two above areas. 
The next section will review how management control of the business 
enterprise is perpetuated despite these identified conflicts of 
interest. 
Management Control Strategies 
The growth of large scale business enterprises and their associated 
bureaucratic structures, the key dimensions of which, hierarchy, 
specialization and division of labour, impersonality and formalized 
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rules, can all be related to the financial 'logic' which characterizes 
industrial society (Cherns, 1978). In particular, according t~ Cherns 
, 
the theory and practice of bureaucracy was developed, and has evolved 
OVer the last century to such an extent that the principles which 
underlie this organizational form have become dominant within society, 
so that management control is' often unquestioned. Within modern 
organizations, employees perform either high or low discretion roles 
and different strategies of control are employed to facHi tate the 
achievement of organizational objectives. 
High discretion roles involving management and administration (and 
in certain cases skilled craftsmen, eg, Friedman, 1977) are 
characterized by general job description, it being impossible to pre-
specify actions. In such circumstances, employees, either formally or 
informally are encouraged to internalize established standards and 
procedures of work practice. Performance of work is seen to give 
intrinsic as well as extrinsic rewards, so that self control is aligned 
to hierarchical relationships. It should, however, be noted that such 
high discretion roles are to a considerable degree circumscribed by the 
process of delegation. Rules are prescribed so as to enable delegation 
to occur without risk of substantial loss of control to junior 
managers, the delegated decision making being set within established 
Control frameworks reflecting organizational priorities. The decisions 
that are delegated are inevitably the least important ones concerning 
the application of existing procedures, based upon established 
assumptions and limited by various parameters and controls - budgeting, 
procedural and formal authority, for example. The important decisions 
are still retained at the top of the organization. As Blau (1970) puts 
it: 
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managerial decisions in organizations are either 
significant, in which case they are not delegated, or 
delegated, in which case they are not significant" 
(p. 172). 
Low discretion roles generally concerned With the production 
process and supportive administrative activities are often tightly 
defined and limited to highly specific tasks. Direct supervision is 
exercised, extrinsic rewards depending on a minimum level of 
performance. For such employees the work itself is, on the whole, 
likely to be devoid of meaning, creativity, challenge or autonomy. 
Such low discretion roles limit the opportunities for an individual to 
be involved in organizational affairs, and also can limit any desire 
to become involved in such affairs. Schein (1965) has argued that 
many workers are denied the opportunity to develop their individual 
abilities at work: 
"In the cases of those workers who are not actively 
seeking challenge and self actualization at the place of 
work, either this need is lacking or it is not given an 
opportunity to express itself. This last may occur 
because lower-order needs are not yet fulfilled, or the 
organization has 'trained' workers not to expect meaning 
in their work as part of the psychological contract·' 
(p. 59). 
According to Salaman (1979) organizations are 'structures of 
Control' (p. 107). Individuals, having been allocated tasks, are 
trained into the procedures and rules which govern action, and 
'ideally' are provided only with the information that is required to 
undertake the relevant task. In this way, the individual's actions can 
to a considerable degree be controlled so as to ensure that 
organizational objectives are enhanced. As March and Simon (1958) put 
it: 
"One function that organiza Hons perfo~ is to place the 
organizational members in a pyschological environment 
that will adapt their decisions to organizational 
objectives, and will provide them with the information 
needed to make the decisions correctly" (p. 79). 
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According to Mouzelis (197~) there are five mechanisms by which an 
individual's decision environment is structured. He states: 
"The division of labour, standard procedures, 
authority, communications and training are important 
organizational features setting limits to, and shaping 
the decision making environments of the individual. 
They do not necessarily deprive him of all his 
initiative, rather they· determine some of the values 
and factual premises of his environment, and in a way 
which assures that his decisions will be co-ordinated 
with the decisions of others" (p. 127). 
For employees these forms of organizational control can lead to 
alienation, loss of self-esteem etc and moreover can limit the ability 
of employees to challenge management's control of the business 
enterprise. Baumgartner et al (1979), organizational sociologists 
argue that when employees are denied involvement in decision processes, 
this monopoly of decision making power of management is perpetuated 
within the business enterprise and in wider society: 
"The structuring under capitalism of the production 
process has taken planning, management, communication 
and other control functions from workers. These are 
activities relating to higher cognitive levels of 
precision, categorization, language development, 
abstraction and complexity. This limits the 
possibilities of workers to develop such competences. 
The under-development of labour in this and related 
respects assures not only continued subordination to a 
technocratic elite in the workplace - even if the 
workers are given the right to participate in decision 
making activity - but also their subordination in 
political and socio-cultural spheres where the 
possession of such capabilities is of strategic 
importance" (p. 201). 
As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, trade unions as organizations 
of employees have failed to develop their decision making capabilities 
and management strategic decision-making powers have in consequence 
largely been unchallenged. In these circumstances, management can 
attempt to promote the view that decisions on such matters as 
technology, redundancy plans, etc, are based on market forces beyond 
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their control. Using any authority they can derive from their 
expertise and decision responsibility, management attempt to project 
such decisions as being inevitable. Blau and ~choenherr (1973) argue 
that within large-scale organization, decision responsibility can be 
institutionalized in a way which does not allow them to be questioned: 
"... the complex structure of decision making make it 
frequently impossible 'to locate the individuals in 
diverse places whose judgements were the ultimate source 
of a given action; ••• when they can be located, they are 
usually specialized experts whose judgements rest on 
technical grounds of efficiency, which make it almost 
meaningless to hold them responsible for any deleterious 
consequences that may result from their judgements. The 
pressure to make the most rational decisions in terms of 
the interests of the organization requires that the 
recommendations experts make on the basis of technical 
competence govern as much as possible such decisions of 
organizations, as to whether to shut down a plant and lay 
off its workers, in which city to build a new plant ••• 
Decisions like these have far-reaching implications for 
the lives of people, and sometimes they have deleterious 
consequences for society. But if experts have reached 
their recommendations on the basis of technical 
judgements, they cannot be censored for having arrived at 
these conclusions, because there is no animus in them, 
technical criteria govern them, and other experts would 
have reached the same conclusions" (p. 21). 
To the extent that management are able to promote decisions on the 
basis of 'organizational need' and expertise, they can hope to control 
by 'consent'. When management's strategic decisions such as redundancy 
plans are implemented on the above basis. and therefore unopposed by 
trade unions and employees, management may be seen to be exercising 
unobtrusive forms of control which Lukes (1974) has characterized as 
three dimensional power. Clearly, the 'dominant coalitions' control of 
strategic planning is the principal management prerogative and the 
source of organizational control. Control of this process 1n large 
measure guarantees management's control of ,other aspects of the 
employment relationship which are often seen as negotiated outcomes 
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arising from the process of collective bargaining. This is also 
recognised by Storey (1983a): 
"While in practice management may not be as 
rationalistic as textbooks and manuals seem to assume, it 
would be absurd to overlook the general capture by 
capital of the conception functions. Planning and 
corporate strategy are thus vital components in the 
overall control of labour" (p. 85). 
Strategic planning provides an overall context of control; however, 
as will be shown in the next chapter, trade unions have never seriously 
challenged this area of management prerogative and, in consequence, 
their influence on the development of the business organization has 
been limited. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter it has been argued that the strategic planning 
processes, described in Chapter 2, are not implemented by a 'neutral' 
management but are set within a framework that ensures the advancement 
of shareholder interests. Strategic planning based on profit 
generation was seen to conflict with employee interests in the areas of 
job security and wage-effort bargain. Because of this conflict, 
management have sought to develop organizations which preserve 
strategic decision making as a prerogative of senior management. 
Within the business enterprise, the majority of employees are assigned 
low discretion tasks which limit employee ability and inclination to 
challenge the decision making prerogatives of management. In 
conclusion, it was argued that management's control of strategic 
planning is the principal management prerogative and the source of 
organizational control. As the next Chapter will show, trade unions 
have never sought to challenge management strategic planning practices, 
and that in consequence, their role within t}1e business enterprise is 
limited to representation rather than decision making. 
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Chapter 4. Trade Unions and Management Decision Making 
Trade unions, throughout their history, have challenged the 
decision- making powers of management. However, the historical review 
of trade unionism, presented in this Chapter, will show that this 
challenge has never involved issues of a strategic kind. As Chapters 2 
and 3 have shown, management have consciously evolved systems of 
planning and organization which support their strategic decision-making 
capabilities in pursuit of their profit objective. In contrast, the 
organizational development of trade unionism has largely been unplanned 
and at no time has there been a direct correspondence between trade 
union and management organization which would allow the central locus 
of management decision-making to be challenged. The principal function 
of trade unionism has been restricted to a representative role within a 
collective bargaining framework under management control. By failing 
to develop decision-making capabilities outside this context, it could 
be said that trade unions have been unable to provide organizational 
opportunities for members to develop the higher-level cognitive skills 
which are necessary to assess the consequences of management's 
strategic decision-making. An examination of trade union support for 
industrial democracy reform in the 1970's reveals that trade unions 
simply wished to perpetuate their representational function in 
organizations, despite the contradictions for employees inherent in a 
system of planning for profit. 
Historical Perspective. 
Initially, trade unionism was fiercely resisted by owners and 
managers (Hobsbawn, 1964) and early trade unionism was confined to 
skilled workers upon whom management depended. The initiation of trade 
unionism on this sectionalist basis was to provide a model of official 
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unionism, which owners and managers subsequently came to accept. We 
shall see that throughout the development of craft unionism and the 
spread of unionism to other workers via general, industrial and white 
collar unions, trade unions never sought to challenge management's 
strategic decision making powers. 
The first employees to form unions were craftsmen who were able to 
exercise a degree of countervailing power within the employing firm 
through their control of craft technology and labour supply. Craft 
unions were established in the face of employer hostility and in 
consequence the bonds of loyalty to the individual craft union were 
strong. Craftsmen identified a commonality of interests across 
employer boundaries so that trade unions were not only sectionalist 
but also external organizations. In combination such craftsmen sought 
to control the supply of labour to establish common time payment rates 
from different employers who were obliged to respect their craft 
methods of working. Such craft unions, except in the limited sphere of 
payment, did not challenge the deci sion making rights of employers. 
According to the Webbs (1965): 
·'they (craft unions) neither desired nor sought any 
participation in the management of the technical process 
of industry (except in so far as these might affect the 
conditions of their employment, or the selection of the 
persons to be employed), whilst it never occurred to a 
trade union to claim any power over or responsibility 
for buying raw materials or marketing the product" 
(p. 654). 
By failing to take any interest in business affairs, these unions 
were unable to independently assess the claimed 'full standard 
conditions of employment' offerred, and in consequence had to be guided 
by employer action. The Webbs (op cit) indicate that this was the 
practice of the ASE, the model union of the second half of the 
nineteenth century: 
"Their (ASE) trade policy was in fact restricted 
to securing for every workman those terms which the 
best employers were willing voluntarily to grant" 
(p. 241, emphasis added). 
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Craft union control of work practice placed a major constraint on 
employer ability to direct labour and the pace of work, however, in 
time many large-scale employers accepted craft unionism, especially 
when it was realized that the formation of employer associations would 
in large measure neutralize the bargaining powers which trade unions 
could exercise through their ability to deny labour to a particular 
employer. This gave rise to a situation whereby district rates were 
jointly agreed between employer association and the relevant craft 
union. By entering joint agreements employers found that this had a 
further advantage in that it removed wages from competition. The 
industrial relations historian, Phelps-Brown (1959) has shown how 
cotton manufacturers encouraged district negotiations, having come to 
realize these benefits: 
"Those who had little love for the union 
willing to negotiate a rate, because of 
activities this interfered with them least. 
were still 
all union 
They would 
resent hotly any encroachment on their prerogatives as 
managers of their own businesses, but collective 
bargaining only meant that they were paying the same 
price as their competitors for one factor of production, 
just as they did when they bought a raw material in the 
same market" (pp. 123-4). 
As the rate of technical change increased, employers decided to 
challenge craft control of work practice and employer associations 
provided a means of developing concerted action. Lovell (1977) records 
how employers in the engineering industry having formed themselves into 
an association were able to institute the famous six-month 'lock-out' 
of 1897/8, which totally defeated the unions involved. After the 
strike, the unions had to accept the loss of craft control and payment 
"Their (ASE) trade policy was in fact restricted 
to securing for every workman those terms which the 
best employers were willing voluntarily to grant" 
(p. 241, emphasis added). 
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by result systems of remuneration. According to Phelps-Brown (op cit): 
"The dispute of 1897/8 in engineering had really been 
about the prerogatives of management. For example, was 
the decision which man should work on a certain machine 
one for management alone, or had the union a right to a 
say in it? The principles agreed to govern such 
questions were industry-wide in their application, 
because an employers' federation had sprung up to make 
the dispute industry-wide" (p. 282). 
By the turn of the century, . a system of nation-wide procedural 
agreements had been established, whereby local disputes had to be 
referred to central joint conferences of employer associations and 
national union leaders before any strike action could take place (eg, 
cotton weaving 1881, cotton spinning 1892, boot and shoe 1895, 
engineering 1898, building 1904, shipbuilding 1908). Collective 
bargaining over substantive issues was generally conducted at a local 
or district level. 
All of these developments reflected a curtailment in trade union 
challenges to management decision making prerogatives. Craft unions no 
longer exercised unilateral control over work conditions, whilst the 
'official' union constrained local union organization inititatives for 
strike action. In this respect, Clegg et al (1964) observe 
"Some of the national agreements represented a joint 
victory for employers and trade union leaders over the 
hostili ty of a rank and file which was still wedded to 
the tradition of unilateral regulation" (p. 471). 
National procedures were also to be applied to new areas of 
unionism covering unskilled workers. 
Employer dependence on the skills possessed by early craftsmen 
allowed these workmen to establish the practice of trade unionism. 
Unskilled employees in time came to realize that their own labour had a 
scarcity value if they controlled its supply ~y combination, and this 
realization allowed them to form unions. The pre-existence of craft 
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unions was also to beinfluencial in the pattern of demarcation which 
became established between unions. 'General' or 'new' unions which 
were developed from the 1890's sought to extend unionism to non-skilled 
employees. Whilst the leaders of such unions were often advocates of 
socialist principles, their recruitment and trade policies were in fact 
very similar to those advanced by the pre-existing craft unions. There 
were limits to the general character of these unions, according to 
Hyman (1975): 
.. 
even the most expansionist tempered any 
aspirations to become all embracing 'class unions' with a 
respect for the existing strongholds of unionisation ••• 
even the most expansionist of the new unions were 
essentially residual in their recruitment patterns 
filling the numerous and often complicated gaps left by 
the earlier structure of union~sm. Moreover, the 
dynamism of their open orientation tended to ebb. Once 
groups of non-craft workers established effective 
organizations they tended to become conscious of 
possessing sectionalist interests and of their ability to 
pursue them sectionally. The most effective strategy 
could then appear to be the creation of a stronghold of 
unionism isola ted from the broader la bour marke t j 
excluding the alternative labour force seemed easier than 
organizing it" (p. 52). 
The early extension of trade union membership to cover unskilled 
employees occurred in periods of economic recovery, such as 1889-91 and 
1910-14, when labour shortages allowed employees to strike in pursuit 
of improved employment conditions. Hobsbawm (1949) has argued that the 
success of these unions depended on their ability to recruit members 
within certain industries, (such as gas, tinplate, docks, transport) 
and large works, rather than their ability to recruit indiscriminately. 
He characterized these new unions as 'alliances of local closed shops 
of regular employees' , whose survi val depended on employment 
'recogni tion' as bargaining agents. Clegg et al (1964) suggest that 
the recruiting policies of such unions were more complex than that 
ascribed by Hobsbawm, whilst agreeing about the importance of 
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continuity of employment and employer recognition to union stability. 
They state: 
"Only relatively permanent employees could give 
stability, but even they might not prove stable 
members without some form of pressure to keep them in 
the union. Recognition by the employer would provide 
a positive incentive to join a body which could handle 
grievances, and might lead to his acceptance of some 
form of closed shop" (p. 88). 
Leaders of general unions, like their craft union counterparts, 
could expect to enhance union stability by seeking agreements with 
employer associations. Such agreements promoted leadership authority 
within the union and made it possible to negotiate necessary changes 
centrally rather than wasting the union's resources in a series of 
local disputes over which they had no control. According to Clegg et 
al (1964) 
the development of 
the outstanding feature 
(p. 471). 
collective bargaining was 
of the period 1889-1910" 
As with craft unionism, the development of such national collective 
bargaining systems did not pose any real challenge to management 
strategic decision making. Moreover, the existence of craft and 
general unions in large measure precluded the development of industrial 
unions which had the potential of overcoming the sectionalist character 
of early trade unionism. 
The revolutionary syndicalist element of industrial unionism was 
never widespread in the UK, and according to Lovell (1977) 
revolutionary arguments were never widely accepted even in areas such 
as the South Wales Coalfields, where syndicalism was most strongly 
advocated. The 'industrial' unions which emerged (eg Railways 1913, 
Iron and Steel 1917) never actually covered all sectors and were 
generally 'committed to the system of collective bargaining. For 
example, Flanders (1968) states that: 
"By the time it (industrial unionism) appeared on 
the scene as a conscious influence within the trade 
union world, substantial parts of the territory which 
industrial unions might be expected to occupy had 
already been possessed whether by stubborn, craft 
conscious unions or by the now amorphous general 
labour unions" (po 31). 
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The period 1910-20 was a period of high employment, which together 
with Government war time regulations provided a major stimUlus to 
membership growth not only for craft, general and industrial unions, 
but also for white collar unions. Total union membership was to 
increase from 3 million (density 17%) to over 8 million (density 45%) 
in this period (Bain, 1970). The years up to the First World War saw 
strikes rising to a new record in 1913, and the Government introduced 
compulsory arbitration as a means of resolving disputes during wartime. 
This, together with Government control of certain industries, and the 
recommendations of the Whitley Committee in 1917 to establish national 
wage agreements via joint councils of employers and unions, promoted 
trade union growth in new sectors, and extended collective bargaining 
at national level to include substantive issues. This system of 
national collective bargaining remained largely intact up until the 
1960's. 
Summary. 
Nei ther craft, general or industrial unionism mounted a sustained 
challenge on management decision-making. The national system of 
collective bargaining which emerged was sectionalist and, moreover, 
negotiations were underwritten by trade union acceptance of employer 
'rights' of management; the trade union role was to negotiate 
settlements in restricted aspects of the employment relationship, 
principally basic wage rates. Not only did, this system of external 
collective bargaining protect management prerogatives at the plant, the 
73 
official unions having signed national agreements were partially 
responsible for overseeing their implementation, which inevitably 
placed constraints on local trade union initiatives and could involve 
disciplinary action when national agreements were contravened. In the 
rare times of tight labour markets between 1920-1960, trade union 
demands remained limited and did not challenge any significnt decision 
'rights' of management. 
The Challenge From Below. 
However, from the early 1960's, workplace shop stewards became a 
central focus of trade union activity in manufacturing. Their numbers 
rose from 90,000 in 1961 (Clegg, 1979) to 175,000 in 1968 (McCarthy and 
Parker, 1968), and, at the time, the internal negotiating role of shop 
stewards was perceived as a 'challenge from below' (Flanders, 1970) to 
management decision making prerogatives. However, we shall see that 
this challenge was of a restricted nature and was contingent upon 
conditions of full employment. 
The formal system of national collective bargaining outlined above 
provided stability in industrial relations when the countervailing 
power of labour was low as was the case in the inter-war period. 
However, when the market environment changed to one of full employment 
and high demand and low investment in new capacity, employers found 
themselves obliged to negotiate on work practices at plant level with 
direct representatives of the workforce, ie, shop stewards. According 
to Phelps Brown (1973) lengthening experiences of high levels of 
employment has: 
"given the employee a heightened appreciation of the 
demand for his services, and ••• has also removed the 
fear that if he walks out of his job he> may not get it 
back •••• Meanwhile the leverage of the strike has been 
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raised by changes in the organizaton of industry. 
Increased complexity and integration of proc~ss has given 
qui te small groups the power to halt wide sectors of 
production. Increased capital per employee has raised the 
cost of a stoppage relative to the cost of the settlement 
that will avoid it" (p. 333). 
For example, these conditions prevailed in the car industry, 
particularly in the 1950's when production for exports were 'bought at 
any price', and, not surprisingly, there was a marked increase in 
unofficial collective action at a work group level. Such actions were 
initiated in other industries, particularly those where technological 
and organizational change increased the bargaining power of workgroups. 
The increasing levels of conflict in such industries led the Government 
to establish a commission of enquiry into the. state of UK industrial 
relations. The Donovan Commission (1968) concluded that: 
"Britain has two systems of industrial relations. 
The one is the formal system embodied in the official 
institutions. 
by the actual 
associations, 
(p. 12). 
The other is the informal system created 
behaviour of trade unions, and employers' 
of managers, shop stewards and workers" 
Donovan noted three specific changes that reflected the 
underlying collapse of institutional regulation and the increasing 
power of shop stewards. The first was the rising number of strikes in 
all industries except mining, and particularly the increase in 
unofficial (ie, not sanctioned by the union) and unconstitutional (ie, 
in breach of procedures negotiated in collective bargaining) stoppages. 
These now accounted for 95 per cent of strikes. The second was 'wage 
drift', the gap between officially negotiated wages and what workers 
were actually paid. The third was labour utilization: some workers 
were sometimes able to restrict managerial prerogative and insist on 
'overmanning', rigid 'job demarcation', worker control of the 'rate' of 
production, and who should be transferred from job to job. The Donovan 
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Commission (1968) found from its analysis of unofficial strikes in the 
motor industry that disputes arose over work arrangements, rules and 
discipline, redundancy and dismissal, and suspensions. They concluded: 
"... there is considerable confusion as to what 
management does and does not have the right to do; or 
where it is conceded to have the right, whether it is or 
is not making reasonable use of it" (p. 195). 
Flanders (1970) argues that this position had arisen because 
employers had responded to the growth of workgroup organization: 
" wi th no clearly defined, long term and - above 
all - consistent objectives in mind. By making ad hoc 
concessions to pressure, when resistance proved costly, 
they had fostered guerilla warfare over wages and working 
conditions in the workplace and encouraged aggressive 
shop floor tactics by rewarding them" (p. 196). 
The shop steward at this time was viewed as a significant new force 
in industrial relations affairs. However, it should be noted that the 
challenge posed by the shop steward was essentially limited in that it 
had a workplace focus. As Turner et al (1967) noted: 
••• the leading stewards are performing a managerial 
function, of grievance settlement, welfare arrangement 
and human adjustment, and the steward system's acceptance 
by management has developed partly because of the 
increasing effectiveness - and certain economy - with 
which the role is fulfilled" (p. 214). 
Management acceptance of the shop steward role is indicated by 
their willingness to allow stewards to be engaged full time on 'union' 
activites, whilst continuing to be paid by the company. Estimates 
indicate that in the late 1960's 2,500 shop stewards were so engaged 
(Terry, 1983, p. 70). In contradiction to the popular image of the 
shop steward as a 'militant', Parker's (1972) survey of management-shop 
steward relationships revealed a high degree of consensus as to the 
supportive nature of the relationships, eg, 79%, of senior managers of 
the sample thought that shop stewards were helping them solve their 
industrial relation problems, 87% of stewards agreeing with this view. 
The survey in many ways confirmed McCarthy and Parker's (1968) 
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submission to the Donovan Committee that the shop steward should be 
viewed as 'more of a lubricant than an irritant" (p. 56). 
Some shop stewards attempted to develop a wider challenge to 
management decision making prerogatives and promoted multi-union, 
multi-site shop steward combines. These were initially formed 
independently of both official unions and management, in industries 
such as engineering and chemicals where there was a strong trade union 
tradition (Brown and Terry, 1978). The multi-occupational nature of 
these combines to some extent questioned the recruiting principles of 
the official unions to which stewards belonged, and such developments 
were not always welcomed by official unions. According to Friedman 
(1976) : 
"The unions ••• often fear these committees, for they 
cannot always control them. An individual union may be 
able to control its own shop stewards; but since a joint 
shop steward's conunittee is composed of stewards from a 
number of unions, its policy may differ from the policy 
of a particular union" (p. 4). 
Initially, these developments were seen by certain commentators 
(Hyman, 1975; Coates and Topham, 1974) to be illustrative of a new 
orientation and confidence within the trade union movement. At the 
beginning of the 1970's, shop steward organizations, even in a time of 
rising unemployment, were prepared to directly challenge redundancy 
plans of management by direct action (eg, a 'work-in' or 'sit-in' on 
the factory premises) in order to preserve their jobs - the most 
notable success being Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (McGill, 1973). It was 
also at this time that the Lucas Aerospace Combine began work on its 
Alternative Corporate Plan (Wainwright and Elliott, 1982) which sought 
to challenge management decision making in an area largely unquestioned 
until this time, eg product/market strategies. However, such 
independent action by shop atewards involving issues beyond the wage-
work contract were the exception rather than the rule. 
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Management have normally refused to recognise combines where 
membership is extended beyond the immediate site location (Wainwright 
and Elliott, 1982). For management, the problem is· to promote joint 
shop steward committees to overcome the problem of multi-unionism , 
whilst endeavouring to limit the .issues of negotiation at an individual 
site level. Within this framework, there was a major growth in the 
number of shop stewards. By the late 1970's the number of shop 
stewards was estimated at 250,000 plus, an increase of 100,000 in a 
decade (Clegg, 1979). Management support for this development is 
evidenced by the growth in the number of full-time shop stewards to 
10,000, a fourfold increase over the decade (Terry, 1983, p. 70) and by 
the provision of increased facilities such as office, telephone, 
secretarial support and by allowing joint shop steward committee 
meetings to be held in worktime (Hyman, 1979, p. 57). Terry (1983) has 
argued that this growth reflects policies of managements, both in the 
private and public sector, to develop formal bargaining relationships 
with joint shop steward committees. He suggests that in the private 
sector the objective was to overcome the ad hoc workplace agreements 
developed in the 1960's, whilst in the public sector the objective was 
to provide a new structure of negotiation centred around the shop 
stewards. He argues that management have used work study and job 
evaluation techniques to remove negotiations from the workplace: 
"By presenting work in abstract terms, management 
hoped to remove work-related issues from individual 
shop floor haggling, and to handle them in the 
committee room in bargaining designed to deal 
comprehensively with, for example, a company's entire 
manual workforce" (p. 79). 
He argues, that measured day work payment systems, group and plant 
bonus systems have removed the wage bargaining role of individual shop 
stewards: 
Hyman 
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"Under many of the newer schemes, the majority of 
stewards have little direct role in wage determination, 
which is handled by a negotiating committee, or even one 
person, whose authority· with respect to other stewards 
may therefore be enhanced, especially given the 
importance generally attached to wage issues" (p. 80). 
(1979), likewise, identifies the formali za ti on and 
centralization of shop steward activity as the most important feature 
of shop steward development in the 1970's. He argues that these 
developments have co-incided with the integration of shop steward 
organization into official trade union structures. Rule books have 
been amended to give workplace leaders, such as convenors, an official 
role within union constitutions, stewards were given representation on 
many national negotiating bodies, whilst the rights and obligations of 
convenors and joint shop steward committees have been defined via 
formal constitutions. Hyman argues that official trade unions and 
management have channeled the militancy of the shop steward movement by 
a policy of sponsoring shop steward organization to facilitate the 
introduction of new production and manning standards: 
"Introduced largely from above, steward machinery in 
such circumstances is normally far more closely 
integrated into the official structures of trade unionism 
and collective bargaining than where its origins lie in 
independent initiative from below" (p. 59). 
For Hyman, the shop stewards' challenge to management prerogative 
has been muted by bureaucratization. 
In the view of Brown and Terry (1978) the changes in shop steward 
organization have been 'dwarfed' by the changes in the structure of 
British industry arising from the process of closures, consolidation 
and ammalgamation. Examining statistics for the largest 100 firms in 
Britain they suggest that the magnitude of chan~e can be represented by 
the number of plants controlled by a corporate management. In 1958 a 
middle range large company had 6 plants whilst in 1968 the same company 
l'i 
had 20 plants - a trend which has continued into the 1970's. Such 
changes have resulted in Britain becoming 'a nation of giant multi-
plant firms', a development having major implications for shop steward 
organization: 
"The threat this concentration poses for shop 
stewards' organization is a profound one. Operating 
at the level of the individual factory, it is hard for 
them to influence management by striking when 
production can often be shifted to other factories 
wi thin the company, and when the company often has 
cash coming in from factories in quite different 
industries. Furthermore, factory managers often have 
little control over the strategic decisions of where 
new plant should be installed and where there should 
be redundancies. Both bargaining strength and access 
to the real decision makers is thus moving away from 
the workplace shop steward committees" (p. 659). 
Management's willingness to accommodate to workplace shop steward 
organization whilst preserving control at a higher (ie, company) level 
is reflected in the advice given by the CBl (1980) on recogni tion of 
shop steward organization. They state: 
"Evidence suggests that there is more conflict and 
less co-operation where stewards' organizations are 
resisted by management, and that stewards work better 
together where joint committees exist. Care needs to be 
taken however, over the definition of 'company'; such 
arrangements as joint negotiating committees in groups 
of companies or a company wi th diversified interests 
will be more appropriate for an individual establishment 
or site, rather than company wide" (p. 25). 
Summary. 
The growth of the shop steward movement in many ways reflects the 
inadequacy of official trade union organization, which did not provide 
for managerial decision making to be effectively challenged at the 
workplace. 
However, the re-emergence of repre.sentative shop steward 
organizations building from the workshop up have not effectively 
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provided trade unions with an ability to challenge the strategic 
decision making prerogatives of management at company· level. 
The merging of official and unofficial forms of trade union 
representation has resulted in a complex system of industrial relations 
whereby management negotiate .with different kinds of trade union 
officers (full-time external officials and lay shop stewards) with 
different unions and at different levels within the company for 
different issues. The complexity of the resulting bargaining structure 
is illustrated for the engineering industry in Table 4.1 below. The 
table shows the levels at which negotiations take place, the issues of 
negotiation and the parties who are responsible for negotiations and 
policy development. Close examination of the Table would reveal that 
there is a significant gap in the pattern of bargaining in that there 
is no effective company wide negotiating machinery for issues of 
strategic importance, eg, closure decisions. This suggests that 
management have successfully adapted to the "challenge from below" by 
implementing a policy of 'sharing power' at a workplace level, whilst 
retaining control at a strategic, company level. 
Trade Unions and Strategic Decisions: The Industrial Democracy Debate 
We have seen that the historical development of collective 
bargaining at national, workshop or 'plant' level, was based on the 
principle that trade unions must remain independent of management. The 
basic trade union strategy has been to react to managerial decision by 
organizing employees into occupational groups prepared to withdraw 
their labour where the decisions are viewed as unacceptable. 
From the mid 1970's certain trade unionists have been prepared to 
recognise that the existing system of collective bargaining has 
fundamental weaknesses. Thus a TUC policy statement (TUC 1979) on 
industrial democracy states: 
Table 4.1. The Structure of Bargaining in the Engineering Industry 
National Negotiations 
reo Basic Rates of Pay, 
Hours of Work, Overtime 
Rates etc. 
Company Level Negotiations 
reo Basic Rates of Pay, 
Pensions, Sickness and 
Lay-Off Agreements etc. 
Subsidiary Company Level 
reo Variations to National 
or Company Pay Rates, 
Lay-off Agreements, 
Sickness etc. 
Plant Level Negotiations 
reo Variations to National 
or Company agreements on 
condition of employment and 
Procedural agreements. 
Workshop Negotiations 
reo Interpretation of payment 
systems and negotiation of 
issues of dispute. 
Company Negotiates 
With Representatives of ~ational 
Executives of Individual Ullions 
on Individual or Federated Basis 
via the Engineering Employees 
Federation. 
Directly with full-time officers/ 
lay delegates of Individual Unions 
on Individual or Federated Basis. 
Directly with full-time officials/ 
lay delegates of Individual Unions 
or Individual Union on .ederated 
basis, or with Joint Shop Steward 
Committee. 
Full-time officials of Individual 
Unions or Plant Shop Steward 
Committee or Stewards of Individual 
Unions. 
Shop stewards (full-time officials 
where shop stewards have not taken 
over responsibility for this area.) 
Trade Union Policy 
Established by 
By National Executive Committees 
and Delegates' Conferences of 
Representatives elected via the 
Branches. 
Full-time officials in liason with 
Shop Steward Representatives from 
Subsidiary Companies. 
Full-time officials in liason with 
shop steward representative from 
plant, or Joint Shop Steward 
Committee in liason with members. 
Full-time officials in liason 
with shop steward representative 
or shop stewards in liason with 
members. 
Shop stewards (or full-time 
officials) with members. 
Note. Throughout these negotiations shop stewards have the option of involving full-time officials in these 
matters, a course of action which is often taken when negotiations fail. 
.... 
>4 
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"Major decisions on investment, location, closures, 
takeovers and mergers and product specialization of the 
organization are generally taken at levels where 
collective bargaining does not take place, and indeed are 
subject matter not· readily covered by collective 
bargaining. New forms of control are needed" (p. 33). 
The limited challenge posed by trade unions to management 
strategic decision making has been documented by Wilson et al (1982). 
Their study of 150 strategic decisions across a wide range of employing 
organizations reveals that trade unions were only involved in 29 of the 
150 strategic decisions and that their impact was slight even in cases 
where their involvement was greatest. They. state: 
Then: 
"The striking feature of all the nine cases described 
above where union influence is reported to be at its 
highest is that not only do unions always fail to get 
what they want (except in the 3 cases where they wanted 
the same as management), but also, in all cases, their 
part was wholly reactive to managerially defined topics" 
(p. 18). 
••• data show(s) the low levels of union involvement in 
strategic decisions portray modern forms of organization 
as mechanisms which delimit union powers and channel the 
voice of employees. Unions challenge the existing power 
structure of management hegemony,privilege and resources 
only at the margin" (p. 9). 
In the 1970' s when employment levels were high and when a Labour 
Government was in office, trade unions did not act decisively to 
rectify these weaknesses. From an examination of the reforms in 
company law proposed by the Bullock Committee (1977) on Industrial 
Democracy it will be seen that T. U. C. support for these reforms were 
based on a belief that it was sufficient for trade unions to represent 
rather than plan the interests of employees at this higher level of 
decision making. Trade unions remain committed to a 'representative' 
role which leaves management strategic planning practices unaltered. 
------------ -------- .. ~-.--
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Trade unions have traditionally rejected any direct participation 
in the management of ~he business enterprise on the premise that there 
is a basic conflict of interest between the workers and owners of 
capital and that trade unions .must . independently. represent the. former 
interests within a collective ~argaining context. 
The first indications that certain significant parts of the 
official trade union movement were reconsidering this basic strategy in 
this matter appeared in the TUC' s Evidence to the Donovan Commission. 
In this submission it was indicated that a scheme for worker 
representation on Boards of Directors might be a favourable 
proposition. After reconfirming the achievements made by trade unions 
via a voluntary system of collective bargaining, the report (TUC, 1966) 
went on to argue that the conflict of interest between workers and 
employers was not necessarily an overriding obstacle to participation 
of worker representation on Boards of Directors. 
••• a distinction needs to be drawn between the 
negotiating function of the employer and the overall 
task of management. Once this distinction is 
established, it can be seen that it does not detract 
from the independence of trade unions for trade union 
representatives to participate in the affairs of 
management concerned with production, until the step is 
reached when any of the subjects become negotiable 
questions as between trade unions and employers" 
(p. 12). 
It appears that the TUC believe a clear distinction can be drawn 
between collective bargaining and participation in corporate policy 
making. Worker directors would seek to influence medium and 10ng-
term corporate policy decisions by participation in Board decisions, 
whilst traditional forms of collective bargaining would be retained 
to protect employee Interests at the policy implementation stage. 
The Donovan CommIssion did not pursue the TUC's 
suggestion, but the appointment in 1970 of a TUC working party on 
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industrial democracy provided a focus for the further development of 
this issue despite there being no apparent widespread enthusiasm for 
these proposals within the trade union movement as a whole. This 
working party produced its report on industrial democracy in 1974, and 
the advent of the Labour Government placed this issue firmly on the 
political agenda. 
The 1974 TUC report argued that advances in industrial democracy 
required three complementary developments within the modern business 
enterprise. 
Firstly, that the range of issues subject to collective bargaining 
should be extended to include non-wage areas. The report stated 
"Plant, site and enterprise level bargaining 
should extend. to cover recruitment, training, 
deployment, manning and speed of work, work sharing, 
discipline, redundancy and dismissal, plus fringe 
benefits .,. pension rights ••• sick and industrial 
injury pay, minimum earnings guarantees and so forth • 
••• It should be recognised that many of these issues 
.,. are ultimately based on prior decisions by 
management about production programming, workplace 
layout, and the technology and design of plant and 
machinery ••• As far as possible unions will need to 
bring these factors within the scope of collective 
bargaining" (p. 27). 
Secondly, it proposed trade union negotiators should have access to 
information in all of the above areas, including future plans and 
financial forecasts. In this matter, negotiated arrangements between 
management and trade unions were seen to be preferable to legal 
requirement. The report stated: 
it is clear that enforced disclosure is 
hardly likely to be followed by meaningful discussion 
on related decisions. For this reason, it is proposed 
that where difficulties arise the CAS should exercise 
a largely conciliatory role by discussing with both 
union and management the form and· content of an 
appropriate information agreement" (p. 32). 
Thirdly, it argued that worker directors should be appointed via 
trade union machinery to newly established supervisory boards on a 50-
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50 basis with shareholder representatives, and, furthermore, that 
company law should be changed so that the supervisory board would 
become the supreme body of the company: 
"The supervisory board would be responsible for 
determining company objectives, the policies necessary 
for their achievement " and for moni toring and 
reporting progress to workpeople as well as the 
shareholders The management board would be 
appointed by the supervisory board, and would be 
responsible to it for the day-to-day running of the 
company, according to the objectives and policies laid 
down" (p. 37). 
Whilst most trade unionists accepted the validity of the first two 
proposals, no consensus existed regarding the appointment of worker 
directors. This was reflected in the 1974 TUC Congress decision to 
accept the Industrial Democracy Report, whilst also passing Composi te 
Motion 17. This motion rejected the mandatory imposition of boards 
with worker directors, and called for statutory backing for the right 
to negotiate on major issues of corporate policy, via existing 
collec ti ve bargaining arrangements. Thus, although there was general 
agreement in the trade union movement about the need for increased 
influence and control of organized workers over corporate decisions, 
there was disagreement over the best way to achieve it. 
This conflict was reflected in trade union submissions of evidence 
to the Labour Government's Committee of Inquiry into Industrial 
Democracy (Bullock 1977). The majority of unions affiliated to the TUC 
were in broad agreement with its industrial democracy policy as 
outlined in the 1974 Report, and supplementary evidence, and therefore 
made no separate submission to the Bullock Committee. However, three 
major unions, the AUEW, the GMWU and the EETPU all drew up policy 
statements in opposition to the main thrust of tbe TUC's proposals, and 
submitted them as evidence to the Committee. 
86 
The GMWU rejected any statutory requirement to introduce worker 
director schemes and argued that any change should be the subject of 
negotiations between unions and employers. They argued ,that there must 
however be a mandatory general obligation on company management and 
directors to consult and negotiate with trade unions on all major 
decisions, and mandatory disclosure of information on a wide range of 
issues. In evidence it was stated that 
"There has to be a significant development of trade 
union machinery in the private sector towards the 
creation of company level machinery involving both 
official and lay members at the point where strategic 
decisions are really made At present, in most 
instances, there is a gap in trade union machinery 
between the plant level and the national (JIC) level. 
Yet it is at company level that major decisions are 
made. The creation of collective bargaining machinery 
at company level is a necessary prerequisite to any 
further institutional development of industrial 
democracy ••• 
In most cases this machinery does not at present exist" 
(quoted Bullock, p. 36). 
Both the EETPU and the AUEW rejected outright worker representation 
on the policy boards of private companies, preferring to rely 
exclusively on the widening scope of collective bargaining and greater 
disclosure of information' for an extension of industrial democracy. 
For the EETPU this approach was derived from an understanding of the 
function of trade unions defined it its evidence as 'negative workers 
control' (po 8), in which democracy in industry is measured by the 
ability of organized workers through trade unions to say 'no' to 
management decisions disadvantageous to employees. It was stated that 
the job of a trade union was 
o. • to consider, contrast and oppose, if 
necessary, the exercise of management prerogative. It 
is not the responsibility of work people.to manage the 
enterprise; indeed it is essential that trade unions 
retain their independence •••• 
Far better in the interests of those affected by a 
managerial decision that the responsibility for the 
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decision is firmly laid at the management's door, 
then the collective bargaining machinery can oppose and 
moderate the impact of the decision when necessary" 
(EETPU Evidence, para 24 et seq). 
Trade union representation on boards was to be opposed since the 
sharing of decision making responsibilities would compromise trade 
union ability to oppose, and .act as an independent countervailing force 
within the organization. This was a classical restatement of 
traditional union policies. 
The AUEW's rejection of board participation in private companies 
reflected the traditional trade union belief that it was impossible to 
reconcile the interests of shareholders and employees by a system of 
joint decision making. It was argued that employee interests could 
only be advanced by extending the scope of collective bargaining at 
company level. It was claimed that the introduction of worker 
directors could in fact lead to a restriction of industrial democracy 
by hiving off certain policy areas from collective bargaining and by 
disarming workers through committing them to policies made at board 
level by their own representatives. The AUEW preferred a system of 
collective bargaining which allowed 'rank and file' involvement in the 
formation of trade union objectives and policies. 
The recommendations of the majority report of the Bullock Committee 
(1977) were in favour of the TUe's proposals, excepting the Committee's 
preference for a unitary board with parity representation (via 2x + y) 
rather than a two-tier system. The unitary board was to have defined 
responsibilities vis-a-vis the AGM of shareholders. Bullock's 
recommendations were underwritten by the belief that such changes would 
have beneficial effects in terms of efficiency, industrial innovation 
and confidence. The major trade union organiz~tional reform was the 
proposed establishment of Joint Representational Committees; 
representative body composed of shop stewards drawn from all 
a 
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independent trade unions in the company. The principal function of 
this body was to elect worker directors, and to provide a two way 
communication channel between the workplace and the worker directors. 
The Committee, whilst recognising the need for worker directors to be 
competent in certain management: areas, argued that effectiveness of 
jOint decision making at board level would not be determined by this 
capacity alone. The succcess of a worker director was directly related 
to his ability to communicate with employees through the JRC structure. 
Thus they state 
"As the Report has consistently stressed, 
employees will be on the board as representatives of 
the workforce elected through trade union machinery 
and not as traditional directors ••• In the long run we 
believe that the value of the contribution which 
employee representatives will make on the board will 
depend less on the mastery of the tools used~ 
professional practice of management than on their 
personal quali ties of judgement and leadership, and 
their ability to interpret and represent the views of 
their constituents" (p. 157, emphasis added). 
The TUC also advanced the view that the election of worker 
directors within trade union machinery would enhance industrial 
efficiency. Their submission however does not detail how this would be 
realized. Their supplementary evidence to Bullock (TUC 1979) states 
that: 
"(t)his point cannot be proved, but in the view of 
the TUC, the major gain in efficiency would derive 
from the creation of a new approach to policy making 
in companies, particularly in relation to new products 
and new methods of working. The fact that the whole 
financial aspect of a company's affairs would be 
monitored and assessments made of this by worker 
representatives, as well as those traditionally 
involved would have implications for the presentation 
of reports and the drawing up of corporate plans. In 
sum the TUC' s belief is that a. major extra 
contribution to company's affairs would be generated 
and a1 though ini tially the length of time taken to 
consider future policy might be extended,' the 
acceptance and implementation would in general be 
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assisted, given the greater confidence in the work of 
the policy board and the systematic reporting back to 
established steward and office committees of the board's 
work" (p. 49). 
Both viewpoints seem to be underwritten by the belief that an 
exchange of views and information at the corporate level would lead to 
a fine-tuning of management decision making to the benefi t of all. 
This is reflected in the TUC's view that deadlock in decision making at 
board level would not be a recurrent problem, and that when 
difficulties arose the aim should be 'to find a bargained compromise 
acceptable to both parties' (p. 47). 
Employers, unlike the TUC, did not believe that boardroom decisions 
such as closures or information disclosure could be subjects of 
'bargained compromises' nor did they believe that such proposals would 
advance the profitability of companies. As Elliott (1978) points out, 
the CBI organized a concerted lobby against the Committee's proposals, 
and the campaign was influencial in the Labour Government's decision to 
formulate legislative proposals much less radical than those proposed 
by Bullock. The Government's White Paper issued in July 1978 proposed 
trade union minority (one-third) representation within a two-tier board 
system. As a consequence of Labour's defeat at the 1979 General 
Elections, these proposals were not enacted. 
The TUC's initiative to change the direction of trade union 
strategy by promoting trade union representation at the highest level 
of decision making was, for the second time, rebuffed. This rebuttal 
especially on the part of employers clearly reflects a wish to exclude 
trade unions from any and all the strategic areas of management 
decision making. Management often draw attention to the damage caused 
by industrial conflict at a policy implementation stage, but have 
rarely sought to involvt:! trade unions in long term strategic planning 
as a means of avoiding such conflict. As the next chapter will show , 
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mass redundancies, from the mid 1970' s in UK manufacturing industry, 
based on the profit generating planning practices of management, 
provided little scope for joint management-trade union decision making, 
as envisaged by worker director proposals. 
Conclusions 
Trade union organization, both formal and informal, is relatively 
underdeveloped, since historically trade unions have only acted as 
representative channels for employees within a collective bargaining 
. context. Management, throughout this time, have exercised unilateral 
control over strategic decision making. Trade unions have never 
matched management's strategic decision making capability, and in 
consequence, collective bargaining negotiations have either been highly 
generalized (eg, national wage rates) or highly specific (eg, work 
place regulation). Management's strategic decision making prerogatives 
have in consequence been unchallenged. 
In the mid 1970's, certain trade unionists recognised their limited 
ability in this regard, and sought to overcome this problem by 
supporting legislative reforms based on worker director principles. 
However, these reforms were not useful to management and, in 
consequence, were not enacted. Having sought to rely on legislative 
reform, which implied an extended representative role for trade unions, 
they did nothing to enhance their ability to develop an independent 
understanding of management planning practices. As the next chapter 
will show, trade unions were in consequence, not prepared to contest 
mass redundancies arising from management's strategic plans, based on 
profit generating principles. 
Chapter 5. Trade Unions. De-industrialization and Economic Planning 
Particularly since 1979, the closures and mass redundancies that 
have occurred were of such a magnitude as to preclude the possibility 
of sharing meaningful decision making with trade unions, as envisaged 
by 'Bullock' type proposals for worker directors. Co-operation is 
useful to achieve long term goals but closures must be expected to be 
conflictual. Moreover, a review of Labour Government and TUC economic 
planning activities of this period at national and industrial level 
shows that they had no significant impact on strategic decision making 
at company level and therefore did not effectively evaluate investor 
plans. 
Despite this fact the Labour Party and the TUe remain committed to 
a system of 'tri-partite planning agreements' and a perpetuation of 
management practice based on profit principles. This reliance on 
management, and consequent failure of 'official unions' to 'shadow 
plan' investor strategies (Bryer et aI, 1984b) critically weakens shop 
steward attempts to oppose closures and redundancies at company and 
plant level, since this opposition is un-coordinated and unplanned. An 
example is the eventual irrelevance of the 'alternative plan' developed 
by shop stewards at Lucas Aerospace, although their initiative was a 
significant departure from traditional trade union re-active policies. 
It was a pro-active attempt to anticipate and prepare for change by 
using some aspects of management practice whilst not planning for 
prof! t. 
Shareholder Investment Strategies and De-industrialization 
Closures of individual plants and even the decline of whole 
industries is a widely accepted aspect of capitalist market economies 
such as the UK. However, the widespread and rapid decline in economic 
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activity from the mid-1970's was of a scale to distinguish it from a 
'normal' recession. In fact this economic downturn is seen to herald 
the end of a long post-war boom, the decline occurring almost 
simultaneously in most advanced capitalist economies. 
The British economy was one of the first to feel the effects of the 
ending of this period of more or less uninterrupted growth. From the 
mid 1960' s unemployment levels have risen from under 400,000 to in 
excess of 3,000,000. The number of jobs in manufacturing industry has 
slumped from nearly 9 million to under 6 million, whilst the increase 
in service sector employment has in no way compensated for declines 
recorded elsewhere. The unprecendented fall in employment has been 
characterized as the 'de-industrialization' of the UK economy, 
(Blackaby, 1979; Glyn and Harrison, 1980; Aaronovich, 1981; Hughes, 
1981), which Hughes (op cit) defines as 
.. the chronic and cumulative elements of both 
relative and absolute decline in the contribution of 
manufacturing to the national economy. This declining 
trend can be measured in output terms, in employment 
and in weakening net exports" (p. 9). 
Such changes in the economy arose from the policies implemented by 
large multi-divisional and multi-national companies which have 
developed rapidly since. the 1950' s and which now dominate economic 
activity. The degree of concentration which has arisen can be simply 
illustrated by the assets controlled by the largest companies. As 
Table 5.1 shows, the top 100 companies (of which Lucas Industries is 
one) control 44% of total company assets. 
r 
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Table 5.1. - Assets of Top UK Companies in 1977 
No. of Companies Proportion of Total UK 
Company Assets 
% 
20 21 
50 33 
100 44 
250 59 
Source. Trade and Industry [1978] 
The multi-national nature of large organizations is illustrated in 
Table 5.2 below which indicates that approximately 40% of assets owned 
by the 50 largest companies are located abroad. 
Table 5.2. UK/Overseas Involvement of UK Industrial 
and Commercial Companies 
(Analysis by asset size involved) 
Proportion of total assets 
1500 companies surveyed 
Operating wholly in UK 
Operating mainly in UK 
Operating mainly overseas 
Operating wholly overseas 
Source: Trade and Industry, 
of 
1978 
50 Largest 
% 
48.5 
7.4 
50.4 
38.2 
4.0 
The Rest (1450) 
% 
51.5 
40.2 
48.1 
10.7 
.9 
The decisions of such companies are important in themselves, and 
also have a significant 'knock-on' effect for the many smaller firms 
which function almost entirely as component suppliers for the 'giants'. 
The decisions made within such companies have resulted in the loss of 
output across the manufacturing sectors as detailed in Table 5.3 below. 
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Table 5.3. Changes in UK Manufacturing Output: 
Two Decades Compared 
Sectors growing in 1971-81 
Food, Drink, Tob. 
Chemical & Allied 
Instrument Engin. 
Electr. Engineering 
Declining in 1971-81 
Coal & Coal Products 
Metal Manu!. 
Shipbuilding & M. Eng. 
Vehicles 
Metal Goods n.e.s. 
Textiles 
Leather, etc. 
Clothing & Footwear 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, etc. 
Timber, Furniture 
Stable, 1971-81 
Paper, Publishing, Printing 
Other manufacturing 
Overall 
1961-71 
% Change 
+ 26.5 
+ 80.0 
+ 104.7 
+ 58.5 
+ 63.5 
+ 3.1 
+ 3.3 
+ 15.3 
+ 12.0 
+ 31.5 
2.5 
+ 9.1 
+ 38.2 
+ 26.2 
+ 23.3 
+ 74.5 
+ 32.3 
1971-81 
% Change 
+ 9.6 
+ 21.9 
+ 15.8 
+28.3 
- 24.4 
- 31.8 
- 34.1 
- 19.1 
- 26.8 
- 34.0 
39.8 
9.8 
- 14.7 
- 13.5 
0.1 
+ 1.9 
8.1 
Source: National Income and Expenditure, 1982, derived from Table 2.4. 
Quoted by Hughes, 1983, p. 44. 
Massey and Meegan (1982) in their study of job loss in the UK 
between 1968-73 have identified three management strategies which 
promote profit accumulation through the displacement of labour by the 
re-organizaiton of production. 
a) Intensification, whereby changes are made in the production 
process without major capital investment to increase labour 
productivity. Without any change in either the nature or scale of the 
labour process, the individual worker is 'motivated' to produce more in 
a given amount of time. Where demand for. the product produced is 
constant or declining such intensification leads to job loss. 
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b) Investment and technical change which involves significant 
capital expenditures to raise labour productivity through mechanisation 
and/or increases in the scale of production. The principle is to 
substitute capital for labour to reduce total unit costs. Again, 
unless product demand is rising job losses result from such policies. 
c) Rationalization or divestment which involves an elimination of 
productive capacity by complete or partial plant closure. The only 
alteration to existing production and labour processes is thus one of 
scale, the end result being a reduction in the productive base of the 
industry in which it is undertaken. 
In analysing Department of Employment statistics for 32 industries 
involving a job loss of 304,600, Massey and Meegan estimate that 15% 
could be attributed to intensification, 37% to technical change and 48% 
to rationalization. According to the authors, policies of technical 
change in large companies can be equated to policies of intensification 
within smaller companies: 
"The basic rationale for technical change in a 
capitalist system of production stems not from some 
neutral technological improvement nor from 'need', but 
from competition and the requirement of profitability. 
Technical change in the process of production within a 
given product-market occurs as a result of the 
continuous attempt of firms to steal a march on each 
other. The commonest overall rationale is cutting 
production costs in some general sense. This may be 
either in the obvious immediate sense of reducing the 
combined cost of equipment and labour, or in the less 
direct way of enabling the use of a potentially less 
organized work force" (pp. 65-6). 
The policy of rationalization, the prinCipal cause of job loss in 
the period 1968-73 can likewise be related to pursuit of profit at the 
expense of employee interests. The general reason for rationalization 
is a lack of profitability. As a result of this lack of profitability 
in a particular industry, re-investment of ,capital is directed 
elsewhere, either within or outside the UK economy. The dominant 
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position in the UK economy of large multi-divisional companies can be 
related to the process of rationalization which often involves mergers 
and take-overs as a first step in capacity cutting. 
In the 1960's the Labour Government, via the Industrial Re-
organization Commission (IRC) sought to facilitate mergers by giving 
financial support to companies involved, as was the case with the most 
infamous case of rationalization, the GEC-AEI merger (Beynon and 
Wainwright, 1979). Rationalization in individual sectors is a 
necessary bi-product of changing relative levels of profitability, as 
investment .flows to those areas of the economy where the return is 
highest. As such, rationalization is not so much the result of a 
failure of profitability, but a way of maintaining and increasing rates 
of it for capital over the economy as a whole. Given the concern for 
relative levels of profitability it is possible for plants to be closed 
down, even when profits are being earned. What is important is the 
relationship between the current rates of return on capital and the 
return offered by investments in other areas. Thus Massey and Meegan 
state 
..... it is clearly possible for plant closures and 
job loss, resulting from rationalization, to occur in 
sectors with positive rates of profit, as well as in 
those where losses are being made" (p. 88). 
Bryer et al (1984a) study post-war investor strategies to analyse 
job loss in manufacturing for the period 1969-81. They show that 
divestment occured despite the financial viability of the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Divestment was a rational policy solely pursued in 
the interests of profit. By undertaking international comparisons of 
fixed capital formation they show how UK financial performance 
deteriorated as a consequence of under-investment from the 1960's 
onward. They suggest that shareholders accepted relatively modest 
profits in the UK whilst investing abroad to produce offsetting 
returns. They state: 
----
"In the mid 1950's,· when market share and profits 
began to fall, investors faced a clear choice: One 
option was to re-invest heavily in UK manufacturing 
industry to 'restructure' it as Europe and Japan had 
done, but this would have meant three major overhauls 
in as many decades.:. The other option was to squeeze 
as much as possible from heavy· war-time investments , 
and divert surplus funds into more lucrative funds 
overseas. This was the option chosen. During the 
1960's in particular, UK investors went for high 
overseas investment rather than investment at home. 
For example, between 1960 and 1966, 20% of the UK's 
total industrial investment went overseas" (p. 28). 
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In consequence, they conclude, 'it was low investment that caused 
low profits' (p. 29) rather than low productivity and profit making 
investment unattractive, as most suggest (eg., Wilson Committee, 1980). 
By examining the policies of BSC they also show how plans to 
restructure the UK manufacturing sector were deferred as a consequence 
of the 1973 oil crisis, after which companies slowed or stopped 
investing, overall investment falling by 22% between 1971 and 1975 
(p. 32 footnote). Between 1974-79 there were many closures and in 
total some 650,000 jobs were lost. It appears that most UK 
manufacturing companies adopted policies similar to that of Lucas 
Industries, which was to leave the UK 'on a care and maintenance basis' 
(see Case Study, p. 151). However, the second oil crisis of 1979 
prompted the Government to stimulate a deliberate policy of divestment, 
which resulted in a loss of 1,200,000 jobs in manufacturing between 
1979 and 1981. This divestment process was principally implemented 
through British owned multi-nationals. For example, they found that 2S 
large private companies (of which Lucas Industries was one) and BL and 
the BSC were responsible for 433,000 redundancies. They conclude: 
"The loss of wealth to the Nation has been very 
large. In 1979 manufacturing industry generated an 
income for the Nation of £35 billion, after paying for 
its investments, and its total labour costs were £31 
billion. From the Nation's point of view, 
manufacturing industry was 'financially viable' • 
However, the overriding -concern of investors is their 
share of total wealth (their profits), not the total 
amount, and divestment from manufacturing industry 
helped them considerably" (po 37). 
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The elimination of 'excess capacity' through rationalization had 
served the purpose intended, since the above companies have generally 
returned to higher rates of· profitability; company profits having 
'rocketted' since 1979. (See Figure 5.1.) 
Figure 5.1. Gross Trading Profits for Industrial and Commercial 
£ompanies 1979-88 
£Bi1lion 
28 
26 
24 
22 
20 
18 
. 
1979 1981 
1982 1983 
Source: Central Statistical Office - Monthly Digests. 
Bryer et a1 conclude that: 
"(i)t is clear that UK manufactur~ng industry has, 
wi th Government help, been run down in the interests of 
investors, and so long as profit is accepted as the 
measure of economic success, their interests will always 
hold sway" (p. 27). 
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The recovery of profitability is not only related to the 
elimination of capacity; closures and mass redundancies have made it 
easier for management to impose changes in work practices, which at 
other times would be resisted by employees and trade unions. Massey 
and Meegan (1982) in reviewing this period state: 
••• the very obviousness of the closures 
happening all around has made other forms of change in 
production more likely. The clear threat of job loss 
through rationalization bas ••• increased management's 
abiH ty to push through other changes in the 
organization of production... This has been 
particularly true of intensification" (p. 216). 
In support of the above view, Massey and Meegan refer to 'speed-up' 
and changes in disciplinary procedures at BL, which led to the 
Longbridge 'riot' at the end of 1980 (po 216) and provide a series of 
press cuttings detailing other instances of changes in work practice 
across a range of industries. Other examples of this type of change 
imposed by management will be detailed in the Lucas Electrical case 
study where trade unions are asked for the first time to accept a 'non-
negotiable wage offer' and provide 'full co-operation' for changes in 
work practices and technology together with a no-strike commitment. 
Whilst the last demand is rejected, the trade unions nonetheless agreed 
to 'give their support to the removal of ineffective work practices' 
and were in principle prepared to accept changes which had previously 
been established and preserved by collective action. Massey and Meegan 
question whether acceptance of co-operation within British industry 
truly reflects a change of attitude to management authority amongst 
employees. They speculate that: 
..... the constant threat of rationalization, of 
output decline as well as employment decline, further 
strengthen management's hand in, introducing 
••• changes in production. What is referred to as 'a 
changing more responsible attitude on the shop floor' 
and 'a n;w mood of realism', as if it represents some 
realization by workers of what constitutes sensible 
behaviour on their part under a capitalist system, is 
often a straightforward submission to the fear of 
unemployment" (p. 217). 
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As trade unions are expected to protect and advance the interests 
of members, it is interesting to ask how they responded to these 
threats? 
Trade Union Responses to Investor Strategies 
It is possible to distinguish trade union responses to these 
changes in the economy at two levels. At national and industry level 
trade unions are collectively represented only by the TUC which alone 
seeks to influence the formulation of general Government economic 
policy. The rundown of UK manufacturing industry, outlined above , 
suggests that such endeavours were inadequate and, as will be shown 
below, this was largely due to the fact that Labour Governments were 
unable to exercise any control over strategic plans developed at 
company level. In consequence, the main challenge to the closure and 
redundancy plans of management arose at the implementation stage at a 
company and plant level. At this late stage, the prospects of 
reversing policy were very 1imi ted and successful opposi tion was very 
exceptional. 
Historically, the trade unions have looked to Labour Governments to 
control private industry's investment, markets and owners, whilst they 
• organize workers around the issues 'directly' concerned wi th the 
employment contract. However, over the last two decades, trade union 
involvement with Government economic poliCies, (especially incomes 
policy) has been such that the distinction between industrial and 
political spheres of influence has become artificial (Crouch, 1979). 
This separation must also be questioned, given.the dominant position of 
multi-divisional companies in the economy and the significance of their 
deCisions for government economic policy (Holland, 1975). 
101 
Throughout the period under review, Labour Government economic 
policy has been supported by TUC initiated attempts to constrain wage 
settlements in line with Government income policies. The 'high mark' 
of this policy was the 'social contract' (HMSO, 1975), the first stage 
of which involved a TUC agreed 'pay restraint' of £6 per week limit on 
pay increases for 1975/6. In return, legislative reforms, especially 
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 and the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 were to enhance employee and trade union 'rights' 
within the employing organization. 
Individual workers secured considerable protection against 
dismissal, improved redundancy arrangements, paid time off from work to 
carry out union duties, and (for women workers) paid maternity leave. 
Unions gained a legal procedure for securing a right to recognition, a 
fuller extension of immunities from common law actions, improved 
arbitration facilities through a new body, the Advisory, ConCiliation 
and Arbitration Service (ACAS), and new rights to access to information 
relevant to bargaining (Crouch, 1979, pp. 92-93). 
These 'rights', however, did not enhance trade union ability to 
oppose closures and redundancies. In fact, increased redundancy 
payments helped to facilitate the implementation of management plans 
(Levie, Gregory and Callender, 1984). The avoidance of the mass 
redundancies of the late 1970's and 'de-industrialization' required a 
reversal of investor strategies,· whereby manufacturing industry would 
be the subject of co-ordinated planning up to and including national 
planning. Throughout the period, such a policy was never to be 
implemented by Labour Governments, or advocated by the TUC. From the 
workers point of view, the Labour Government and TUC response to the 
rUndown of the British economy was ineffective, and this failure has 
. 
been partially acknowledged by the Labour Party and the TUC in their 
document 'Economic Planning and Industrial Democracy' (1982). 
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Introducing their 'new planning framework' they review 'lessons t 
••• 0 
be drawn from the relative failure of past planning attempts' (p. 13). 
It is recognised that the 1965 National Plan organized by the 
Department of Economic Affairs as the main planning initiative of the 
1964-70 government, failed because it did not involve two crucial 
centres of decision making: 
"First, the DEA was fatally weakened by the fact that 
public expenditure control and the key macro-economic 
decisions were not geared into the Plan's 
objectives •••• Secondly, the Plan failed to change the 
various strategies being pursued by companies. In 
particular, the relation between the national growth 
target and the targets for individual sectors was 
vague, while the relation between companies' plans and 
sector plans was vaguer still" (para. 62). ~ 
Ineffectiveness at company level indicates just how little 
influence the Government was able to exercise over investor strategies. 
Regarding the 1974-79 period of office, it is recognised that the 
main planning initiatives, the establishment of NEB and Planning 
Agreements, failed to link the corporate strategies of the major 
companies wi th the development of national industrial strategy. A 
number of factors were identified to explain this failure, ego the 
absence of a coherent planning framework within which tripartite 
bargaining could be controlled; the voluntary nature of company 
participation with no link to government financial subsidies disbursed 
under the Industry Act, and a lack of understanding of, and sympathy 
with, the proposals within Whitehall. Pervesely, the Report goes on to 
claim success for industrial 'studies' undertaken by the NEDC's 
Economic Development Committee and Sector Working Parties, whilst 
acknowledging that they did not influence policy at a company level! 
••••• (I)t is apparent that they too (Sector Working 
Parties) have been unsuccessful in translating their 
work at the level of industrial sector into action in 
companies. They like previous attempts to plan in the 
UK have failed to come to terms with the decisive role 
of company planning" (para 65.) 
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The new planning framework which supposedly takes account of the 
above 'lessons' remains committed to a planning agreement approach, but 
ties Government's financial aid to participation in such agreements and 
allows for trade union involvement, principally through boardroom 
representation based on a modified Bullock form (see Chapter 4). In 
many respects, the proposals are a refinement of past policies which 
Topham (1982) characterized as the 'practice of tripartism' (p. 10). 
Past policies and the enhanced proposals within the Report are, he says 
.. strongly wedded to an assumption of consensus 
between employers, workers and the state, and this 
leads it to make many proposals for the role of 
workers and union organizations, which end up re-
inforcing employer and Government domination, through 
the incorporation of forces which should be directed 
towards bargaining power, into a debilitating process 
of consultation at the margin of authority" (p. 9). 
Nonetheless, the Labour Party still advocate industrial democracy 
in the belief that it will raise industrial efficiency by improving 
managerial decisions and that Government economic planning can achieve 
a more effective distribution of state aid to the private sector. The 
baSic rationale here is to promote more private sector activity and not 
to change the basic criteria underlying company decision making, ie, 
prof! tability. The inadequacy of this type of government involvement 
from an employee perspective has been illustrated by the past activites 
of the IRC and the NEB which have promoted rationalizations on private 
enterprise principles (see: GEC (Holland, 1975), British Leyland 
(Trades Councils, 1980), Vickers (Beynon and Wainwright, 1979), Lucas 
(Wainwright and 
Wainwright (1980) 
She states: 
Elliott, 1982) Parsons (Trade Council, -1980). 
is critical of Labour Government policy in this area. 
, .. 
"When it came to the GEC rationalizations, and then 
those of British Leyland and British Shipbuilders, the 
negotiations ••• took place on the basis of very 
definite, albeit implicit political premises. For 
----~~~=========== 
example, in the case of 
starting point was Wilson's 
restructuring of manufacturing 
GEC, the 
belief 
industry 
political 
that the 
into fewer 
more concentrated private corporations managed by the 
most profit conscious of modern management was in the 
interest of the majority of the British people. Such 
a political premise had never been agreed at any trade 
union conference, but this was the shared basis of the 
negotiations which at Woolwich negotiated 5,000 out of 
a job, and smoothed the way for the further 29 
closures which Weinstock carried out over the 
following four years·' (po 3, emphasis added). 
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The unwillingness of Labour Government to plan on a basis other 
than profit, is well-illustrated within nationalized industries where 
planning procedures and principles are similar to those operated in the 
private sector. No provision has. ever been made for direct 
participation by either Government or trade union in corporate 
planning. The setting of financial targets and the vague monitoring of 
capital investment programmes are seen to provide an effective means of 
Control. Bryer et al (1981) in their study of BSC show that in the 
steel industry this does not provide an adequate system of 
aCCOuntability (p. 276). Their study shows that the trade unions were 
unable to monitor and evaluate ESC strategic plans on the basis of 
employer interests even though they had access to the relevant 
information. The trade unions and worker directors simply endorsed 
management plans for expansion without making any attempt to validate 
them, and were subsequently unprepared when these plans were reversed, 
as the fi rst major step in the rundown of British manufacturing 
industry. The same circumstances seem to have applied with regard to 
the NCB's 'Plan for Coal' (1974, 1977), however, in this instance, the 
reversal of the Plan was for a year vigorously resisted by the National 
Union Of Miners. The failure of this dispute was in large measure 
inevitabe given the preceding rundown of UK manufacturing of which 
BSC's Contraction was a major part. 
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In the view of Bryer et al (1984b) an effective response to 
investor strategies required trade unions at an industry and national 
level to develop alternative plans for manufacturing industry for 
otherwise their influence was inevitably limited. They state: 
"For the Labour movement to have responded coherently 
in 1979-83 would have required integrated shadow plans 
for at least six sectors that were responsible for 70% 
of the fa11 in manufacturing output between 1979 and 
1981, and for at least the 27 companies within them 
that were responsible for 40% of the resulting 
increase in unemployment" (p. 232). 
Such 'shadow planning' was not undertaken and trade union 
OPposition to investor strategy was consequently developed by shop 
stewards at a company and plant level. 
Shop stewards, as work based trade union representatives, have 
inevitably had to play a focal role in trade union responses to the 
redundancy and closure decisions of management. The experience gained 
by such shop stewards in the 1960's of organizing collective action to 
support wage and work control issues seems not to have prepared them 
for the closures occurring in the 1970's. A range of responses have 
evolved, and as will be seen below, trade union 'successes' are the 
exception rather than the rule, and moreover, such 'successes' have 
generally not been sustained. 
In the vast majority of cases, management plans were enacted 
Without any organized opposition. Often employees and stewards 
aCCepted the economic rationality of private profit with no alternative 
employee perspective being developed. Shop stewards are confronted by 
many inhibiting factors which lead to acquiescence. These fac tors 
reflect both aspects of management practice and also weaknesses arising 
from trade union action or lack of action. Management's position is 
\ 
strengthened in a number of important ways. 
Firstly, management need only reveal their plans at the policy 
implementation stage, there being a legal requirement to disclose 90 
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A weakness in trade union organization is that officials are 
usually organized sectionally, external to the company or plant, and 
generally have made no attempt to provide shop stewards with any 
financial or expert advice. Their role is often to discourage the 
belief that management actions can be successfully opposed. Moore 
(1984) for example, having reviewed trade union responses to shop 
steward opposition to closures, concludes: 
"In closure fights workers appear to go to the brink 
of realising it may be the working of capitalism 
itself, through the decisions of employers, 
governments and international agencies, which are 
making them redundant. But instead of inspiring, 
encouraging or even assisting them to seek 
alternatives, the conventional trade union role 
appears to pull them back to look for a compromise, or 
even to countenance a sell-out. If the picture 
sometimes appears to be the reverse, wi th members 
clamouring for redundancy payments rather than job 
retention from the trade union officials, it may 
amount to no more than reaping what has already been 
sown (as at Corby)" (p. 212). 
A minority of shop steward organizations have, nonetheless sought 
to contest the redundancy plans of management by attempting to 
highlight the contradiction inherent in decisions based on profit based 
criteria. The criticism of these plans can simply be based upon an 
internal perspective, which shows how management planning fails to 
provide for employee interests. On occasions, this approach has been 
extended to involve an evaluation of the costs redundancies imposed on 
the wider community, thereby presenting a social-audit approach 
(Barratt Brown, 1978). Both approaches, however, have only provided 
trade unions with limited success. 
Normally, management are able to ignore such initiatives, as will 
be illustrated by the Lucas Electrical case st~dy. Other documented 
cases include the Massey Ferguson closure of its Kilmarnock plant 
(Henderson et aI, 1984), the Dunlop closure of its Speke plant (Lane, 
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1979), the British Aluminium closure of its Resolven plant (Gregory, 
1984), BSC's closure of its Corby plant (Bryer et aI, 1984c) and BL's 
closure of a number of plants (Robinson, 1982). 
Where shop stewards have adopted the social-audit approach and have 
successfully politicized the issue by reference to local/regional 
employment considerations, management plans have been reversed. This 
has required Government intervention, and has therefore depended upon 
the unwillingness of the Government to accept the political 
consequences arising from the redundancies. An example here involved 
the Government's decision, on behalf of the CEGB, to advance a major 
capital investment project, the. Drax B power station, thereby avoiding 
redundancies at Parsons Ltd (Trades Council, 1980). Where the 
political consequences of redundancies are of less concern, Government 
intervention has not been forthcoming (Gold et aI, 1979). 
In instances where shop stewards have organized occupations of 
company premises, either on a sit-in or work-in basis (Coates, 1981), 
and have forced Government intervention on the basis of political 
expediency, redundancies have been delayed. Ei ther the intervention 
has involved financial subsidy to the companies concerned, eg, UCS 
(McGill, 1973), or assistance has been given to set up worker co-
operatives, eg Meriden (Greenwood, 1977), Scottish Daily News (McKay 
and Barr, 1976) and KME (Eccles, 1981). Where such government 
intervention is not forthcoming then failure has been the norm 
(Grunberg, 1981, p. 92). An exception here being the case of Lee Jeans 
(Lorentzen, 1984) where a commercial take-over was negotiated. 
The significance of the 'successes' achieved by the above actions 
has sometimes been oversta ted (Coates, ,1981) since Government 
involvement has been selective and the passage of time has often 
resulted in a return to management control eg, UCS. In other 
instances, where shop stewards have attempted to continue without the 
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requisite 'management' expertise, the employees have inadvertently 
accepted a reconstruction of the enterprise on an underfunded basis, so 
that closure is postponed rather than avoided, eg KME (Bryer, 1982). 
One of the most successful and innovative attempts to avoid 
redundancy was the Lucas Aerospace Shop Steward Combine Committee 
(LASSCC) alternative plan to produce socially useful products. This 
initiative must be explored in more detail for a number of reasons. It 
represents a major departure from traditional trade union activity in 
that it involves a conscious proactive attempt to anticipate and 
prepare for change in using management practice but not planning for 
profit. It also reveals how company management refuse to involve shop 
stewards in strategic planning and illustrates how the Labour 
Government's commitment to tripartite bargaining was underwritten by 
the acceptance of a profit based system of planning. The authoritative 
study of the Lucas Plan, by Wainwright and Elliott (1982), reveals many 
of the problems involved in organizing a campaign. It began in the 
late 1960' s and continued to the early 1980' s. The first four years 
involved inter-site co-operation over wages, pensions and redundancies 
at the Burnley site, to prove the potential value of 'combine' action 
involving both production and staff unions. Two years of further 
campaigning on such issues, especially redundancies, led the combine in 
November 1974 to approach Tony Benn at the Department of Industry to 
explore Government attitudes to the Combine's proposal that Lucas 
Aerospace be nationalized. Benn told them that the Government was 
unlikely to consider it favourably. However, he did encourage the 
Combine to prepare for tripartite negotiations on company strategy via 
the planning agreement system. The Combine felt that having a plan of 
their own was a pre-requisite of such negotiations and in consequence 
spent the next year developing alternative products to be produced by 
Lucas employees in the event of threatened redundancies. The Plan was 
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made public in January 1976 and involved detailed documentation of 150 
product proposals together with accompanying analysis. Wainwright and 
Elliott state that for the purpose of summary the Plan can be divided 
into four interwoven parts: 
(i) a documentation of the productive resources of Lucas 
Aerospace; 
(ii) an analysis of the problems and needs facing workers at Lucas 
Aerospace as a result of changes in the aerospace industry 
and the world economy; 
(iii) an assessment of the social needs which the available 
resources could meet; 
(iv) detailed proposals about the products, the production process 
and the employment development programme which contribute to 
meeting these different needs (p. 98). 
The two central features of the Plan were the proposals to produce 
socially useful products* by using human-centred technologies and the 
rejection of the need to earn profits, the criteria of economic success 
being limited to the achievement of financial viability over a range of 
products (allowing some products to be produced at a loss) Over a given 
period of time. 
According to Wainwright and Elliott, so 'radical' were the 
implications of the plan that opposition to combine activity arose not 
*At first the meaning given to the term "socially useful production" 
tended to be intuitive and implicit. Over time an approximate 
definition evolved: 
- The product must not waste energy and raw material, neither in 
manufacture nor in its use. 
- The product must be capable of being produced in a labour 
intensive manner so as not to give rise to &tructual unemployment. 
- The product must lend itself to organizational forms within 
production which are non-alienating and without authoritarian 
giving of orders. Instead the work should be organized 60 as to 
link practical and theoretical tasks and allow for human creativity 
and enthusiasm (Wainwright and Elliott, p. 107). 
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only from management and the Government, but also from official trade 
unions. 
Wainwright and Elliott detail the response given by official trade 
unions to the Combine's initiative. At best, it was 'limited', and to 
a certain extent 'obstructive'. For example the Confederation of 
Shipbuilders and Engineering Unions (CSEU) was not clearly friendly to 
the Combine. After producing an 'alternative corporate plan' to avoid 
redundancies, the LASSCC sought CSEU support to negotiate this plan 
wi th Lucas management and the Labour Government. They were ignored. 
The CSEU would not recognise even the existence of the Combine let 
alone actively support its efforts. In fact, the Combine (LASSCC, 
1980) questioned whether the CSEU's main concern was to support Lucas 
management, rather than the workers' initiative to save jobs: 
"We do not like to think that there was a 
conspiracy between the CSEU and management, but the 
following quote from a section of the May 77-May 78 
Annual Report of the Lucas Aerospace Personnel 
Department makes you wonder. After complaining 
that the Combine committee was still pushing the 
alternative plan, it went on 'it is clear that 
national officers of the union, and the Department 
of Industry are aware of the Company's policies, 
and the CSEU is dealing effectively with the 
unofficial body'" (p. 7). 
Opposi tion from the company was to be expected, since, as 
Chapter 3 has argued, for top management the right to manage does not 
simply mean the freedom to get on with the technical task of management 
without interference. It is the right to manage in the interests of 
shareholders. Furthermore, as was indicated in Chapter 4, it is not 
normal for management to recognise multi-plant combines and in 
consequence voluntary negotiations were unlikely. Negotiations, 
therefore, depended upon Government influence within a tripartite 
bargaining context. As will be shown below, the Labour Government did 
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not give direct support to the Plan either and tripartite negotiations 
with the Combine were never instituted. 
The presence of the Plan was, however, a serious embarrassment to 
the company and provided a focus !or resisting the Company declaration 
that it was to make 1,100 workers redundant in February 1977. These 
redundancies were withdrawn with the Combine's threat of industrial 
action across all sites. However, in March 1978, the company proposed 
2,000 redundancies and according to Wainwright and Elliott (p. 183) 
secret meetings with the President of the CSEU, Ken Gill, paved the way 
to an eventual agreement between the company, the Labour Government and 
the CSEU. The agreement accepted the closure of a plant in Liverpool 
(the Victor Works), which was to be replaced by a new factory which 
would attract an £8 million government subsidy. However, 1,000 jobs 
were to be lost. The Combine Committee and a CSEU Delegate Conference 
expressed major reservations about the agreement. However, these were 
set aside, and an agreement was signed by the CSEll and Lucas Aerospace. 
Wainwright and Elliott argue that the acceptance of the agreement by 
Ken Gillon behalf of the CSEll, and by Gerald Kaufman on behalf of the 
Government, reflect differences in attitude as to what is achievable by 
employees in negotiation with management. The Combine were prepared to 
believe that Lucas Aerospace could be planned to promote employee 
interest; Gill and Kaufman could not disassociate the interests of 
employees from those of Lucas Aerospace as a company: 
"The explanation for these different assessments lies 
in the way that the Department of Industry and the 
CSEU leadership accepted management's basic objectives 
for Lucas Aerospace. The following extracts from an 
interview with Kaufman indicate the Department of 
Industry's acceptance of (Lucas Aerospace's) view: 
Wainwright: The shop stewards feel that they could 
have taken on the company industrially and 
saved all the jobs 
Kaufman: That would have wrecked Lucas Aerospace, 
there is no doubt about it, all the jobs 
in Lucas Aerospace 
Wainwright: You mean that Lucas management would have 
closed down Aerospace? 
Kaufman: Lucas Aerospace the-company would have 
become Unviable. It is as simple as that. 
Lucas Aerospace as a company was on the 
verge of becoming unviable because of the 
delay in implementing their restructuring 
plans. And in that case they would have 
just had to close the whole thing down. 
Now the Confed in my view very sensibly 
decided that that was not a risk they 
wanted to take ••• 
Wainwright: It is not clear from the agreement whether 
all the jobs were saved or not. 
Kaufman: No, all the jobs were never going to be 
saved. One of the things that the Confed 
Conference put forward was that all the 
jobs should be saved and tha t was never 
on" (p. 194). 
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This illustrates how even a Labour Minister was unwilling to 
conceive of any alternative system of planning other than that operated 
by a 'capi talist' management. As was indicated above, the official 
response to investor strategies has been underwritten by this belief. 
Despite this setback, the Combine continued to press its case and 
Wainwright and Elliott argue that the Plan helped to forestall major 
redundancies at Lucas Aerospace over a five year period. The advent of 
a Conservative Government in 1979 ended any prospect of the re-opening 
of tripartite negotiations regarding the Plan. 
The radical challenges posed by the Plan was so unlike traditional 
trade union practice that the failure to receive more positive support 
from the official unions and the Labour Government was, in retrospect, 
not so surprising given the failures recorded since 1979. 
Even though the Lucas initiative depended upon a number of special 
circumstances (eg, highly-skilled workforce, versatile technology, 
tradition of alternative products, a planned economic environment, 
recognition but independence, political support (Wainwright and 
Elliott, pp. 247-50», it is nonetheless important since it not only 
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allowed the logic of capitalist decision making to be questioned but 
also because it illustrates how other identified inadequacies of trade 
union responses to redundancies, such as lack of time, unity, 
organization and information can be over~ome. By planning, the Combine 
created time, so that not only were plans developed, but also 
organization· and unity within the workforce was fostered, and the 
process of planning provided a basis for organizing and collecting 
information to evaluate employee interests as the first step in 
realizing those interests. As such, it was a significant attempt to 
implement some aspects of management practice, as a means of enhancing 
employee interests. 
This said, the initiative in itself was unable to provide 
sufficient impetus to embrace Lucas Industries as a company, let alone 
provide for the co-ordination of plans across industrial sectors. 
Nonetheless, it partially, if only temporarily, moved the trade union 
structure within Lucas Aerospace into a position to start 'shadow 
planning', (Bryer et aI, 1984b). An examination of the Lucas 
Electrical case study in Part 2 will show that a similar initiative may 
have been adopted to benefit employee interests. 
Conclusion 
The review of investor strategies and trade union responses to 
closures and redundancies undertaken in this chapter allow a number of 
major inadequacies in trade union policy making to be identified. More 
importantly, it has been illustrated that trade unions have not 
developed an alternative logic to the profit based planning advanced by 
management in the interests of shareholders. Throughout the period 
official trade unions and Labour Governments appear to· have accepted 
. 
that employee interests can only be advanced by attempts to enhance 
profit based planning either by simply providing capital subsidy or by 
enabling trade unionists to provide an input into managerial planning 
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via t systems of representation t • This view is underwri t ten by the 
belief that Labour Governments have the political power to re-direct 
maJ'or macro economic variables to provide for employee interests. Y t e , 
the Labour Party in office has never sought to use the powers that 
exist to change the basis of company decision making and company law to 
advance employee interests and in consequence they have fallen back on 
the logic of private profit as the fundamental resource allocative 
mechanism within the economy. 
In the above circumstances, trade union attempts to resist closures 
and redundancies have been based on re-active oppositional policies at 
the time of implementation. In consequence, resis tance has not only 
been isolated but unplanned, the Lucas Aerospace t alternative plan' 
providing the earliest exception to this norm. This initiative showed 
how planning can be directed to enhancing employee interests, and also 
illustrates how management do not wish to share their strategic 
planning prerogatives with trade unions. As the Lucas Electrical case 
study in Part 2 will show, a major objective of management is to 
maintain its planning prerogative, whilst assigning trade unions a 
negotiating role within a collective bargaining context. 
Part 2. Redundancies at Lucas Electrical Ltd, Birmingham: 
a case study 
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Chapter 6. Research Methodology and Introduction to the Case Study. 
The Case Study as a Research Strategy. 
As was stated in the introduction, the objective of the research 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of trade union policy making and by 
means of this attempt to assess the potential for effective use by 
trade unions of accounting information. To explore this a case study 
approach was used. 
It is well known that case studies have a number of strengths and 
weaknesses (Rowan and Reason, 1981). They are ideal for in-depth 
exploratory investigation and for achieving a detailed understanding of 
the dynamics of specific situations (Blau, 1955; Gouldner, 1954; 
Selznick, 1966; Pettigrew, 1973). They are less well-suited for 
research where the aim is to produce generalizable knowledge about 
facts and relationships in a wide range of settings. Here the more 
formal hypothesis testing mode of study is more appropriate. Since the 
aim of the present research was to acquire in-depth understanding of a 
little-researched area, the case study offered itself as an obvious 
methodology for developing an analysis and interpretation of trade 
union decision making in a real situation. 
The literature on research methodology identifies at least two 
broad possible approaches to the conduct of case studies. On the one 
hand, the researcher can attempt to develop what Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) have described as a "grounded theory" which attempts to build up 
a theoretical explanation of the si tuation studied from the accounts 
and interpretations found in the situation investigated. On the other 
hand, a theoretical model can be taken into a situation to be used as 
an attempt to evaluate the extent to which the situation confirms, 
rejects or modifies the theory. As there was little previous research 
in this area there was no substantial theoretical issue to guide the 
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field work and, in consequence, the research was necessarily 
exploratory and open-ended, the major conclusions of the study tmerging 
as part of the research process. 
Development of Case Study 
Information disclosure to trade unions became a topic of 
considerable interest when the, 1975 Employment Protection Act required 
management to provide information to trade unions consistent \.;1. th "good 
industrial relations practice". Collective bargaining in the UK. is 
viewed as the most important vehicle for enhancing employee 
participation in industry, and the central focus of management-trade 
union relationships. Information was seen to have a crucial role to 
play in the process of collective bargaining. However confusion 
appeared to exist as to the actual impact and consequences of greater 
disclosure, a situation illustrated by the conflicting arguments 
employed by proponents of greater disclosure (Foley and Maunders, 
1977). For example, advocates of greater disclosure of information 
(Hunter and McKersie, 1973) argued that it would lead to a more 
rational and objective bargaining based on the 'facts' in addition to 
enhanced employee commi tmen t. Others believed such di sc10sure would 
only strengthen union 'power' (Foley and Maunders, p. 44). A belief 
supposedly confirmed by the public statements of certain unions and the 
TUC's claim of increased disclosure as part of its industrial democracy 
reform package (see Chapter 4). 
Underlying this debate was a belief that information equals a power 
resource, with the implication that disclosure of certain categories 
of information could potentially affect the process of management 
decision making. However, academic research in this area in the, 
1970' s did not address this issue directly by locating research at a 
decision level within the employing organization. Empirical research 
generally sought to map out changes in the scope of collective 
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bargaining arising from greater disclosure (Reeves and McGovern, 1981; 
Jackson-Cox et aI, 1984). This research employed survey and interview 
methods which precluded any analysis of the decisions subject to 
bargaining. An alternative approach, based on the elaboration of 
theoretical decision models for particular participants in collective 
bargaining eg shop stewards (Cooper & Essex, 1977) sought by survey 
methods to establish whether a correspondence existed between theory 
and practice. Again, however, this approach fails to provide any 
analysis of the decision subject to negotiation such as the reasons for 
redundancies and, moreover, Cooper and Essex recognised important 
limitations arising from survey research methods. In advoca ting 
research based on observation, they state: 
"A forced choice questionaire, such as the one used in 
our survey involves the researcher coding the responses 
for the respondent. In other words, our image of 
reali ty has been imposed on the respondents by the 
questionaire. Forced choice answers also tend to 
'prompt' the respondent, particularly when the 
respondent is asked about information which he has 
probably never received. 
These limitations suggest that 
steward's role should also 
observational methods" (p. 212). 
data about the shop 
be collected by 
In initiating fieldwork research I therefore sought to establish 
trade union access which would allow a detailed evaluation by 
observation of current practice in the area of wage negotiation, then 
seen as the principal concern of collective bargaining. Additionally, 
there was an intention to evaluate the issue subject to negotiation, as 
a matter of research in itself. The research therefore not only 
focused on the activities of the principal actor, but also sought to 
provide an analysis of the issue of dispute with the intention of 
assessing whether trade union needed accounting information. A major 
concern was to assess whether available accounting information was 
relevant and useful to trade unions in their decision making since this 
information is generally produced for management use. 
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The 1975 Employment Protection Act which provided the initial 
stimulus to research in this area was also to play a part in 
facilitating my research access. Senior shop stewards at Lucas 
Electrical had negotiated with management to attend a Worker's 
Education Course at Birmingham. University on the use of accounting 
information in negotiations as the Employment Protection Act required 
employers to provide paid leave for attendance at recognised trade 
union courses. As tutor of the, 1979/80 course, my supervisor (Dr. 
R.A. Bryer) was able to introduce me to senior stewards who wished to 
promote the use of accounting information in bargaining at Lucas 
Electrical and these stewards, as members of a multi-union, multi-site 
shop steward committee (known as the Senior Shop Steward Committee _ 
hereafter SSSC) proposed that the SSSC co-operate in my research 
proposal to review trade union negotiating practice with the intention 
of providing financial information for bargaining purposes. No 
oPpposition to this proposal arose at the SSSC. Early in the research, 
management declared 3000 redundancies at Lucus Electrical; this 
decision became the focus of the case study analysis. There were three 
prinCipal phases of field work research in developing the case study: 
1. An investigation of wage bargaining practices: 
Initially, the research involved the conduct of interviews to 
establish how different trade union groups formulated wage claims at 
Lucas Electrical Ltd. These interviews were loosely structured to 
allow respondents to provide their own account of current practice 
(see: Exploratory Questionaire, Appendix 1). The general opinion was 
that the perceived 'technical' nature of accounting information limited 
its potential usefulness to trade unions in wage bargaining. Wage 
. 
claims they thought were better formulated by reference to changes in 
the "cost of living" as reflected by changes in the retail price index. 
In the case of "skilled" trade groups there was also a concern to 
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maintain "pay differentials." Both of the above jUstifications for 
wage increases are widely represented in the media. Shop stewards did 
not think wage claims based on company specific information was 
feasible nor necessarily in their interests. Generally, the 
"financial information" that was made available by management was 
ignored in the belief that such information was invariably provided 
merely to lower trade union wage claim aspirations. Little use was 
made of "accounting information" since negotiators did not have any 
independent information, and the information provided by management was 
viewed with great suspicion. 
gloom and doom report". 
It was seen to be part of the "annual 
2. Participant-observation of redundancy negotiation: 
Management's announcement in June, 1980, of 3,000 redundancies at 
Lucas Electrical provided the major new focus for the field work. The 
SSSC requested that I become involved as a participant in all major 
meetings· to discuss and develop trade union policies regarding the 
redundancies. My brief was to provide any information which might help 
inform trade union policy making. The fifteen week period of 
participant observation is reported in the case study and, as will be 
seen, trade union policy was largely unaffected by the limited 
information which I was able to provide in the time available. A major 
constraint here was management's refusal to provide company specific 
information in response to a questionare to them on the redundancy 
decision which I and my supervisor produced for the SSSC. From 
management's response it was evident that they were attempting to 
Contain trade union decision making wi thin a limited ·'information 
context", that is, a situation, in which trade unions are provided with 
information regarding the current circumstances, but which is 
insufficient in itself to allow the trade union to understand why 
current problems have arisen and to identify possible future courses of 
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action. Management's information response simply addressed the areas 
which supported management policy interpretation. Other areas of 
information were ignored. The trade unions were not prepared to 
challenge management's control over information sources. 
3. Setting the redundancy in a strategic planning framework: 
After the redundancy I collected background data so that I could 
try to assess whether it was a shortage of information or other 
problems that prevented an effective trade union response. I decided 
to set the redundancy decision wi thin a historical perspect! ve based 
upon the strategic policy options available to Lucas Electrical during 
the previous five year period. The starting point was the last major 
redundancy decision at Lucas Electrical which had occurred in 1975. It 
involved three months library and field research, a fundamental 
revelation being that the decline in UK vehicle production output, the 
major management justification for the 1980 redundancy, had been 
publicly documented as early as 1975. Not only did this raise 
questions as to the interests advanced by management strategic planning 
practices, but also highlighted the 'reactive nature of trade union 
policy making, and trade union disinterest in information already 
available. Until management declared 3,000 redundancies in June, 1980, 
the trade unions were not aware of how management strategic policy was 
evolving, or its likely impact on employee interests. There was almost 
complete trade union disinterest in strategic planning. 
The identification of strategic planning as of fundamental 
importance to the evaluation of trade union policy suggested that the 
case study could not be put into perspective until trade union policy 
in this area had been investigated. Based on the analyses in Chapters 
4 and 5, and trade union practice at Lucas, I was able to identify four 
policy options available to trade unions varying according to 
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a) the nature of trade union-management relationships 
and 
b) the degree of trade union involvement in planning. 
The juxtaposition of these dimensions provides the four-fold 
classification of trade union policy options shown in Figure 6.1 below: 
r 
I 
Figure 6.1. Alternative Policy Options Available to Trade Unions 
Dependent Type 1 Type 2 I , I 
I , 
Bargaining over 
the Terms of 
Policy 
Implementation 
Negotia tion 
of Long Term 
Policy 
Choices 
I 
I 
I Relationship 
t, with 
Management 
Independent 
Type 3 
Militancy Based 
on Trade Union 
Principle 
Restricted 
Involvement 
With Planning 
Type 4 
Mili tancy Based 
on 
Alternative Plans 
Comprehensive 
I 
I 
The principal aspects of each dimension and the alternative 
policy options will be outlined: 
Relations with Management. 
The distinguishing feature here is the trade union attitudes to 
objectives. For trade unions to accept a dependent relationship on 
management, they must act on the assumption that their objectives can 
only be achieved through and with the aid of ma~agement. A position of 
independance is based on acknowledgement that management and trade 
union objectives are not compatable. 
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Involvement with Planning. 
Two related aspects of planning involving questions of Scope and 
time are of importance here. A restricted involvement with planning is 
based upon a short time perspective which assumes that one particular 
aspect of an organizations performance can be controlled without 
controling the whole organization. Thus, trade unions can mistakenly 
believe that industrial relation issues can be separated and negotiated 
in isolation from other aspects of business strategy. As the latter 
comment suggests, a comprehensive involvement with planning requires a 
long time perspective embracing policies concerned with the 
organization as a whole. 
Type 1: Bargaining over the terms of policy implementation. 
Traditional trade union collective bargaining is the central focus 
of this policy. Negotiations between management whether at national 
level with official trade unions or at company level with shop stewards 
are set within a planning framework which reflects the objectives and 
priori ties of management. Issues of negotiation are restricted in 
SCope and involve a fairly short time span as is illustrated by wage 
negotiations at both national and company level. Management plans are 
set outside the negotiations. All that is to be decided is the post 
implementation balance of interest. Chapter 4 outlined the historical 
development involved here. 
Type 2: Negotiation of long term policy choices. 
The TUC proposals for worker directors sought to change management-
trade union relationships by lengthening the time perspective and scope 
of issues subject to bargaining. As was shown, these proposals imply 
that planning remains a management rather than a trade union function. 
This dependence on management for planning is also incorporated in 
other similar proposals such as management by agreement (McCarthy and 
Ellis, 1973), tripartite bargaining (Holland, 1975), which do not 
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provide any clear indication as to why management should be prepared to 
change the objectives which inform their planning activities. In 
consequence, this option is underwritten by a trade union preparedness 
to accept these objectives. Otherwise management would have no reason 
to involve trade unions. 
Type 3: Militancy based on trade union principles. 
This policy recognises that management do not give priority to 
employee interests in their planning. However, no attempt is made to 
engage in business planning as a means of identifying employee 
collecti ve interests. Trade union practice is based on a defence and 
advancement of employee interests in defiance of management plans. 
Employee interests are identified collectively by employees themselves 
from the common experience they share in the work place. Tradeunions 
are organizations which allow this collective will to be expressed. 
Since employee experience at work is essentially restrictive the issues 
of dispute are likewise limited in scope and time perspective, 
reflecting a principal strategy of management control. (See Chapter 
3. ) 
Type 4. Militancy based on alternative plans. 
To develop this policy trade unions must set industrial relations 
issues within a total strategic framework of company policy 
development. Plans are evaluated by comparison with defined employee 
interests and the process of planning is used to develop a collective 
understanding of interests between employees and to initiate collective 
bargaining of strategiC issues. 
The case study, if Lucas experience is typical, illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of trade union policy where trade union involvement in 
planning is restricted. It also illustrates ma'nagement' s unwillingness 
to comprehensively involve trade unions in planning on a partnership 
baSis, as 1s implied by worker director proposals. Management have 
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always had the opportunity to negotiate long term policy choices by 
involving trade unions in planning, however as will be seen, management 
made no initiative in this area. They recognised the conflictual 
aspects of strategic planning, and sought to exclude trade unions from 
this area of management. The case study will also establish that there 
was plenty of information available to trade unions, and that this was 
not a fundamental reason for trade union failure to oppose the 
redundancies. The case study shows that the failure was caused by the 
unchallenged exercise of management power, as a result of trade union 
weakness, especially that arising from a disinterest in strategic 
planning, and the sectionalist nature of trade union organization. 
Detailed Research Methodology Employed: 
As noted, fieldwork research involved three distinct phases: 
1) Investigation of Wage Bargaining Practices. 
2) Participant Observer Role in Redundancy Negotiation. 
3) Setting the Redundancy Decision in a Strategic Planning 
Framework. 
Each of these stages had different emphases and required the 
employment of different methodologies. In the first two phases, 
research was exploratory and open-ended, the intent being to collect as 
much data as was possible in whatever way seemed appropriate for 
descriptive adequacy. The third phase, principally involved 
documenting, analysizing and checking events of the first two phases 
with the secretary of the SSSC, as my main "informant·' (Zelditch Jr, 
1970). Figure 6.2 presents a research diary together with a statement 
of the research methods adopted during the three phases. 
All of the activities identified in the research diary have been 
documented in two principal research files: 
1) A diary file with verbatim records of all meetings attended and 
all interviews conducted. When possible, interviews were tape-recorded 
Figure 6.2. Research Diary - Phases of Fieldwork Research and Research Methods Adopted at Lucas Electrical 
Period March 1980 --------------------- June 1980 -------------------- September 1980 -------------- February 1981 
Phase of 
Field Work 
Research 
Methods 
Adopted 
Investigation of wage 
bargaining practices. 
(a) Loosely structured 
interviews with the 
Chairman and/or 
Secretary of 7 wage 
negotiating groups. 
(b) Document analysis: Lucas 
Industries Annual Reports, 
Extel, Stockbroker Reports 
etc on Company Financial 
Performance. 
(c) Review of financial 
information use in wage 
bargaining - other 
documented cases e.g. Ford 
wage claim, ICI. 
(d) Visits to Centre for 
Alternative Industrial and 
Technological System - A 
research centre established 
at North East London Polly 
on initiative of Lucas 
Aerosrace Shop Stewards. 
,---_._-------
Participant observer role in 
redundancy negotiation. 
Setting the redundancy decision 
in a strategic planning framework. 
(a) Participant observer role (a) Analysis of academic, government 
and stockbroker reports on 
developments in UK and European 
vehicle industry, particularly 
from 1960. 
involving attendance at 
formal meetings: Time Involved 
5 SSSC Meetings 18 hours 
3 Mass Meetings of 12 
Stewards 
2 Work Conferences 18 
2 Co-ordination Meeting 
of Lucas Industries 
Stewards 6 
.. (b) AnalysiS of 'management - SSSC . 
communication by examination of 
minuted Business Review and Joint 
Policy Communication Meetings. 
(b) Between formal meetings, 
events were monitored 
through discussions with 
Chairman and Secretary of 
SSSC. 
(c) Informal contacts - numerous 
informal conversations and 
meetings were conducted with 
senior stewards and stewards, 
e.g. before and after formal 
meetings. 
(d) Development of Information 
Questionaire and analysis of 
t-fanagement's Response. 
(c) Analysis and cross checking of 
data with other independent 
sources. 
(d) Monitoring of ongoing events and 
review of participant - observer 
period via regular meetings with 
Secretary of SSSC. (These 
meetings continued until Aug 
1981.) 
(e) Monitoring of newspaper articles 
of direct and indirect relevance. 
..... 
N 
0\ 
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with the material being subsequently transcripted. Figure 6.3 lists 
formal contacts made with the SSSC and its executive members. 
2) A financial analysis file for the period, 1975-80 which 
accummulated relevant market forecasts, annual accounts and stockbroker 
reports regarding the UK and European vehicle market, and Lucas 
Electrical's position within the market. 
Figure 6.3. Diary of Formal Contacts with SSSC and Executive Members 
1980 26th March 
17th April 
23rd April 
24th April 
1st May 
7th May 
8th May 
8th May 
11th June 
17th June 
2nd June 
17th July 
6th August 
11th August 
14th August 
19th August 
21st August 
25th August 
11th Sept 
SSSC Meeting. 
Interview - Chairman SSSC. 
Interview - Chairman Allied Trade Group. 
Interview - Chairman Standards Room Group. 
Interview - Secretary SSSC. 
Interview Chairman Toolsetters Group. 
Interview - Chairman and Secretary of Autosetters 
Group 
Interview - Secretary Toolroom Group. 
SSSC Meeting. 
Mass Meeting of Shop Stewards. 
SSSC Meeting. 
Works Conference. 
SSSC Meeting. 
Mass Meeting of Shop Stewards. 
Co-ordination Meeting - Lucas Industries Shop 
Stewards. 
Re-convened Works Conference 
SSSC Meeting. 
Mass Meeting of Shop Stewards. 
Reconvened Works Conference. 
During the above period frequent informal contact was kept with 
the Chairman and Secretary of the SSSC. Shortly after this period, the 
chairman 'accepted' voluntary redundancy, and thereafter frequent 
informal contact was maintained with the Secretary, up until February, 
.1981. Subsequent meetings were held in April and August, 1981. 
An interesting feature of the research diary for the period of 
participant observation is that in total formal trade union meetings 
OVer 15 weeks to discuss the redundancy policy only amounted to 30 
hours, and approximately 20 hours was spent in negotiating sessions. 
These figures are interesting in that they show that shop stewards 
spent very little time in formal meetings, the only real occasions when 
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a corporate view of the problem si tuation could have been developed. 
This time commitment represents approximately 10% of working time which 
contrasts markedly with the almost full-time commitment of various 
managers to this problem. The full-time trade union officials were 
only directly involved for some 20 hours, which would be approximately 
4% of their working time. In these circumstances the term "full-time 
official" is misleading. 
Special Features and Problems of the Research 
The research methodology which developed involved a significant 
degree of participation within the case study. This level of 
involvement had consequences for the research process. 
Of particular relevance was the fact that the SSSC did not wish to 
restrict my involvement to observation; from the outset I was cast in 
the role of 'advisor'. As has already been indicated, the limited 
immediate information available prevented this role from being fully 
developed. From a research perspective this is of interest in itself. 
The advisor role was also important in that it influenced research 
access. It guaranteed full access to trade unions and only as good 
access to management as was available to the shop stewards. This was a 
deliberate choice. 
On the one hand, the 'advisor' role gave me intimate and assured 
access to all principal meetings which occured over the period of 
participant observation. It is very unlikely that being cast in the 
role of a more de tached 'researcher' would have provided equal access 
and material. 
On the other band, the 'advisor' role and the superior access it 
gave would have been destroyed if equal access with management had been 
sought. Realistically, I did not expect to be privy to confidential 
discussions involving issues of negotiation whilst being an advisor to 
one of the two parties involved. Given that the objective of the 
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research was to study the usefulness of accounting information to 
unions and employees and not its usefulness to managers, the choice of 
whom to advise was predetermined with its inevitable, predictable and 
controllable effects on access. Management's motivations and use of 
accounting information could only be studied indirectly, using 
documentary evidence, inference and observation at negotiating 
meetings. At least, until management objected to the trade union 
having outside advisors. Under current law even trade union officials 
have no right to enter an employer's premises and researchers working 
for trade unions are in no better posi tion. This can be an alarming 
experience. If management use academic researchers to help them solve 
their problems the researcher has legal access to company premises and 
information. Often, trade unions and shop stewards are expected to 
cooperate in ways thought appropriate. Trade union researchers, 
however, may be faced with the threat of prosecution for trespassing on 
'company' premises. 
Lucas' management went to great lengths to prevent the people 
working for them obtaining detailed information. For example, in the 
annual reports and accounts, Lucas management group Lucas Electrical 
together with six other subsidiary companies of Lucas Industries (the 
holding company) have established "trading agreements" to allow joint 
reporting of financial performance via a collective subsidiary holding 
company, Lucas Trading Ltd. (See Figure' 6.4, p. 132 below.) 
Management clearly establish these reporting arrangements to conceal 
detailed financial information being published about the individual 
companies. However, in determining available strategic policy options 
such constraints are not insurmountable, since external sources of 
information are important in evaluating a company's need to respond to 
changes in the environment in which it operates. Furthermore, the 
relevant financial evaluations must take account of the corporate 
130 
financial position rather than that of the individual companies. 
Moreover, there are a number of alternative sources which can be used 
to supplement information provided in annual accounts. Lucas 
Electrical's trading position has been constructed from information 
released by management to stockbrokers, shareholders, public enquiries 
(eg., Monopoly Commission investigations), public relation documents 
(eg., Lucas and Europe), press releases and to the employees and this 
has proved adequate for a strategic outline of the company's position. 
Moreover, strategic decisions often arise from changes in an 
organization's external environment and here very detailed company 
specific information is often not necessary. Thus, in setting the 
redundancy decision in a strategic planning framework, external sources 
(such as the Government's Central Policy Review Staff (1975), 
investigation of the UK car industry) have been used as an independent, 
authoritative source of information. 
A note on company releases: 
The principal source of internal information has been the minuted 
Business Review and Joint Policy Communication Meetings (hereafter 
JPCM) held for the SSSC by the General Manager and Persone1 Director of 
Lucas Electrical. 
Appendix 2a and 
Sample minutes for each kind of meeting are shown in 
2b. It would seem reasonable to suppose that 
management intended this information to be used to influence shop 
steward decisions. Obviously, it can still have information value when 
used in conjunction with other data: it didl 
The Research Site and Principal Actors. 
The redundancy decision detailed in the case study largely revolves 
around the attempts made by SSSC at Lucas Electrical to formulate a 
. 
policy response to the redundancies declared by management in June 
1980. For management, the Personnel Director of Lucas Electrical is 
the only individual directly involved, i.e., actually speaks to the 
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SSSC. For the SSSC, the T.G.W.U. District Official is the principal 
negotia tor. However, many others are involved in policy formulation. 
The principal participants and their relationships can best be 
established by a general overview of management and trade union 
organization at Lucas Electrical. 
The Company and Management Structure. 
Lucas Electrical is one of the major subsidiaries of Lucas 
Industries, the latter in 1980 being the ninty-seventh largest company 
quoted on the London Stock. Exchange (Stock Exchange Fact Book 1980). 
Lucas Industries is a holding company with worldwide interests in the 
design, manufacture and marketing of engineering products for three 
main sectors: automotives, aerospace and industrial. Worldwide in 
1980, the company employed over 100,000 people and had an annual 
turnover in excess of £1000 million (Annual Accounts). Within the UK, 
the company employed 67,805 people and is organized into manufacturing 
subsidiaries, there being one service subsidiary company which supports 
the manufacturing subsidiaries on a world wide basis. Figure 6.4 below 
shows the eight UK subsidiary companies and their areas of specialist 
interest. 
Lucas Industries is a decentralized organization which provides a 
high degree of autonomy for subsidiary companies whilst maintaining 
overall financial and operating control through a system of strategic 
plannlngs (details to be provided in Chapter 7). 
Since its establishment in 1919, Lucas Electrical has built its 
business as 8 principal supplier of electrical components (e.g., 
starters and generators, lamps, switchgear and windscreen wiper motors) 
mainly to UK car manufacturers for assembly. Worldwide in 1980 the 
Company had operating interests in eleven countries (normally via 
partnership agreements) with employment exceeding 28,000. In the UK, 
the company had six divisions which operate as profit centres and which 
Figure 6.4. Lucas Industries and Its Principal UK Subsidiary Companies 
Lucas Lucas Lucas Lucas Lucas Rist's Wires S.M.E.C.: 
Aerospace: Electrical: CAV: Batteries: Girling: and Cables: 
Airframe and Automotive Fuel Vehicle Vehicle Vehicle Industrial 
aircraft electrical injection batteries. braking electrical holding 
engine and systems systems. cables and company 
systems and electronic for diesel wiring utilizing 
equipment. components engines. harnesses. electronic 
technology. 
Source: Constructed From Lucus Industries Annual Accounts 1977 - Company House Records. 
--_.-
~. 
Lucas World 
Service: 
Provides 
aftermarket 
service 
through a 
chain of 
retail outlets. 
.... 
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employed over 19,000 people at seventeen principal sites (prior to the 
June 1980 redundancy decision). Figure 6.5 below sets out the 
principal divisions and sites operated in the UK. 
The activities of Lucas Industries and its subsidiaries are 
organized by a division of responsibility which provides for decision 
making at subsidiary level wi thin a context established by planning 
deCision taken at Lucas Industries level. Directors at holding and 
Subsidiary company level share responsibilities through overlapping 
participation as either policy or operating executives of the relevant 
boards. The policy executives have responsibility for long term 
planning, whilst the operation executives oversee the implementation of 
plans and monitor performance. Integration of activities of these two 
bOdies is established by allowing common membership at the highest 
level and by specialist functions, especially finanacial control 
eXerCised through the Lucas Group Service organization. The 
organizational links between Lucas Industries and subsidiary companies 
are illustrated in Figure 6.6 below, the presentation being simplified 
by restricting the subsidiary company level to Lucas Electrical, as the 
relevant example. 
The redundancy decision reported in the case study would have been 
a decision of the Lucas Electrical Board with Lucas Industries 
Operating Executive having reviewed the subsidiary company's decision 
prior to its announcement. The implementation of the redundancy 
decision was, however, the responsibility of the Lucas Electrical 
Personal Director who was the only senior management representative 
inVol ved in the formal negotiation of the redundancy wi th the· trade 
unions. The trade unions had quite a different form of 'organization'. 
Trade Union Organization. 
Trade union membership at Lucas Electrical is dispersed over eight 
manual and three staff unions. However, as the case study will show, 
Sites in 
DfvTsTon: 
Figure 6.5 Lucas Electrical Ltd. Divisional Organization. 
r Lucas Elect,riC~~J 
Central Services 
- Marketing 
Accounting 
Service Factory Division 
(College Road) 
- External Transport 
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Generators 
--r----~---~--- I .--_.-._----... --,- , 
Switchgear Plastics 
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and Rubber 
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Systems 
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Great King St 
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Telford 
Shaftmoor Lane BW3 Great King St Foremans Rd Great HamptonSt 
Cranmore Bvd Chester St Fradley 
Marshall Lake Rd Burnley (3 sites) Oozell St 
Plume St 
Constructed from information given to SSSC by management. 
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Figure 6.6. Integration of Lucas Industries and Subsidiary Companies 
Through Policy and Operational Executive Bodies 
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i 
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trade union activity does not involve "officials" from the unions 
except 1n formal procedures. Most trade union activity revolved around 
shop steward committees and in the case study, the SSSC in particular. 
The SSSC was the most wide-ranging trade union organization in 
Lucas Electrical, senior stewards being elected by seventeen site 
steward committees. Its principal function was to "negotiate the 
annual wage claim" for manual and semi-skilled production workers who 
made up just over 50% of the workforce. Site shop steward committees 
between them nominated forty-eight senior stewards for membership of 
the SSSC, one senior steward being appointed for each official union 
having a "significant" membership interest at a site. In addition, six 
skilled trade groups, who make up just over 10% of the workforce, 
nominated ten members to the SSSC. This arrangement allowed 
representation for each official union with members in a trade group. 
Figure 6.7 below, shows how the fifty-eight members of the SSSC are 
drawn from si te and skill trade group commi tteees, whilst Figure 6.8 
shows the distribution of senior steward by "official union" 
membership. 
Whilst the SSSC provides a multi-union multi-site organization for 
OVer 60% of the Lucas Electrical employees in the Birmingham area, its 
policy making powers are constrained by its constitution which allows 
it to make recommendations to site shop steward committees. When SSSC 
policy has been formulated, members of the SSSC are expected to return 
to their individual sites to argue in favour of the policy deCided upon 
by the SSSC. However, the site committees reserve the right to 
recommend policy to members and are not automatically committed to SSSC 
recommendations. The exception here is the annual wage claim which 
must be accepted by all sites before the SSSC ~an even submit the claim 
to management. Should the wage claim be rejected by management, 
individual sites retained their right to give or withhold support for 
~ 
~ 
Figure 6.7. The Senior Shop Steward Committee:.The System of Election 
Approximately 10,000 Manual and Semi- Approximately 20,000 Skilled Employees 
skilled Employees Belonging To 4 Belonging to 6 Official Unions 
Official Unions. Elect Approximately Elect Approximately 100 Stewards 
500 Stewards at Work Group Level. at Work Group Level by Trade. 
,~ ~l 
17 Site Shop Steward Committees 6 Trade Groups Elect Stewards From 
Formed By Work Group Shop Stewards 
Who Elect Senior Stewards From Each " 
Each Official Union To Attend S.S.S.C. 
Official Union To Attend S.S.S.C.* 
17 Sites Represented By 48 Senior 6 Trade Groups Represented By 10 
Stewards from 4 Official Unions Stewards From 6 Official Unions. 
I 
I TGWU (25) AUEW (15) GMWU (6) Ms~m (2) ASBSB (1) NUSMN (2) UCATT (1) EEPTU (1) TGWU (1) AUEW (4) 
. 
-------------
~
Senior Shop Steward Committee - 58 Members Representing 7 Negotiating Groups 
J t r I I I I 
Production (48) Allied Trades (4) Electricians (1) Toolsetters(2)** Toolroom (1) Auto setters (1) Standards Room (1) 
*For further details of representation by site see Figure 6.8 below. 
**Toolsetters at one site (BW3) had independent negotiating rights. 
Constructed from Information Given by Secretary SSSC. 
~ 
IN 
....., 
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Figure 6.8. Union Membership of Senior Shop Steward Committee by Site 
Great King Street 
Great Hampton Street 
Chester Street 
Shaftmoor Lane BW3 
BW4 
Foreman Road 
Marshall Lake Road 
Mere Green 
Grange Road 
Garrison Lane 
Oozell Street 
Plume Street 
Hednesford 
Telford 
Cannock 
Fradley 
College Road 
External Transport 
Lucas Batteries (2 sites) 
Lucas Griling (4 sites) 
Total Number of 
Senior Stewards 
139 
any SSSC policy established to counter management's rejection of the 
wage claims. The six trade groups aff ilia ted to the SSSC main tai ned 
independent rights to develop policy and submit their own annual wage 
claims. In consequence the SSSC rarely acted on behalf of the whole 
60% of the Lucas Electrical workforce that was represented by its 
membership. Staff unions who represented the remaining 40% of the 
workforce had no formal contact with the SSSC. 
Whilst the SSSC stands at the apex of the shop steward organization 
at Lucas Electrical its remit is very limited since both trade union 
and management practice was to address issues of negotiation at lower 
level. Most trade union-management negotiations were resolved at 
either work group, trade or site level without any SSSC involvement. 
Its primary function appears to have been to provide management with a 
representative channel of communication with a major part of the 
workforce. This at least is how it was used by the General Manager and 
Personnel Director of Lucas when the redundancies were declared across 
all sites and all skill levels. We shall see that the SSSC was unable 
to formulate policy on a corresponding corporate basis. The policy 
which it did formulate was, on the other hand, never effectively 
implemented. In the event, individual site committees adopted their 
own policy posi tions. This was a major contrast to the position of 
management, the Personnel Director truly being able to claim "we are 
Speaking with one voice." 
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Chapter 7. Lucas in the 1970's: The Strategic Choices 
Chapter 2 outlined the evolution of the multi-divisional enterprise 
and showed how strategic planning had been developed to co-ordinate and 
control decision making at the highest level. Academic models of 
strategic planning show how management's strategic decision making is 
set in a context that aims to satisfy largely financial objectives. We 
shall see in this chapter that strategic planning was well established 
at Lucas Electrical, and we shall review the information which this 
planning system would have made available to management and the 
policies it implemented. 
Strategic Planning in Lucas Industries 
The Lucas Industries Board has established a pattern of operation 
to bring a financial logic to its diverse interests through the control 
of organizational structure and by information systems to monitor 
performance against pre-set company criteria. The official history of 
Lucas was written by Nockolds (1976; 1978). It shows that Lucas' 
strategic planning practices were a key part of its process of 
organizational control. 
Responsibilities within the Lucas Industries Board are Rhared 
between its members through their participation either on the Policy or 
Operations Executive. Integration of the activities of these two 
bodies is ensured by common membership at the highest level. The 
POlicy Executive has responsibility for long term planning on a 2-10 
year time scale, setting overall policy and objectives. The Operations 
Executive oversees the co-ordination and implementation of Group 
policy, working with detailed plans for the next two years. The 
General Managers of the major UK subsidiary companies are members of 
the Operations Executive and it is through this link that the Lucas 
Industries - Lucas Electical relationship is established. This 
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organizational link is cemented through the strategic planning and 
Control systems which direct Lucas Industries to its overall 
objectives. To quote Nockolds at length: 
"Strategic planning starts towards the end of August 
each year when the planning groups of the main 
subsidiary companies receive three documents. The 
first is a statement from the executive chairman 
setting objectives for 'the group as a whole in both 
financial and non-financial terms, covering a long-term 
view and a shorter (two year) view. The current 
financial objective is expressed as the return on 
capi tal employed... At the end the chairman sets out 
the strategic priorities as regards which parts of the 
groups would get the major allocation of money in the 
forthcoming years ••• The second document is prepared by 
the Group Marketing Services and provides economic 
guidelines which might be called prognostication about 
what was likely to happen in the next five years to the 
economy of the United Kingdom and other countries in 
which Lucas operated and getting down to such details 
as the number of cars that were going to be produced in 
that period, and the probable extent of the after 
market... The third document laid down guidelines 
prepared by the strategic planning and review team and 
approved by the policy executive ••• The format started 
with an executive review, giving assumptions and 
background, objectives and strategy, which is written 
by the Subsidiary's General Manager himself, and this 
is followed by sections on business activities and 
functions and statistics ••• The second section provided 
a screening process to see thether the subsidiaries 
(and their individual division and product groups) are 
earning their corn or not. The Lucas treasurer 
produced a set of financial criteria which were 
regarded as the minimum in terms of cash that a 
subsidiary (or business) within the group ought to 
produce in order to remain viable. The financial 
criteria could be translated into a return on capital 
employed and supplied a current objective return. The 
last section was a statement of investments outside the 
Scope of the annual engineering budget" (pp. 385-6). 
These plans are reviewed in detail by the Lucas Industries Policy 
Executive between January and May. The General Managers of each 
subSidiary company (including Lucas Electrical) have to negotiate 
Within the planning framework to determine performance criteria which 
become incorporated in plans. The plans are prepared on a 'rolling 
forward basis', being continuously updated and refined. The first year 
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of the plan is adopted as the annual budget for actual performance 
evaluation, and by monitoring performance against budget the 
Operational Executive of Lucas Industries is able to maintain a 
detailed control of the Company's affairs. 
- , 
The General Manager of 
Lucas Electrical requires his ,own management team to produce detailed 
plans based upon the 5 year forecasts provided by the Lucas Industries 
Group Marketing department. 
The Lucas Electrical Policy Executive -is, responsible for both the 
development of long term policies (such as overseas and European 
policy, business development, new market penetration, all of which are 
reviewed by the Lucas Industries Policy Executive) and for the 
implementation of detailed policies. Whereas these functions are split 
at Lucas Industries in practice they are simultaneously achieved 
through the General Managers and functional managers of the separate 
divisions. 
Each division works as an independent business (ie, a profit 
centre) within the overall policy, structure and procedures established 
by Lucas Electrical Polcy Executive. The strategic objective of each 
Division is "to satisfy the customer by providing the products required 
at the right time and the right quality standard, and to achieve an 
adequate profit" (Nockolds, p. 280). All diviSions are held 
responsible for meeting agreed targets, and achievement is monitored at 
operations executive meetings, which are held monthly. The operations 
executive meetings are attended by the general manager, manufacturing 
director, and financial director of Lucas Electrical, and the 
Divisional Management team. ~he subjects discussed Bt these meetings 
amount to a searching examination of each division I s performance in 
terms of sales, margin, output overheads, stock, excess costs, 
industrial relations, production engineering, quality and reliability, 
engineering and design activities. 
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Lucas Industries is listed on the London Stock Exchange and hence 
makes, publicly. available sufficient information for knowledgeable 
outsiders (eg, stock analysts) to understand what were its 
circumstances and what are its prospects. Because of the huge 
structural transformation that was beginning to take place in the car 
industry in 1975 when the background history to the case study starts, 
their predicament was "common knowledge". 
Lucas and the UK Car Market. 
During the 1950's Lucas Electrical established itself as the 
dominant supplier to the UK car industry mainly by a policy of 
standardization of electrical components to vehicle assemblers. This 
policy was advantageous to both Lucas and the assemblers as it allowed 
economies of scale in its production. In 1960 the Monopolies 
Commission revealed that Lucas Electrical held market shares exceeding 
75% in four major product areas (eg, dynamos and starters 75%, 
igni tions, coils etc 79%, windscreens, wiper motors 79%, lamps 85%). 
However, by the late 1960's Lucas Electrical's position in the market 
was being threatened in two major ways. 
Firstly, the growth in weekly volume of vehicle manufacture made it 
feasible for individual vehicle assemblers 
a) to dual source by placing orders with different manufactur~rs 
whilst achieving economies of scale, and 
b) to consider the possibilities of in-house manufacture on an 
economic scale. 
According to company historian Nockolds, from the early 1960's 
Lucas planned to counteract these market threats by a policy of 
"technical excellence" (p. 278) and product improvements which other 
suppliers, especially small independent produ~ers, would find difficult 
to match. 
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Lucas Electrical's policy' to promote itself as a research-based 
monopoly was to a large extent successful in that in 1975 Lucas still 
supplied 90% of B.L.'s 'electrical buy', 64% of Ford's, 68% of Chrysler 
and 49% of Vauxhall (Nockolds, p. 276). However, it was risky because 
it meant that the demand for Lucas products was Closely tied to UK 
production levels, its direct exports of auto components in. 1975 
amounting to only £8m; the company preferring to achieve world wide 
sales via licensing agreements for local manufacture. Indeed, the late 
1960's and 1970's were difficult times for UK vehicle manufacturers, 
its problems being made worse because the industry Was to some extent 
already adversely affected by Government 'Stop-Go' policies, being used 
as a market regulator with frequent changes to the levels of purchase 
taxes, interest rates and hire-purchase terms. 
Secondly, with the UK entry into Europe in 1971 and the removal of 
tariff protection, it was inevitable that a structural rea1lignment of 
the industry would occur. UK vehicle manufactueres, such as Ford, 
being able to supply the UK market from continental sources. Import 
penetration of the car market almost doubled from 14% to 27% between 
1970 and 1973. However, it was the 'oil crisis' and subsequent world 
depreSSion in 1973-74 that led to the sharpest fall in the production 
of cars in the UK. Statistics for UK vehicle production are given in 
Table 7.1 below: 
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Lucas Electrical's policies were so closely tied to the UK 
production that by May 1975 management declared 2,500 redundancies. 
These were implemented with "full trade union cO-operation", management 
accepting the trade union request that volunt.ary redundancies should be 
open to all employees, and that. any resulting imbalance in the 
workforce should be overcome by internal transfer. With the 
implementation of redundancies and other measures, such as short-time 
working, the Company adapted to the market downturn and Lucas 
Indus tries were able to report record prof! ts of £32. 3m for the year 
1974/5. In fact, the growth in the financial strength of Lucas 
Industries over the period under review is illustrated by the key 
statistics reported in Table 7.2 below. 
Table 7.2. Lucas Industries Financial Performance 1960-1975 
1960 1975 % change 
.tm .tm 
Sales 122.3 570.2 366 
Profits before tax 8.7 32.3 271 
Shareholders funds 38.1 200.9 427 
External borrowings 4.3 66.3 
Source: Lucas Industries Annual Accounts 
Whilst inflation adjustments reduced the 1974/5 profits by £16m, 
stockbrokers Phillips and Drew were, nonetheless, able to recommend 
that Lucas shares be purchased, stating that: 
"Following the excellent results in the second half of 1974/5, 
we look for a further substantial profit advance in the 
current year" (po 1, 27 January, 1976). 
Therefore, despite the fall in UK vehicle production and the 
redundancies, management policies appeared financially 'successful'. 
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However, in 1975 major strategic decisions remained to be taken. 
Lucas Electrical's market position in the UK was threatened in three 
important ways: 
1. Vehicle producers were increasingly 'dual-sourcing' component 
supplies to achieve competitive pricing and higher quality. 
Furthermore the policy avoided production disruption in the case of 
an industrial dispute at the component suppliers. 
2. Components were being imported into the UK by the multi-national 
vehicle assemblers and other independent component manufacturers 
(Bosch, Ducellier, Marelli, etc) 
3. Given rapidly increasing car imports from Europe from the early 
1970's the future growth prospects of the UK vehicle industry was 
in doubt. In Table 7.3 below is shown the relative decline of UK 
car manufacturing within Western Europe. 
Table 7.3. UK Production, Imports and Share of European Market of Cars 
and Commercial Vehicles (DOD's vehicles) 
UK Production 
Total W. European production 
UK share of W. European 
production 
1960 1970 
1811 2099 
6081 11589 
30% 18% 
60 168 
1974 
1936 
11537 
16% 
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To Lucas Electrical this development posed a major threat which was 
highlighted in 1975 by the temporary 'demise' of B.L., Lucas's largest 
Customer. 
Emergency government aid was given to B:L. on the basis of the 
Ryder Report and the setting up of a House of Commons Select Committee 
enabled the development of a public evaluation of the problems facing 
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the UK car industry at this time. This was principally achieved 
through a Central Policy Review Staff study "The Future of the British 
Car Industry" (HMSO 1975). Whilst the market forecasts contained 
within the report might vary in detail from those made by Lucas 
management, the overall forecast could not be in doubt. To quote the 
Report in full: 
"The actual size and shape of the British car industry will 
depend on demand factors not controllable by the 
Government. However, wi thout a change in the 
competitiveness of the British car industry it is clear that 
the future production is unlikely to exceed 1.55m units per 
year, even if the most optimistic forecasts of demand are 
realized. With a combination of poor demand and a failure 
to improve competitiveness, production is unlikely to exceed 
1m units" (p. 110 emphasis added). 
The report does not break down the UK production forecast, because, 
this would have entailed disclosure of what are termed "manufacturer's 
strategic responses" to demand conditions (ie closure plans). However, 
the report provides a detailed forecast of European market size and 
shares which are given in Table 7.4 below: 
Table 7.4 European Market Size (ODD's vehicles) and 
Share Forecast for 1980 
UK Registrations 
Imports 
European Registration 
UK Share of Europe 
UK Production Forecast 
UK Competitiveness 
Stays the same Improves 
1.65m 1.65m 
45% 28% 
8.45m 8.45m 
3.2% 4.0% 
l.Om 1.55m 
Source: Constructed from Information CPRS Report 
The Future of the British Car Industry (HMSO, 1975) 
The anticipated fall in UK car production outlined above had 
two implications for the future prospects for Lucas Electrical. 
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Firstly, the decline in UK production would affect original 
equipment sales and would have further repercussions for Lucas 
Electrical in the aftermarket, both at home and abroad. Customer 
replacement purchase decisions would now have to reflect a positive 
decision to switch from the original equipment to a Lucas replacement 
product. Furthermore, the Ryder Report had recommended that B.L. 
should consider more in-house production of components and the 
possibility of selling these in the aftermarket. 
Secondly, the expansion of European production and its domination 
by five or six manufacturers (including the US multi-nations G.M., 
Ford, Chrysler) would mean that Lucas' European component competitors 
would have a larger home market upon which to develop their products. 
Furthermore, the fact that these products were now becoming relatively 
more expensive made the option of in-house manufacture more attractive. 
A further threat was emerging as the markets in developing 
countries became increasingly difficult to penetrate because of the 
development of home industries which were developed on the basis of 
barter agreement between national governments and multi-national 
producers who undertook to purchase lower technology component parts in 
return for access to markets. These countries could then begin to 
export the components to markets such as Britain and Continental 
Europe. 
The problems facing the UK vehicle industry had been well 
documented in 1975 and it was clear that Lucas Electrical as a 
principal supplier to that industry would need to radically re-
orientate its policies to take into account these circumstances. The 
next section reviews the basic choices available to Lucas Electrical's 
management. 
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The Strategic Policy Options In 1975: 
Two basic options can be identified. Crudely, management could 
either try to exploit Lucas Electrical's marketing and technological 
advantages by overseas investment, or it could develop production 
facilities in the UK and export. 
Strategic planning models of the kind outlines in Chapter 2, based 
on the profit criterion suggest that companies in a declining market, 
even those with a strong market position such as Lucas Electrical , 
should plan an asset reduction (disvestment) strategy (Hofer, 1977, p. 
32). However, given the fact that 1 million cars were expected to be 
produced annually in the UK and that another million vehicles would be 
imported, a complete withdrawal would not be necessary. As much of the 
UK demand for cars and components was going to be satisfied from Europe 
from 1975 onwards, Lucas decided to develop a strategy for this wider 
market. Because it had limited immediate growth potential and 
established competitive positions amongst principal suppliers, the most 
sensi ble strategy for Lucas was business acquisition involving market 
sharing agreements (Hofer and Schendel, 1978, p. 166). A more direct 
entry would threaten the competitive balance established and lead to a 
reduction of profit within the market as a whole. For the UK 
employees, however, these policies threatened job security since UK 
employment prospects depended upon a direct entry in the European 
market. The broad policy choices from shareholder and employee points 
of view are set out below in Figure 7.1. 
The policy choices made by Lucas management can be anticipted from 
the views expressed by the Chairman of Lucas Industries, Sir Bernard 
Scott, in his submission to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
The Motor Vehichle Industry in March 1975. In response to questions 
whether Britain's continued membership of the EEC would lead Lucas to 
concentrate its investments overseas, he stated that: 
Markets 
Figure 7.1 Western Europe Market Strategies for 
Lucas Electrical Ltd 
Supply decisions based on: 
Shareholder Employee 
Interests Interests· 
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UK Supply from UK 
and W.European 
sources 
Supply from UK 
sources 
W. Europe Supply from Western 
Europe through 
business 
acquisition 
Build up direct 
exports from UK 
in competition to 
existing component 
suppliers 
"(t)o be quite clear about it, the working conditions, 
the worker effort, the total efficiency, the environment 
of many of our factories compare favourably with anything 
you would find in France or Germany and are fully 
justi fied so long as we manage to provide the necessary 
investment to provide for major expansion" (p. 307, 
emphasis added). 
This might suggest that investment policies would be structured 
around existing factories and the skills of the Lucas workforce. 
However, in reply to a question whether the bulk of Lucas planned 
investments in the next ten years would be in the UK or in other EEC 
countries, he stated: 
"So long as the volume of the out-turn of the British 
motor industry can be restored to levels of 2 1/2 
million vehicles a year. It is currently running at 
1.6 million, estimated in our terms to be 2 million for 
1975/6. You cannot invest other than in relation to 
volume" (p. 307 emphasis added). 
Gi ven the forecast of UK vehicle production by the Government's 
Central Policy Review Staff, the prospect of attaining a 2 million 
vehicle output was remote. This interpretation of the thinking of 
. 
Lucas management agrees with the analysis of the Investor's Chronicle. 
Commenting on Lucas Industries' interim results for 1974/5 it suggested 
that Lucas management intended 
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..... to leave Britain more or less on a care and 
maintenance basis" (p. 29 November 197~). 
This intention was also reflected in a sample survey of component 
suppliers in the West Midlands (DOl, 1976, pp. 22-5) which indicated 
that major current exporters expected to increase foreign sales by 
" 
direct investment overseas. 
The dangers in such a policy for Lucas employees were spelt out in 
the Counter Information Service Report on Lucas Industries, "Where 1s 
Lucas Going?" (1975). As they put it: 
"A care and maintenance policy means that the company 
accepts that by and large the output of its British 
plants will remain the same or less, as the market 
warrants. And that in turn means as the constant 
process of innovation, tehcnological progress and 
rationalization takes effect, a constant decline in the 
number of people employed. 
That does not mean a continuous year by year 
cutback. Lucas, just as any other company, is affected 
by the continuous cycle of boom and slump, cycles that 
are likely to get worse in the future if anything, for 
there is no panacea for them within the present 
economic framework. Whilst its sales are rising 
towards the peak of the boom, Lucas secures extra 
output from increased productivity with a maintained or 
marginally increased workforce when the slump comes it 
then cuts its work force. The process repeats itself, 
but each time the number of jobs left afterwards is 
less" (pp. 40-2). 
We shall see that this prognosis was broadly correct, but the 
'slump' was permanent. 
Management Policies 1975-80: 
The Company's production, employment and financial performance are 
, 
largely determined by the marketing and investment policies set by top 
management. 
Lucas Electrical's marketing policies would have to be structured 
to satisfy two principal areas of concern. 
1. Account would have to be taken of the fact that the British car 
industry was becoming increasingly integrated into Western Europe, 
and that the decision of multi-national producers had a major 
influence In this market. 
2. Provision would have to be made to protect Lucas Electrical sales 
in the 'aftermarket' which were threatened by the import of cars 
and associated components. 
1. Market Strategy For Western Europe 
a) Direct Exporting 
From 1974 Lucas Electrical redesigned its product range to European 
specifications and this allowed direct exporting contracts to be won in 
all major· West European vehicle manufacturing companies. Management 
reported that in a six month period to December 1976 'significant new 
business' was achieved with V.W.; BMW in Germany; Citroen, Chrysler in 
France; Fiat in Italy; Fesma; Motor Iberica in Spain (JPCM, 3 December, 
1976). By 1978 direct exports had increased from £8m in 1975 to over 
£4Om with France being Lucas Electrical's second largest market (Annual 
ACcounts, 1978). By 1978 direct exports accounted for 15-20% of sales 
and was a major growth area in the company's activities. Penetration 
of the European market was only about 1%, and given that this market 
was 5 times larger than the UK, the sales potential for Lucas 
Electrical was enormous. In June 1978 management told senior stewards 
that future 'job security' depended upon success achieved in this 
market. Management stated: 
"Analysing the detailed business prospects for 1978/9, 
the majority of the new business opportunities promised 
were with major European motor manufacturers. Such 
contracts, which were so critical to the future success 
of the Company, should be secured during the year and 
could lead to further business in world markets given: 
(1) No further damage to the Company's reputation 
through disruption of production or supply. 
(2) A high standard of customer service in all respects. 
(3) Cost controls enabling competitive prices. 
(4) Successful conclusion of the Ducellier 
negotiations. 
This move would strengthen considerably the 
Company's position, since it would ~eet customers' 
demands for a second source of supply. 
Equally important, however, was the retention of 
existing business ••• which ••• could be resourced to the 
company's competitors, particularly European and 
Japanese component manufacturers" (JPCM, 3 June, 1978). 
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In August 1979 management rei terated "the importance of direct 
exporting" and set a target of £80m for 1980/81. They warned that "if 
this target was not met contraction of the company would follow··. It 
was noted that ··short term pressures, such as the strengthening in the 
value of the pound ··must not be allowed to impede progress" (JPCM, 8 
August, .1979) 
Stockbroker reports on a visit to Lucas in July 1979 and comments 
made in relation to the declaration of the 1978/9 profit figures 
indicate that a considerable measure of success had been achieved 
towards meeting their stated objectives in the above areas. To quote 
stockbrokers Simon and Coates: 
•· ••• the build up to Europe of direct exports of vehicle 
electrical components from the Birmingham factories has 
been quite rapid. The Group appears to be having more 
success in winning new direct exports than we had 
anticipated. It seems that despite the industrial 
problems in the UK over the last 12 months (June 1978 -
July 1979) the Group has been able to maintain adequate 
deliveries on export contracts, and that in consequence 
there is less customer resistance to being supplied 
direct from the UK than might be supposed (15 November, 
1979). 
"The Company also said that it had no indication 
whatsoever of any major loss of business due to the 
CSEU dispute, and that it had managed to keep 
deli veries to its European cus tomers going normally·' 
(15 November, 1979). 
The above quote suggests that despite certain industrial relation 
"problems·', condition (1) identified above was being satisfied, since 
no disruption to supply occurred. 
Regarding quality standards, the Annual Accounts for 1979 records 
Lucas Electrical's pleasure 1n receiving from Ford an award for ··having 
attained a standard of excellence in the supply of quality products." 
Condition (2) was obviously being satisfied. 
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Regarding price performance, Simon and Coates reported: 
"Lucas is now very strongly placed in product terms. Its 
main European compe ti tor in vehicle electronics, SEU 1s 
reported to have higher manufacturing costs and inferior 
quality ••• Hence despite a probable downturn in European 
car production next year, management say they are 
confident of a 'further substantial rise in exports'" 
(15 November, 1979). 
"At the analysts' meeting, Lucas were not as gloomy about 
cost pressures as had been expected. The UK pay round 
(79/80) is now virtually complete ••• and they believe that 
they will be able to pass on the increases in higher 
prices to a considerable extent ••• taking into account the 
anticipated productivity increases the Group is hoping to 
broadly 'maintain' aggregate margins this year" 
(15 November, 1979). 
This suggests that condition (3) was being satisfied. 
Furthermore, an analysis undertaken by the author in July 1980 
indicates that management had been able to raise prices to 
improve profitability, the percentage of sales revenue going to 
profits being increased from a 1974 level of 7.8% to 10.2% in 
1979 as shown in Table 7.5 below: 
Table 7.5 Lucas Industries Profit Performance 1974-1979 
Profi t before Dividends 
Deprecia tion as as a % of 
a % of Sales Sales 
1974 7.8 0.77 
1975 9.4 0.65 
1976 10.9 0.91 
1977 12.0 0.81 
1978 11.0 0.89 
1979 10.2 0.97 
Source: Constructed from Lucas Industries Annual 
~------------------ ... - ... -
Assuming that management were prepared to stand by their commitment 
not to allow the "strengthening of the pound to impede progress", 
I 
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further direct export g~ins could be recorded. Significant gains had 
already been achieved in 1978/9, as Simon and Coates report: 
"Outside the UK deliveries to overseas vehicle 
assemblies have been building up on the wide range of 
new contracts won following the redesign of Lucas 
vehicle electrics range to European specifications a 
couple' of years ago... This build up is continuing at 
an encouraging rate and between January and July 1979 
further new contracts' worth over £12m have been 
won ••• Lucas' forward order indications give every 
indication of this steady increase in market share 
continuing. 
"Off takes on eXisting contracts from the European 
vehicle assemblers remain good, and as yet European car 
production shows no sign of turning down. A high 
proportion of these contracts are supplied through 
exports from the UK (16 July, 1979). 
These comments agree with the assessment made by Bhasker (1979) on 
the european competitiveness of the UK component sector. He states: 
"The component makers attract foreign vehicle 
makers not only because prices are very competitive, 
but because of the technical excellence of the 
products. In additition, the UK component sector has a 
much larger presence in Europe than Europeans have in 
the UK, especially in terms of plants and marketing 
operations ••• Multi sourcing by vehicle makers, as a 
hedge against supply interruption by one supplier, 
helps UK exports but at the same time provides a threat 
to the component firms' home market position. However, 
so far these firms have successfully defended their 
home terri tory, perhaps because so few foreign 
suppliers can offer sufficiently competitive prices" 
(p. 316). 
Despi te these optimistic reports Lucas Electrical's direct export 
performance failed to maintain the momentum achieved in earlier years. 
As Table 7.6 shows direct exports in 1980 were £52 million, only £10 
million greater than the 1978 level whereas management had a t80m 
target. 
It would seem that at least two factors were important in this 
failure to increase European market penet~ation by direct export. 
Firstly, the strengthening in the value of the pound 'in fact was 
allowed to impede progress despite earlier management claims that "such 
short-term pressures would be set aside". Griffiths (1980) in a 
Table 7.6 Lucas Electrical's Direct Exports: 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Europe and the Rest of the World 
Direct Exports 
Lm 
8.0 
26.5 
36·.6 
42.2 
46.4 
52.0 
Annual Increase 
% 
331 
38 
15 
10 
12 
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Source: Information Relevant To The Redundancies Announced on 
4 June (16 August, 1980) 
FinanCial Times review of the British vehicle component sector 
indicates that manufacturers had begun to question whether the 
Government's exchange rate policy was in fact simply a short term 
factor. He states: 
" •••• suppliers large and small are now deeply concerned 
at the threat of the competitiveness of UK-based 
components arising from the strength of the pound. 
While much of the industry understands the logic 
of the British Government's hard line on industrial 
policy, the current combination of cheap imports, the 
increasingly harsh climate for exports and the collapse 
of sales wi thin the UK is such that many of the small 
industrial patients fear being killed by the 'cure'. 
Allied to this is the fear that if the domestic 
market shrinks much further, the larger companies will 
have little option but to wind down their investment in 
UK facilities, transferring most of what was once a 
highly profitable part of the UK economy overseas" 
(p. 16, 2 September, 1980). 
Management justified the June 1980 redundnac1es saying exchange 
rates had affected the "UK competitive position" (16 August, 1980) and 
Was a factor influencing their decision. Secondly J the deCi sion to 
increase the Company's shareholding in Ducel1ier J a French subsidiary 
Company (the fourth condition of direct export success set by 
management) now provided an alternative continental source of supply to 
direct export. Bhasker (1979) believed that this would be a major 
SUPply route for major UK component manufacturers: 
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"In future, the British component-making 
international and multi-national companies will rank 
all their operations on equal terms when investment 
decisions have to be made, which could result in most 
growth being in overseas centres of production" 
p. 309). 
Clearly Lucas could have 'weathered the storm' only if finance had 
been provided to find alternative work. This was not forthcoming, 
since investor interests were not dependent on UK production. 
Management planning, since 1975, had not given any priority to finding 
alternative work, even though the forecast fall in UK vehicle 
production was public knowledge. 
b) Direct Investment. 
Lucas Industries had always been very aware of the market potential 
for its products in Western Europe, and had in 1958 established 
'liaison offices' in France, Italy and Sweden to promote its various 
products and to develop industrial contacts. In the case of Lucas 
Electrical this brought tangible results when in 1962 the company 
bought a 40% share in SNC Ducellier et Cie, the leading French 
manufacturer of auto electrical equipment for over £3m. In 1972 a 40% 
interest was bought in Fausto Carello, a major Italian vehicle 
electrical component manufacturer, which cost £3.2m (APEX, 1978). 
These companies were acquired in association with two other multi-
nationals, Bendix and ITT, and major benefits to Lucas were seen to 
accure from the exchange of information on production techniques, 
product-development, thereby improving each company's competitive 
POsition vis a vis Bosch, the European market leader. No manufacturing 
links were established, and Lucas' interests were otherwise financial, 
haVing a 40% share in the profits earned by both companies. 
In December, 1977, Lucas Electrical announaed that it had concluded 
a new agreement with Bendix whereby the shareholding in Ducellier would 
be increased from 40% to 49%. In addi tion, licencing agreements had 
been negotiated to allow Ducellier to manufacture the traditional Lucas 
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range of products in France. Management stated that: 
"the agreement would strengthen the Company's intention 
of building up its supplier 'activites' to the European 
vehicle industry. As a result of this move each 
Company would derive significant advantage from the 
other's engineering and manufacturing resources, and 
both would benefit from the greater access in the 
world's markets, particularly the growth market of 
continental Europe" (JPCM, 10 March, 1978). 
Almost immediately after this agreement had been signed, Lucas 
announced its intention to buy the outstanding 51% interest in 
Ducellier from Bendix for $26m. This proposal was blocked by the 
French Government who were unprepared to allow a major part of the 
French vehicle component industry to be under foreign control. Ferodo, 
a leading French components manufacturer made a counterbid for Bendix's 
51% interest in Ducellier. This move was subsequently declared illegal 
but Ferodo demands could not be resisted, especially after French 
Government involvement in the deal. The negotiations lasted 20 months, 
and whilst details of the final agreement (signed in August, 1979) are 
not known, press reports indicate that the French Government demanded 
major concessions from Lucas before allowing the deal to be completed. 
An indication of the concessions demanded of Lucas can be gauged from 
concessions that were conceded in August, 1978, (8 months after the
l 
original bid and 12 months before final settlement) as reported by the 
Financial Times: 
"Lucas has already agreed that jobs will be increased 
and has added the promise to double Ducellier's exports 
in the next ten years" (15 August, 1978). 
"In an at tempt to reach agreement wi th Ferodo, Lucas 
has already made a series of concessions. Lucas is 
prepared to split the Bendix shares 50/50 with Ferodo. 
Joint Lucas/Ferodo commercial operation will be 
developed in certain markets. Lucas has promised to 
limit the Ducellier-Lucas market s~re in starter 
motors and alternators to the 1976/7 level for three 
years. Lucas world-wide service network will be made 
available to SEU (a subsidiary company of Ferodo). The 
two companies will establish a joint subsidiary in 
Spain to compete with Bosch. The two companies will 
establish a joint electrical components concern in 
France" (13 August, 1978). 
.... 
158 
range of products in France. Management stated that: 
"the agreement would strengthen the Company's intention 
of building up its supplier 'activites' to the European 
vehicle industry. As a result of this move each 
Company would derive significant advantage from the 
other's engineering and manufacturing resources, and 
both would benefit from the greater access in the 
world's markets, particularly the growth market of 
continental Europe" (JPCM, 10 March, 1978). 
Almost immediately after this agreement had been signed, Lucas 
announced its intention to buy the outstanding 51% interest in 
Ducellier from Bendix for $26m. This proposal was blocked by the 
French Government who were unprepared to allow a major part of the 
French vehicle component industry to be under foreign control. Ferodo, 
a leading French components manufacturer made a counterbid for Bendix's 
51% interest in Ducellier. This move was subsequently declared illegal 
but Ferodo demands could not be resisted, especially after French 
Government involvement in the deal. The negotiations lasted 20 months, 
and whilst details of the final agreement (signed in August, 1979) are 
not known, press reports indicate that the French Government demanded 
major concessions from Lucas before allowing the deal to be completed. 
An indication of the concessions demanded of Lucas can be gauged from 
concessions that were conceded in August, 1978, (8 months after the, 
original bid and 12 months before final settlement) as reported by the 
Financial Times: 
"Lucas has already agreed that jobs will be increased 
and has added the promise to double Ducellier's exports 
in the next ten years" (15 August, 1978). 
"In an a t tempt to reach agreement wi th . Ferodo, Lucas 
has already made a series of concessions, Lucas is 
prepared ta split the Bendix shares 50/50 wiih Ferodo. 
Joint Lucas/Ferodo commercial operation will be 
developed in certain markets. Lucas has promised to 
limit the Ducellier-Lucas market shpre in starter 
motors and alternators to the 1976/7 level for three 
years. Lucas world-wide service network will be made 
available to SEU (a subsidiary company of Ferodo). The 
two companies will establish a joint subsidiary in 
Spain to compete with Bosch. The two companies will 
establish a joint electrical components concern in 
France" (13 August, 1978) • 
~~--~---'.~~-~-....--------
These conditions were not sufficient to secure an agreement. Ferodo 
demanded a 50/50 split of the entire shareholding, and joint control. 
Negotiations continued for another year before agreement was reached, 
whereby Lucas was allowed to increase its shareholding by 1%, a 48% 
shareholding was assigned to Ferodo, and the remaining 2% was to be 
held by a leading French Bank, Credit Commercial de France. The terms 
of the agreement with Ferodo specified that during the first five years 
that Lucas would have operational responsibility for Ducellier (JPCM, 8 
August, 1979). 
The significance of the deal for Lucas Electrical was highlighted 
by stockbrokers Greenwell & Co at an early stage in the negotiation 
(February 1978 - before the Ferodo intervention). They calculated that 
"when the deal is completed Lucas will have 40% of the EEC market for 
electrical equipment" (February, 1978). Naturally, the combined 
Lucas/Ferodo interest in the EEC market would, as a result of the final 
agreement, exceed 40%, however Lucas would now have to establish 
agreement with Ferodo on major sourcing decisions and their respective 
interests in common markets. 
Stockbrokers Simon & Coates report two other significant 
developments they believed would help consolidate Lucas' position in 
the European market. Firstly, Lucas management had forged close links 
with General Motors after negotiating a £3Om order to supply 
'microjectors' • Simon & Coates thought that these links would place 
Lucas in a favourable position when resourcing decisions were made for 
the supply of components for General Motor's 'world car' to be produced 
in .. Spain from 1982. As they put it "We understand that Lucas are 
confident of winning substantial supply contracts for the various 
versions of the world car" (15 November, 1979). Secondly, they note 
that Lucas were currently in the middle of a period of very high 
development 'spend' for the next generation of vehicle electronics 
160 
equipment which will eventually supercede much of Lucas Electrical's 
current product range. In their view, "this is much more significant 
than the redesign of the standard product to European specifications 
which took place a couple of years ago" (16 July, 1979). 
By the end of 1979 Lucas Electrical had therefore not only 
established a significant market position wi thin the European market 
but had also begun to update the product line to supply this market in 
the 1980s. 
2. Replacement }~rket Strategy 
A strong replacement market performance is one way of adding 
stability to the demand for vehicle components. Replacement business 
is related to the number of cars on the road (in automotive industry 
parlance, 'parc'). This is a market which steadily increases through 
time, whereas original equipment business is tied to the more variable 
annual level of car production. Lucas Electrical, and other major 
component manufacturers were better placed than small independent 
original equipment suppliers (often used by the vehicle manufacturer as 
a second source of supply) to penetrate this market having the 
advantage of national distribution networks, using sophisticated stock 
control methods. Lucas Electrical had over 400 agencies through which 
to sell its component replacements, and by the mid 1970s was the 
largest supplier in this market (Nockolds, 1978). 
A number of developments from the mid-1970s were of some concern. 
Firstly, the increasing annual level of car imports had a cumulative 
effect in the division of car parc between home and overseas suppliers. 
In 1980 imports ac'counted for 30% of car parc compared with 15% for 
1975. Increasing levels of direct exports could offset the above trend 
in that the fitment of original equipment increased the probability of 
repeat purchase in the aftermarket. Lucas Electrical's limited success 
.. 
in this area has been reviewed above and in consequence the ability of 
~~--------- ........ _ ...... . 
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Lucas to minimize the impact of car parc import penetration on 
aftermarket sales depended upon the success of an 'All Makes' product 
introduced in April 1975. These products were generally acceptable to 
the market and sales increased rapidly as can be seen in Table 7.7 
below. 
Table 7.7 Car Parc Statistics and Lucas Electrical's 
'All Makes' Sales 
1974 
1978 
1980 
CAR PARC 
VEHICLES (MILLIONS) 
UK IMPORT 
12 2 
11 4 
11 6 
LUCAS ELECTRICAL 
TURNOVER 'ALL MAKES' 
PRODUCT £m 
15 
20 
Source: Constructed From Lucas Industries Annual Accounts 
and Joint Policy Communication Meeting Minutes 
Secondly, in this period there was increased competition from 
developing countries with products "reaching the retail trade packaged 
to appear like genuine branded parts and sometimes using, illegally, 
well-known brand names" (Gooding, Financial Times, 2 September, 1980, 
p. 13). Thirdly, some vehicle assemblers having increased in-house 
manufacture of certain products began to sell these products in the 
aftermarket. Previously, such companies had sold the branded original 
equipment supplied by the component manufacturer. Bhasker (1979) 
reports how B.L. 's part division was "importing and selling (parts) 
under their own brand name" (p. 324). 
Lucas Electric-a1 were largely able to maintain their position in 
the aftermarket by the success achieved with the 'All Makes' products • 
. However, UK manufacturing facilities were not the only supply source 
for these products. Stockbrokers Greenwell & Co report that "Lucas is 
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also expanding its interests in the marketing of imported electrical 
components through arrangements with overseas suppliers" (9 February, 
1978, p. 11). Such imports, obviously, further reduced the workloads 
available in UK factories and thereby reduced demand for UK labour. 
3. Capital Investment Policies 
In planning its investment, and R&D programmes for the period 
Lucas 'Electrical management sought to achieve two primary objectives. 
Firstly, the marketing policies discussed above necessitated major 
capital investment expenditures to re-design the product range to 
European specification, and to provide a new 'All Makes' range of 
goods. The other principle area of product investment was in the area 
of electronics where silicon chip technology was being used in ignition 
equipment, electronic. petrol injection and small motor applications. 
Management forecast a tenfold increase in this market between 1978 and 
1980 (L. E. Business Review, 1978/9). According to the Investor's 
Chronicle, Lucas Electrical was a market leader in this field. It is 
stated 
"Heavy spending on R&D has given it (Lucas) an almost 
unassailable technological leadership in fast growing 
areas like automotive electronics and diesels, the two 
main profit earning divisions, where the group's market 
penetration is high and growing •••• this is improving 
the quality of earnings as the production base widens 
and labour intensiveness decreases" (p. 467). 
For management, such high technology products, not only reduced 
labour intensity whilst increasing value-added but was also less 
exposed to competition from Third World economies. The 1979 Annual 
Accounts identified another major product development area for Lucas 
Electrical in small-motors. The 1979 Annual Accounts 'stated that: 
"The number of small motor applications in cars is 
increasing rapidly for such' purposes as window lift, 
seat and sun-roof actuation. To meet this demand, 
added to that generated by our new screenwiper, washer 
and fan motor range, we have planned a new factory". 
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This factory was initially planned to replace the existing Chester 
Street facility. However, in March 1980 management changed their minds 
about this venture after having architect plans developed and having 
held, discussions with the shop steward site committee at Chester 
Street. As will be seen later, the failure to progress with these 
plans resulted in the closure of Chester Street in September 1980. 
Secondly, capital expenditure investment was also incurred in each 
Division to maintain and update facilities. However, only the Lighting 
Division was subject to the major reorganization announced in December 
1975 which management said was to make the Division "technologically 
competitive" (JPCM, 1 December, 1975). 
At that time manufacturing facilities were distributed between four 
sites, and the Company's proposals required the replacement of some 
plant and equipment and the redeployment of personnel from Grange Road 
(one of the four sites) while maintaining production to meet customer 
demands. At a JPCM in September 1978, management said that the 
reorganization was progressing to plan yet, as will be seen, the 
Lighting Division reorganization was not complete until 1980, when the 
Grange Road plant was closed. 
Between 1975-80, in the two above areas, Lucas Electrical undertook 
capital expenditure investments in basic services, plant and equipment 
of £46m, £lOm of which was spent overseas (L E Information Relevant To 
Redundancies, 4 June, 1980; 16 August, 1984). 
4. Production, Employment and Financial Performance 1975-1980 
Over this four year period, UK car production fell to the higher of 
the forecast levels of vehicle output predicted by the Government's 
Central Policy Review Staff (see page 147). As Table 7.8 shows, a 20% 
• Contraction in output occurred between August, 1978, and June, 1980, 
'. the earlier period being relatively stable. 
,..-
Table 7.8. Production, Employee and Financial Performance Statistics 1976 - 80 
U.K. Vehicle Production (units - millions) 
L.E. Ltd. ~funagement Forecast 
Actual Production 
Lucas Electricat Ltd.: Capacity, 
Utilization and Employees 
Annual Average Output Volume Index (OVI) 
Employees - Yearly Averages 
Lucas Industries Ltd., Profits (£ millions) 
Profit Before Tax 
Trading Surplus - Total 
- Vehicle Equipment 
1975/6 
1.87 
1.87 
219 
16,512 
55.8 
60.3 
52.5 
1. Aug-Sept: nil (toolmakers strike); Nov-June: 262. 
2." Aug-April only; no actual figures for }fuy-July. 
3. Before 3,000 redundancies declared in June, 1980. 
4. Before costs of June redundancies, £12.2 million. 
1976/7 
2.00 
1.89 
242 
18,359 
76.8 
77 .7 
73.1 
1977 /8 
1.90 
1.90 
262 1 
19,287 
73.1 
77 .9 
70.2 
Sources: Minutes JPCM; Lucus Industries Annual Accounts and Lucas Electrical 
'Information Relavant to the Redundancies of 4th June'. 
1978/9 
1.90 
1. 74 
223 
19,001 
70.7 
74.4 
67.1 
1979/80 
1. 70 
1.53 
2232 
18,2813 
51.34 
61.2 
48.6 
..... 
0-
"'" 
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Despite a relatively constant level of UK vehicle output from 1975 
to 1978 employment at Lucas Electrical increased from the post 1975 
redundancy level of 16,222 in September 1975 to 19,580 in August 1978. 
This increase in employment must be attributed to the growth generated 
by demands arising from direct exporting and the aftermarket. As can 
be seen from the profit figures in Table 7.8 this was a period of 
increasing profits for Lucas Industries, Lucas Electrical being a major 
contributor of trading surplus in the vehicle equipment area, which 
increased from £52.5 million in 1975 to £70.2 in 1978. 
In this period there was one major industrial dispute. In July 
1977 the Toolmakers, in pursuance of increased productivity payments, 
undertook industrial action over a ten-week period resulting in lay-
offs throughout the Company for six weeks. Management claimed that the 
company had lost £3m profit as a result of the dispute (JPCM, 22 
December, 1977) and said that the Company's reputation as a good 
supplier of quality products could be "lost unless the Company speedily 
completed its recovery, achieved output targets and maintained 
consistent supplies to customers" (JPCM, 22 December, 1977). And, 
although the recovery of production was not as rapid as management 
would have liked (November 1977 - January 1978 OVI*- 213), record 
production levels were achieved between February and July (OVI - 282) 
So that the effects of the strike were reduced. Stockbrokers Phillips 
and Drew in their report on the Lucas Industries 1976/7 profits stated: 
"The toolmakers strike stopped the Midlands 
electrical factories for six weeks, but running down 
stocks both at Lucas and at its customers meant that few 
sales were actually lost" (3 February, 1978). 
* OVI. Output Volume Index. -. a weighed measure which indicates 
capacity utilization across the company. 
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The successes achieved in this period suggest,that Lucas Electrical 
had begun to adjust to its new role as a supplier to the European 
vehicle market, and its over-reliance on UK vehicle production had at 
least been partially overcome. 
However, from 1978, Lucas Electrical's performance followed the 
success of the UK vehicle producers. Direct exporting was limited by 
the earlier decision to develop Ducellier as a production unit in 
collaboration with Ferodo and, additionally, Ducellier· was used as a 
second source of supply for the UK market. The decision to supply the 
aftermarket by imported parts using the Lucas trade name was a further 
constraint on UK activity. When UK vehicle production fell by 20% 
between 1978 - 80 management declared 3,000 redundancies in June 1980. 
This followed a period when management reduced the workforce by a 
policy of 'natural wastage' as output was scaled down; 1,550 employees 
leaving the company between August 1978 and May 1980, even though 
vehicle equipment sales continued to produce significant trading 
surplus. 
It seems probable that profit performance would have been even 
better but for an over-optimistic assessment by management of UK 
vehicle output. As Table 7.8 indicates in both 1978/9 and 1979/80 
management's forecast of output exceeded actual output by 200,000 
vehicles, and this may have delayed the redundancy decision. 
Its timing was made more complex by external strikes and there is 
some evidence from stockbroker reports to suggest that this led 
management to compound its production forecast error by overstocking. 
In 1979, the 9 week Ford strike caused widespread lay-offs at Lucas 
Electrical, and the recovery from the strike was subsequently disrupted 
by the road hauliers' dispute. The CSEU strike in 1980 based on two 
. 
. day stoppages disrupted production but did not cause widespread lay-
offs; the normal means by which management limit the adverse effect of 
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strike action by particular groups of employees. Stockbrokers Simon 
and Coates in the lS November report provide some background 
information that helps to explain the circumstances. To quote them at 
length: 
"The company has refused to attempt to place a figure on 
the probable cost of the CSEU dispute in the first half 
of the year. The stock market has understandably been 
very worried about this, as during the period of the 
dispute the huge Birmingham factory complex lost up to 
SO% of its annual production. Indeed we ourselves had 
revised our 1978/9 profit forecast down by £lSm to take 
account of this. 
However, it appears that we may have been somewhat 
over-pessimistic. At the analyst's meeting on November S 
the company admitted that the effects had been 'very 
serious' but also said that most factories were now going 
'flat out' to recover lost production and that given a 
good industrial relations background it might still be 
possible to recover most of the lost profits. The 
company also said that it had no indication whatsoever of 
any major loss of business due to the dispute, and that 
it had managed to keep deliveries to its European 
customers going normally. 
In these circumstances we have revised our estimate 
of probable cost of the CSEU down to around £8m" (IS 
November, 1979). 
Most factories worked 'flat out' for the six month period from the 
settlement of the CSEU strike, the OVI rising from its strike affected 
level of 192 to a Nov-April average of 238, and the commencement of the 
steel strike in January 1980 encouraged management to continue the high 
production levels in fear of future steel shortages. Management plans 
were, however, upset when UK and European vehicle production failed to 
recover in 1980 and this resulted in a very high stock build-up in 
March/April 1980. This led management to revise its estimation of lost 
profi ts arising from the CSEU dispute upwards. For Lucas Industries 
-
the "loss was estimated to be £2Om. The stock build-up coincided with a 
period of record interest rates, and interest costs rose by £6.4m over 
the 1979 level. The strength of sterling reduced the value of overseas 
profits by £S.8m compared with 1979 (Lucas Annual Accounts 1980). 
Despite these problems, the Lucas Group was able to earn £S1.3 million 
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profit before tax; the trading surplus for vehicle equipment being 
£48.6 million. 
The profit performance for the second half of the period under 
review was, however, lower than that planned by management. This, 
together with the anticipated fall in UK vehicle production and the 
Company's readiness to implement new technology and work practices 
provided the signal for management to declare mass redundancies. The 
availability of the information presented above should have forewarned 
the trade union of impending redundancies. However, as will be seen 
below, the SSSC had no real understanding of strategic policy 
developments. 
SSSC Understanding of Management Policy 
The SSSC throughout the period sought to monitor management policy 
by solely responding to management initiated discussions at Joint 
Policy Communication and Business Review Meetings. The SSSC did not 
have any independent source of information on management policies and 
were unable to evaluate and develop alternative poliCies of their own. 
Throughout the period the SSSC believed that management were committed 
to reducing the Company's dependence upon UK vehicle manufacturers by a 
policy of direct export through the achievement of new contracts with 
the major European motor manufacturers. This belief is not surprising 
given management statements to Joint Policy Communication Meetings (22 
December, 1977; 10 March, 1978; 15 May, 1978; 26 June, 1978; 13 
September, 1978; 19 October, 1978; 15 January, 1979; 8 August, 1979). 
The most crucial policy issue was the Ducellier decision, and at no 
time' were the SSSC aware of the policy implications involved. 
Throughout the two-year period of negotiation, management were 
. 
. Consistent in the advocacy of the Ducellier policy. Thus, in telling 
the SSSC of the decision to increase the shareholding in Ducellier to 
100% management stated: 
169 
"Negotiations were continuing with the French 
Government to secure approval of the Company's bid to 
increase the shareho1ding in Duce11ier. This move 
which would provide greater access to the world 
markets, particularly the growth markets of continental 
Europe was critical to the future of the Company, and 
it was hoped, therefore, that negotiations would be 
progressed properly to successful conclusion" 
(Joint Policy Communication l-ieeting, 15 May, 1978). 
This implied that the UK would benefit from new business. 
This interpretation of policy was accepted. However, as more 
details of the Duce11ier deal emerged the SSSC became uncertain as to 
whether management policy was in their interests. The minutes of a 
Business Review Meeting on 13 September, 1978 records a question being 
addressed to the General Manager about a press statement (attributed to 
the Lucas Industries Chariman) that the total shareho1ding in Duce11ier 
would lead to the creation of 800 additional jobs in France. The 
General Manager responded by drawing the SSSC's attention 
"to previous discussions of the Company's marketing 
strategy, emphasising the critical importance of 
Ducellier. Since the majority of new business 
opportunities were with the major European motor 
manufacturers, the Company needed Duce11ier to be able to 
meet such customers' demands for a second source of 
supply" (JPCM, 13 September, 1978). 
The SSSC had to be satisfied by this assurance since no alternative 
was offered. 
When in September Ferodo made a counter bid for outright control of 
Duce11ier, the SSSC requested a meeting with the General Manager to 
discuss these developments. The SSSC's main concern was that if the 
Ferodo bid was successful, then it would threaten jobs, since 
management plans had always stated that Ducel1ier was critical to the 
Com~~ny' direct exporting policies. Management stated that they 
believed that the Ferodo bid was "unlawful" and that they would be 
taking the "appropriate legal action". They said that they hoped to 
re~ch a satisfactory understanding with Ferodo in the near future. 
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Management reiterated that "common interests existed between Duce11ier 
and Lucas employees" (JPCM, 19 October, 1978). 
In January, 1979, the SSSC were again forced to question the 
implication of the Ducellier deal for job prospects in the UK. As a 
result of the earlier licensing agreement (December, 1977), Duce11ier 
was now being used as a second source of supply for UK customers. Work 
previously done in the UK on the MF50 starter was now being carried out 
in France. At the General Manager's meeting on 15 January, the SSSC 
asked whether this policy would be extended to other products covered 
by the licensing agreements between the two companies. In his 
response, the General Manager referred to the Company's marketing 
strategy of providing second sources of supply. He continued: 
nDucel1ier therefore was the natural choice as an 
al terna ti ve source of supply in Europe, and the MF 50 
starter business demonstrated its importance to the 
Company. In this case, Ford and Massey Ferguson had 
indicated that they would resource unless the Company 
could provide alternative supplies from outside the UK. 
On the assurance that Ducel1ier would be the second 
source, Ford and Massey Ferguson had withdrawn this 
threat and the business, important to the UK operators 
had been retained. 
The licensing agreement between Lucas and Duce11ier, 
which provided royalty revenue for the Company, provide 
for the manufacture in France of the traditional range of 
products" (15 January, 1979). 
Management stated that the need for a second source of supply 
reflected the fact that 
"Existing and potential customers currently regard the 
Company as an unreliable supplier, a view which had been 
hardened by further disruption resulting from recent 
industrial action by the Electricians. Indeed, the 
impact which disruption of production had on the 
Company's business was clear: the resultant unreliable 
supply record was the sole reason for the loss of 
contracts, since the Company remained competitive on 
other factors, such as performance, quality and price" 
(15 January, 1979). 
However, the SSSC continued to express reservations about 
these developments and "further clarification" was sought about 
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intercompany trading between Lucas and Ducellier. The General 
Manager responded stating unequivocally that 
..... the UK operations would benefit considerably from the 
link with Ducellier, particularly in the immediate 
future. Ducellier would continue to purchase captive 
parts from Lucas and could also be a major customer of 
electronics. 
This benefit was secondary, however, 
business available to Lucas and Ducellier 
external sources" (15 Januray, 1979). 
to the new 
jointly from 
These assurances never totally satisfied the SSSC since at a number 
of meetings (10 March, 1978; 19 October, 1978; 15 January, 1978) 
management were asked to arrange a shop steward visit to Ducellier. 
Management maintained that such a visit could not be arranged until 
after the negotiations were concluded,at which time its value to the 
SSSC would be much reduced, since the purpose of the visit was to see 
if there was any reason to oppose the negotiations. The delaying 
tactics of management eventually prompted the SSSC to finance (via a 
membership collection) an unofficial visit to France. The four senior 
stewards who went established that production facilities at Ducellier 
were similar to those at Birmingham, but this in itself was not a basis 
of dispute, and in consequence the Ducellier negotiations proceeded 
without any SSSC intervention. 
Until management policy directly affected employees, the SSSC felt 
unable to raise it with members and in consequence did not take any 
action despite management "warnings" that redundancies were likely from 
1978, these "warnings" becoming more specific with the passage of time. 
Between June 1978 and February 1979, management gave several strong 
"hints". For example, at the Joint Policy Communication Meeting on 8 
February 1979 the General Manager straight-forwardly said that "the 
Workload available to UK factories· was falling below plan". In his 
View this was the result of a number of factors: the poor performance 
of the UK market, the problems of Iran, a volume reduction in export 
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sales and customer resourcing decisions based on past disruption to 
production and inconsistency of supply by Lucas Electrical. He 
concluded: 
"The serious impact on the Company could be quantified in 
terms of jobs. . Some excess of labour had been identified 
at the beginning of the financial year, however the 
number of jobs affected totalled approximately 3,000" 
(8 February, 1979). 
Having already instituted policies to reduce overtime and sub-
contracting, and having placed stringent controls on recruitment, 
management said that they hoped to reduce the job loss involved from 
3,000 to 2,000; and that the proposals to reduce the workforce would be 
subject to a detailed appraisal at each Division arid that the results 
would become known in six weeks. These investigations were undertaken. 
However, the General Manager in his opening report to the next meeting 
with the SSSC (26 March, 1979) did not report the Company's findings. 
Responding to a question from one of the Senior Shop Stewards he said 
that the Company "intended to continue its policy of 'natural wastage' 
and would not at present be resorting to a declaration of 
redundancies." This policy was reaffirmed at the Joint Policy 
Communication Meeting on 8 August, 1979, and work levels at most 
factories remained at a fairly high level, especially after the CSEU 
dispute had been resolved. 
Although management anticipated redundancies from 1978, they 
delayed introducing them because of external difficulties. However, in 
March 1980, management came back to talk about redundancies. At the 
Business Review Meeting on 25 March, the General Manager commented 
that: 
" •••• the financial year to date has been disastrous 
both for the Group and Lucas Electrical,. performance 
being seriously affected by a number of factors. The 
continuing steel strike, the depressed UK market, and 
theCompany's own industrial relations problems, gave rise 
to uncertainty about the immediate future, and the 
1./" 
already'difficult position was compounded by the 
projected further decline in the UK vehicle production 
in 1980/81. 
Faced with this situation the Company was developing 
a recovery plan which would include as a key factor, 
improving payroll productivity. The Company had to 
operate with manning levels compatible with the 
business. A policy of natural wastage had failed 
totally to realise this need, and it was now necessary 
to examine alternative approaches aimed at securing an 
appropriate reduction in the workforce. 
A detailed analysis of the impact on jobs would be 
necessary before further discussions with the repre-
sentatives in the near future" (25 March, 1980, emphasis 
added)~ 
For over two years, the SSSC faced the threat of redundancy, and 
uncertainty as to the consequences of the Ducellier deal. Settlement 
of the Ducellier negotiations, in December, 1979, did not remove this 
threat of redundancy. In fact, in justifying the redundancies 
management set aside its commitment to building up exports in 
conjunction with Ducellier. They stated: 
"Our own share of the European market is well below 2% . 
and in view of the fact that we have only a minority 
shareholding in our associate company in France (ie 
Ducel1ier) we have discounted Europe from the 
consideration" (p. 1, Management's Case For Redundan-
cies Appendix). 
Throughout the period, the SSSC had accepted management assurances, 
and had made no attempt to identify possible alternative policies to 
those proposed by management. Two broad alternatives needed to be 
evaluated from an employee prospective. 
For example, the policy of direct export to Europe could have been 
advanced without seeking market sharing agreements ,with major European 
competitors. As has been seen, stockbroker reports (pages 153-55 
above) indicate th~t Lucas Electrical was successfully securing direct 
export orders to Europe. That this policy waS not pursued more 
positively must in part be due to the market 
• 
sharing arrangements 
entered into with Ferodo as part of the Ducel1ier negotiations. 
Although the final market sharing arrangements are now known, their 
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nature was revealed by the Financial Times in its reporting of the 
negotiations. For example, the Ducellier Lucas market share in starter 
motors and alternators was to be held for three years at its 1976/7 
level (see p. 158 above). Moreover, as was stated earlier, Lucas 
Electrical undertook to create 800 new jobs in France whilst doubling 
the level of Ducellier exports over a ten-year period. Management 
presented the Ducellier agreement as the only means by which customer 
dual-sourcing demands could be met. However, it is possible to 
envisage other alternatives. 
For example, would Lucas Electrical employee interests have been 
better served by establishing an independent or partly-owned subsidiary 
in Spain? This at least would have allowed the Company to be in a 
position to act as a second source of supply for GM's world car. Such 
possibilities were limited by the Ducellier deal which involved a 
commitment to a joint subsidiary with Ferodo in Spain. Furthermore, 
since France had previously been Lucas Electrical's largest market 
(outside the UK) a diversification policy based on Spain would have 
left this market exploitable without the constraints on market share 
arising from the Ducellier deal. These possibilities were never 
raised. 
If the policy of direct exporting was impossible then it can be 
argued that Lucas employee interests would have been better served by 
management planning on this basis from 1975, because another option 
would have been to develop Lucas Electrical's production facilities and 
employee skills to cater for other identifiable market demands, 
particularly in the aftermarket which was less vulnerable to falls in 
Ul< vehicle output. Management's intentions are illustrated by the 
closure of the Grange Road site, which had been underutilized since 
1976, despite repeated requests from shop stewards that work should be 
found for this site. For example, the minutes of the Joint Policy 
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Communica tion Meeting on 3 December 1976 record the SSSC' s concern 
about the underutilization of space at Grange Road. The General 
Manager responded to the effect that: 
"the original possibility of transferring the Oozells 
Street activity to Grange Road would not be pursued. It 
had not been possible to investigate this project, 
originally mooted when the Lighting Division's 
reorganisation plans were announced, until agreement had 
been reached with representatives at Grange Road. The 
subsequent studies had proved that Grange Road was 
unsuitable to accommodate the Oozells Street activity" (3 
December, 1976). 
Grange Road was to remain underutilized until its closure in August 
1980. Evidently, management did not plan its continued operation, nor 
did the trade unions. For example, no attempt was made to see whether 
any links could be developed with Lucas Aerospace shop stewards, who 
were actively promoting their Alternative Corporate Plan (Wainwright 
and Elliott, 1982). 
The SSSC's lack of planning for redundancy until it was declared, 
Was also illustrated by its concern to progress the annual wage claim 
without reference to the threatened redundancy. For example, the brief 
given to me in March 1980 was to provide information for wage 
bargaining, no reference being made to the redundancy. 
Necessarily, the SSSC's response to management's declaration of 
redundancies in June 1980 was therefore unplanned. 
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Chapter 8. The Implementation of The Redundancy Decision 
The SSSC having failed over the last two years to take any action 
wi th respect to the threatened redundancies now had. to contend with 
this problem at a very inopportune time from their point of view. 
Firstly, work loads at factories were falling not only because of 
current management resourcing decisions, but also as a consequence of 
previous stock build-ups. Secondly, the redundancy announcement 
coincided with the annual wage negotiation, and employee support for 
any wage claim would be tempered by the threat of redundancy. 
Moreover, management declaration of redundancy to a certain extent 
precluded productivity negotiations, since management had unilaterally 
decided to increase ··payroll productivity" by its action.' In these 
circumstances, there were only two policy options available to the 
SSSC. Management's decision could be accepted, and negotiations 
initiated to bargain over the terms of policy implementations. 
Alternatively, management policies could be opposed on the basis of 
trade union principle, which would involve contesting management's 
right to declare redundancies (Policy Types 1 and 3, page 122 above). 
Over a 15 week period, the SSSC attempted to influence management 
policies on both redundancies and annual wage negotiation, without 
effectively deciding which of the two above policies were to prevail. 
To some extent, both policies operated at the same time and it is 
difficult to separate policies as well as issues (eg, redundancies and 
wages). In consequence, the review of the redundancy implementation is 
-presented chronologically and, to help the reader, a diary of events is 
presented in Table 8.1 below. 
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Tabl~ 8.1. Olorl of Haln Event 
~K ~E PERIOD Of ~y REDUNDANCIES WACE CLAIHS N~OPERAT[ON LAYOFFS 
I 4th June' Coapany .nnou~ce redundancle •• 
-
2 9th JUri« ..... Otopute' .. ade official. 
11th June SSRC ag,ree that an lnfonaation 
,«,eque.t be .uboll ned to 
... nag._eRt. 
Ilth June Infonaal vork. conference. 
1 11th June Shop ateward. and .e_bera 
endora. non-co-op.ratlon poltcy. 
4 24th June Wage cla'_ of production worker. 
.ubaltted to C_pan)'. 
S 10th June 
l 
Luca. Induatrle. non-negotiable 
vage offer. 
2nd July SSSC .eetlng. Sub-co_tttee 
eatabllahed to Inve.tl~ate 
Sub Contracting. 
9th July SSSC reject 'concept' of non-
. negotiable vage offer • 
-
. 
6 II th July > ~arlou. Coapao)' foraal off.r aupported 
SItes by docu.ent -State of the 
C_pan),-. 
ISth Jul,. 
> 
Hanage.ent re.pond to lnfonaatlon Shop Steward. reject cOllpan,. 
requeet • offer. 
11th July Work. conference. 
-
oJ 
1 ANNUAL HOLl DAYS 
8 
1-
9 Varlou. 
1- SItes 
10 2nd Aug An analy.l. of .. nage.eat'. c ••• A reply to _aa,_e"t'. clocuaeat 
1- oJ for the redundanct ••• 
on -State of the COIIpany-. 
II 11th Aut! Shop .tevard. re.fftr. poltcy of 
non-eo-operatlon. 
14th AuS 
--
Luc.. lodu.trle. 'C_blne Meetln,. 
12 18th Au, Helotl.tlnl Heet~ 
19th Aug Re-convened vorke conference. 
i __ 22nd, Aug COIIpaay' .... oded offer. 
Il 2Sth AU9 Acceptance of redund&ncie. by CoMpany offer referred to 
1-- Shop St .... ard. 
MeMber. by Shop Stewarda. 
14 2nd Sept. 
...J Acceptance ot redundanci •• by Acceptance of Na9. Offer by 
r-- _r •• _ra. 
IS 11th Sept. Work conlerence to .et ter .. of 
compulsory redundancy. 
Man.9~nt announce need for 
'--
second round ot redundanclea. 
\ 
-
l/~ 
The announcement of the redundancies: 
Both local and national newspapers 'forecast' the management 
announcement of redundancies at Lucas Electrical. On 2 June, the main 
story in the Birmingham Post was "Lucas may axe 2,000 this week". This 
prediction was made in anticipation of a meeting between management and 
the Senior Shop Stewards Committee on 4 June. 
At the March 1980 Business Review Meeting the SSSC had been told of 
management's intentions to "improve payroll producti vi ty" which would 
require an "appropriate reduction in the workforce". The SSSC were 
however surprised by the numbers involved (3,000 instead of 2,000), and 
by the closure of Chester Street as well as Grange Road. The 
redundancies were, in fact, going to affect everyone of the 17 
Birmingham sites, the levels of redundancies varying from single 
figures to over 600, although the SSSC had no clear idea of this at the 
time. 
Management were observing their statutory obligations to the trade 
unions by giving 90 days prior notice of the impending redundancies, 
to be made effective on 5 September. Management claimed that such 
action was necessary because of: 
"a falling level in UK demand, and problems associated 
with gaining profitable export business when confronted 
with domestic wage inflation and a strong pound" 
(Financial Times,S June, 1980). 
Management stated that they hoped that the redundancies would be 
achieved by 
"acceptable volunteers in designated areas followed by 
enforced redundancies" (Company notification of 
redundancies to Dept of Employment, 2 June, 1980). 
Management requested trade union co-operation. They said that 
redundancy payments would be above the legally-required minimum, and 
details were made available to the SSSC (see Exhibit 1). The details 
of the redundancy plans would be made known by Site Managers to the 
Senior Stewards on an individual basis. 
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Exhibit 1. Lucas Electrical Notification of Redundancies to SSSC: 
Vol~teerR who are accepted for redundancy will receive 
~3/il~ 
JUNE 1930 
n) Their appropriate statutory red~~dancy pay entitlement under the 
Employment Protectio:l <Concolidalicn) Act. 
b) Payment in lieu of notice at time of le~ving aD follows 
i) 8 yellrs service or below - 8 week's pay 
ii) 9 to 12 years service - 1 week's pay for each complete year of service 
iii) Over 12 years service - 12 week's pay 
c) A Special Company Supplement of half a week's pay (subjoct to a £12fJ 
per week max:iJ:lum wage) per year of service up to a maximutII of 20 years 
service. 'l'bis means that the lI'.aximum supplement would be £1200. 
Part-Timers 
The weekly earnings maximum for the Company Supple!lleut will be based on 
a pro-rata reduction of the £120 maximum for a full-time employee, 
1e: £60 per week maxiJlrolJll for a normal. weck of 20 hours. 
d) Employees with less than 2 years service who do not qualify for a 
statutory payment will receiVe a Company Supplement of '1 week's pay, 
subject to the same limit as other supplementary payments (ie: a 
ma.xiarum weekly wage of £120 for full-time workers and proportiaaateJ.,' 
leas tor part-time workers. 
Employt'es due to reach normal retirement age on or before ,1 December 1980 
will not be eligible for the above arrangements. 
Concideration will be given to those with 20 years or .ore service .. ho 
volunteer for redundancy and who are due to retire between 1 JL~ 1981 . 
and the end of July 1982. If the individuals are acceptable to the 
Company then in addi.~ion to the 1980 tenls they will receive an iJ:Dediate 
un -abated pension based. on eerviee up to the date of leaYin§~ 
In response to suggestions that SSSC would "fight to save jobs", 
management warned that the cuts must go through with the· minimum of 
disruption if the future of the remaining workers was not to be 
jeopardised. 
Having reviewed their plans between March and June management were 
now asking the trade unions to accept them and to aid their 
implementation by agreeing to changes in work practices· which would 
~e8ult. Would this consent be given? 
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SSSC decide to make the dispute official: 
1,700 of the 2,600 redundancies planned at the Lucas Electrical's 
Birmingham sites were to be drawn from the production workers. The 
SSSC had negotiating responsibilities for these workers and became the 
trade union organisation charged with attempts to oppose the 
redundancies proposed by management. The skilled trade groups (260 
proposed redundancies) by their affiliation to the SSSC could either 
support SSSC policies or develop policies of their own. Initially, the 
trade groups supported the SSSC whereas the staff unions maintained an 
independent stance from the outset. 
The SSSC's declaration to management that they intended 'to fight 
to save jobs' reflected several considerations. Firstly, record levels 
of unemployment in the Birmingham area meant that the prospect of re-
employment for those made redundant was 'virtually nil' (letter from 
TGWU district official to SSSC - see Exhibit 2). Secondly, the SSSC 
objected particularly strongly to the closure of the two plants, 
Chester Street and Grange Road, which once closed would never be re-
opened. Thirdly, they were suspicious that the redundancies could be 
related to Lucas Electrical activities overseas. For all of these 
reasons the SSSC felt that in this case it could not set aside its 
principled objections to redundancies, and negotiate improved voluntary 
redundancy terms as it had in 1975. 
Not fighting became even less likely after one of the Senior Shop 
Stewards at Chester Street initiated a meeting of Lucas TGWU Senior 
Shop Stewards (with District Official support) at which the following 
resolution was carried: 
"This meeting of TGWU Senior Shop Stewards calls upon our 
members within 'Lucas Electrical' to oppose Management's 
proposals on redundancies and closure by refusing to co-
operate on the transfer of work within'the Group, also by 
refusing to cover the jobs of any member that Management 
may make REDUNDANT" (9 June, Letter to SSSC - Exhib. 2). 
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Exhibit 2 • Letter from TGWU District Official to SSRC 
.. ·iirt .... 40Jhu.· 
ILVl!.I'Otll teN "lW sou.ue lOl<OOIl S.¥I.t. 
.--.1 Offlc.: 
tUN5rOlt HOUSI: 9-17 YICl'OtIA STlf[t WESt MOMWIOi 
Transport & General Workers Union 
Incorporwtjng n. N.tianeI Union of ~. MedwVc.l & Eledriall Wooi<en 
Di,.trict Office: ill! Broad Street! Birmingham! B15 iDE. 
WO,1>C. 
TO: • Senior Shop Stewards, 
LUCAS !l.JXTRICAL LDUTED. 
Dear Colleagu., 
"Maaagemen t 'II Proposal,. on Redundancies 
&r Closure,. - Luc:aa Electrical" 
9th June 1980. 
Th. recent ~ announcement ot their intention to clo,.e plants 
and entorc. REDUNDANCY on 3,000 ot our colleagues IllUSt be oppo,.ed by our 
member,. at 'Lucaa', iA the iAteresta of everyone who has a stake in the 
CoIII~ and an inter.at in the FU'lVRE and PIDSPERITr of the Weat Midlands. 
It must be el..r b7 DOW that &n70n. who vote,. en~ a~cepta redundanC7 is 
votill8 and accepting long te ... UNDWLOYHENT, _ot'. tor thelll8elves and 
possib17 tor their ch1ldren. 
Since JIIlWAJ"'1 of this 7ear almoat 5.000 JIf'Ople a IIOnth have been 
added to the UlQ)(pL()1l!1)l'l' register in the West Midlands and at the present 
time there are onl7 9,403 registered vacancies tor adults • 
.. 01lAl vonld expect these vacancies tend to be .1 ther the jobs people 
do DOt w.nt becauae ot: low peJ' or jobs ot: a hig~ aldlled Dature. 
I beU_ 70U v1ll appreciate froG! the foregoing tkat job prospects 
tor the tJIQ)UltOTEI) are Ylrtual17 HIL and thia crust be explained to our 
memben before the7 1I&Ic. their decia1011At on the Ksllagement'll proposala. 
III ad.dition, it Blat be pointed out to our _bera tlIat 'Lucaa IDduatries' 
18 a verr RIal KlL1'I-llATIDNAL CompaD)' having vast inves~nt abroad and are 
IItll.l ~ lNildill8 JIE\i PLANTS and opening Hili FACTORIES overaeas, which 
ve would oonteDd 18 taId.ng jobs from our lI_bera here in the Mid.l&Dds. 
()Qr .-bert! bay. c::reated the WEALTH which has .nabled the ~ to 
invtllt abroad. ad va beUeve that despite the fact that th. oar indwstl')' 
111 go~ throII8b • "STICICY PA1'CI!" the Lucas ~nt owes • debt to ita 
V.st Midl.aDda woridorce and 1netead of thr_tening peopl. with the "SACK" 
th.)' ahould be aeeId.JI« the oo-operaUon of the Duona in ord.r to ovarooIM 
the preMllt ~fiCNlt1 ... 
It 1a "-aae of all thee. fact. that our Organiaation 1a cleterm.ned 
to protect thAt int ...... ta of 0Qr _b.ra b)' nGH'l'Dll tlanas-nt'. proposala 
and .t a ncent _tillg of Lu.cas T.O.v.n. Senior Shop StevvWi the follovi.D& 
naolut1on _ OarrledJ-
"1'h1a _~ of T.O.V.V. Senior Shop St.wards oa.lla upon our 
-"re wi thin 'Lucas Electrical' to oppose th. MaaIsa-ent' II 
pl"ClpOeal.s OIl NC!unda.ncie. and closur.s by ret\uliJIg to oo-operat. 
OIl th. !RANS1'ER of work vi thin the Group,. aleo b)' retusill8 to 
coYer the ",obIS of &11;7 _ber the Kanas-nt IIIl)' II&Iut JlEDUHDANT't. 
1'1_ ~ th1a r.1I01utioD to the attention ot )'Our ... berll. 
Yours frateruall.7, 
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In the event of management allowing 'volunteers' to leave the 
company without prior trade union agreement, the policy implied that 
production would be brought to a standstill through an 'unbalanced' 
work force. As a consequence, when the SSSC met to determine policy on 
9 June, they had the choice of either supporting or reversing an 
officially approved policy of the TGWU stewards. Not surprisingly, the 
SSSC supported the policy with little discussion, and there was no 
expressed opposition. It was thought that to have reversed the policy· 
at this stage would have indicated to management that their plans could 
be implemented without consideration of trade union objections to the 
proposals. However, towards the end of the meeting the apparent 
consensus wi thin the SSSC broke down when the Electrician's 
repres~ve said he would attend a planned meeting with management to 
discuss the general principles involved in establishing 'redundancy 
agreements' between his trade group and management. 
The SSSC decided at tha t meeting to extend the brief given to the 
author to involve an "investigation of company policies to see whether 
a financial case to oppose the redundancies could be developed". 
Having established their policy of opposition, the SSSC met 
management and requested that the redundancies be avoided by short-time 
working and work-sharing. Management rejected these proposals stating 
that they were "merely short-term remedies, not solutions to the long-
term problems of the company". At the meeting a "failure to agree" was 
recorded, the dispute was thereupon declared "official" and henceforth 
the main trade union negotiator would be a full-time official· of the 
TGWU. 
The SSSC Agree to Submit Questionaire to Management: 
The SSSC met on 11 June to discuss the details of the redundancies 
made known by the Site Managers. The Secretary of the SSSC had 
produced a factory breakdown of proposed redundancies (see Exhibit 3), 
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Exhibit 3. Factory Breakdown of Proposed Redundancies in Lucas Electrical 
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which he had compiled by telephoning each site. The collection of this 
information had taken a week, and was the only information available to 
the SSSC; management had not provided any written information (other 
than levels of proposed severance payments) regarding the redundancies. 
In consequence, the SSSC's discussion of the issues involved was 
largely based upon a generalized critique of management intentions. No 
one spoke in support of management policies; all sites being affected 
by the redundancies. The senior stewards were particularly aggrieved· 
by management intentions about Chester Street. To quote one of the 
Senior Stewards at Chester Street: 
"The Company is being dishonest with us. At Chester 
Street we had been promised 1,900 jobs and a new 
factory ••• architect plans in March closure in 
June ••• and to think that we have co-operated in the 
transfer of work ••• There is only one answer - Accountants 
wishing to make us victims of a balance sheet ••• We've got 
a viable site we're going to fight. The Company's offer 
of alternative employment for half of the workforce at 
Great King Street is intended to break the unity of the 
workers - how else can it be explained when redundancies 
are being made at Great King Street ...... 
Because of the lack of good information available to the SSSC I 
suggested that a questionnaire be addressed to establish the financial 
reasons for the redundancies. This proposal was accepted by the SSSC 
and the questionnaire is included as Appendix 3. 
The Informal Works Conference: 
On 13 June, as the first stage of the formal dispute procedure 
between trade union and management, an informal works conference was 
held. The TGWU District Official was to be the principal negotiator, 
the SSSC were !in attendance' to observe the' formal process of 
negotiation. According to the Secretary of the SSSC, management 
refused to consider any alternatives to redun?ancy, and explanations of 
reasons for the redundancies remained general in character, without 
giving any company specific information. The District Official told 
management of his intention to present the questionnaire (without 
reference to its source) and said that an unsatisfactory reply would 
result in action under Section 17 of the lmp10yment Protection Act, 
which obliged employers to provide information, when such information 
was seen to be required by standards of good industrial practice. The 
officials stated that the formal Works Conference would only be 
convened when further information had been made available. The only 
concession made by management was its commitment to consider the 
establishment of a sub-committee of the SSSC to investigate the level 
of sub-contracting. Given the lack of progress, the Distric Official 
re-affirmed support for the non co-operation policy and this allowed 
the SSSC to call a mass meeting of shop stewards to ratify the 
established policy. 
Management now had responsibility for convening the Formal Works 
Conference, which would not take place until four weeks later. Two 
factors lay behind this delay. The TGWU Distric Official was on 
holiday between 30 July and 11 August, and management would not provide 
any information in response to the questionnaire until the 'official' 
returned from holiday. In consequence, the SSSC had to try and 
mobilize membership support over this period without having any 
detailed understanding of management's justification for the redundancy 
decision. 
Shop Stewards and members endorse non co-operation policy: 
All sites and trade groups attended the mass meeting of shop 
stewards on 17 June (attendance 600 plus). The Toolroom, however, had 
sent their representatives with a "watching brief", and would not be 
committed to any decisions agreed at the meeting. The Chairman stated: 
"That the purpose of the meeting 
policy of non co-operation and 
implementation throughout all sites" 
was to endorse 
to establish 
(my emphasis). 
the 
its 
----- - --------------------------------------
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After reporting back, the Chairman asked for comments from the 
floor. All six speakers criticised the Company for its actions, and 
the Chairman of the Toolroom negotiating committee (in his 'personal' 
capacity) stressed the need for unity, drawing a parallel between 
Michael Edwardes' industrial relations poliCies and those applied by 
Lucas. A motion from the floor suggesting that an unofficial visit 
should be made to Ducellier was defeated by a 70/30 split of votes. 
The proposer of the sse's 'non co-operation policy' was the TGWU 
District Official and the motion was passed with only 10 votes against 
and 40 abstentions. The third and final motion calling for a mass 
meeting of all members was defeated overwhelmingly. It was the opinion 
of the Shop Stewards that members were not prepared to lose a day's pay 
in order to discuss the redundancies. 
The endorsement of the policy of non co-operation by the Shop 
Stewards could perhaps have been anticipated because reversal of policy 
at this stage would have weakened the officials negotiating position. 
The failure to get support for the Ducellier visit and the mass meeting 
of members however indicated that membership support for future action 
would depend on the SSSC ability to conduct its campaign of opposition. 
This was emphasised by the fact that the one speaker who spoke against 
the SSSC policies had been loudly applauded by the body of stewards. 
In his opinion, the SSSC should: 
" ••• get the best deal for the members ••• We can't stop the 
company, so what's the point in trying ••• Be realistic, 
the people on the shop floor are looking to leave. Let's 
not cloud the issue, it's going to happen. We live in 
the real world - the SSSC should have a policy for 
redundancies •• we' ve got redundancies; we've got to plan 
to reduce the effect. We can't change the future - going 
to France-wouldn't change anything in a fortnight". 
One Senior Steward later stated that: 
• 
"He made a mockery of the meeting - he had a standing 
ovation: and what he was saying was anti-trade unionist". 
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The membership similarly accepted the non, co-operation policy at 
shop floor meetings without necessarily being committed to it in 
practice. However, the SSSC thought that the rising levels of 
unemployment and the low level of work at Lucas made members fear the 
loss of their own jobs and that opposition to Company plans would 
emerge when management declared compulsory redundancies. As an interim 
measure the policy of non co-operation would be applied until the Works 
Conference was convened at which time further information about Company 
policies would become available. Until then, the shop stewards would 
have to mobilize member support for the non co-operation policy by 
arguing on the basis of 'principles' rather than facts. 
Implementation of the non co-operation policy to works conference: 
Management's offer of voluntary redundancy was attractive to some 
people and from the outset 'volunteers' applied to leave the Company. 
Because the redundancies were a subject of dispute between management 
and trade unions, the Company could only allow volunteers to leave by 
breaking agreed procedure. Nevertheless, after the mass meeting of 
stewards on 17 June, management began to let people go, thereby openly 
challenging the SSSC's ability to implement its non co-operation 
policy. On the departure of volunteers work practices would have to be 
changed and individual members of the union would either have to accept 
the requests made by the foreman or reaffirm their commitment to the 
SSSC policy. To an individual, this would represent a major decision 
since these actions could bring production to a standstill. 
At the SSSC meeting on 2 July, it was reported that about 100 
volunteers had left, and that management decisions were rarely being 
challenged, so that work practices had been changed to accommodate the 
'volunteers' and production had been maintained. It also became 
apparent that certain Senior Shop Stewards 'Were not implementing the 
non co-operation policy. One Senior Steward was not prepared to answer 
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a question about whether his site was accepting work from Grange Road. 
Another stated that their site would refuse to accept new machinery, 
but would not refuse to use idle capacity on existing machines. He 
commented: 
"We cannot refuse work; we cannot commit suicide". 
This comment led to a heated exchange between the Senior Steward 
and the Senior Stewards from Chester Street, who saw such action as 
supporting management's intentions to close Chester Street. The 
difference of opinion could not be settled at the meeting, and the 
Commi t tee's Chairman asked that the senior stewards meet with their 
respective managers to ensure that the work involved was not being re-
sited from Chester Street. He commented: 
"You've got to work together or there is no hope." 
An opportunity of working together became available when management 
gave consent to the setting up of a sub-contracting subcommittee. This 
subcommittee would be allowed to visit each site to speak to site 
stewards about the level of sub-contracting, but General Managers at 
site would not be available for discussion. The Company stated that: 
"We cannot have twin structures of management" (Senior 
Steward, 2 July). 
In his summing up, the Chairman stated that management were 
claiming to have 2,000 volunteers, and that they were urging the 
officials to set a date for the Works Conference. Management were 
continuing to refuse to reply to the questionnaire, stating that: 
"If we could answer all the questions asked, we'd be 
able to save all the jobs in Great Britain." 
In management's view, they had no choice. 
Despite the evident weaknesses in the non co-operation policy, no 
other options existed until negotiations began at the Works Conference. 
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In respect of the annual wage negotiations the morning papers had 
carried stories of Lucas Industries'~ negotiable wage offer' to quote 
the Chairman: 
"They are saying 'take it or leave it'. They are learning 
fast from BL." 
The Works Conference was due to be held on 17 July, and membership 
resolve to oppose the redundancies appeared to be weakened by the 
announcement of post war record levels of unemployment, the mid-June 
figure of 1.53m having been announced on 26 June. More directly, 
management's announcement on 8 July of lay-offs at most sites for at 
least a week, either side of the annual holiday, was even more 
demoralising. Until the Works Conference, the Shop Stewards were 
committed to the non co-operation policy and meanwhile the annual wage 
claim became the main issue of concern. 
The Lucas Industries 'Non-Negotiable Wage Offer' 
The Production Workers' annual wage claim was normally prepared in 
April/May and submitted to the Company for settlement in June/July. 
The settlement being effective from 1 July. Submission of the 1980 
claim was delayed because the SSSC could not agree whether the claim 
would be for a flat or a percentage increase, and before agreement was 
reached the Company had announced its redundancy plans. As a result, 
the claim for a £25 increase plus index linking was not submitted until 
24 June, and management's reply was not expected for a couple of weeks. 
On 30 June, the SSSC attended a General Manager's meeting at which 
management outlined the problems confronting the Company and emphasised 
the need for a planned pay increase with an £8-£10 maximum. 
Furthermore, management requested the SSSC's co-operation in 
implementing new technology and in the adoption of improved working 
practices. It was also stated that there could be no general payments 
made in order to introduce change. The SSSC considered this meeting to 
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be part of the Company's communication programme, and did not accord it 
any undue significance until reading the evening newspaper on the 
following day. 
The Birmingham Evening ~i1 revealed that the SSSC had attended one 
of the lOS meetings held in Lucas Industries factories where the 
message had been exactly the same. Lucas Industries' 66,000 employees 
were being offered the same pay offer which was "not negotiable". A 
Company spokesman told the Birmingham Post on 2 July: 
"a non-negotiable offer had been made to the unions ••• it 
will be impossible for us to follow the customary pattern 
of pay negotiations. The Company just does not have the 
financial freedom to match trade union aspirations based 
on the usual comparisons ••• the offer was based on 
carefully assessed maxima which cannot be exceeded." 
The SSSC decided at their 2 June meeting that they must make a 
comment regarding these developments. The Chairman stated that: 
"members should be told categorically that no offer 
has been made to the stewards. • we must respond 
positively, otherwise they'd end up brainwashing the 
members on both redundancies and wages... No doubt this 
is the way the Company intends to operate, and we will 
have to treat them in the manner they treat us - that is 
with contempt." 
It was agreed that a press statement should be issued but it would 
not be released to the Birmingham Mail, the original source of the 
story, because that paper had been 'blacklisted' by the district TUC 
for biased reporting of industrial relations. The Birmingham Post on 4 
July headlined its story: "Union Declare War On Lucas", and the report 
contained many comments directly applicable to the dispute, eg, 
management's failure to observe procedure, the Company's refusal of a 
visit to Ducellier and a statement of Lucas Industries' past profit 
performance. The report said that: 
"The stewards' anger and suspicions stem partly from a 
fear that Lucas long-term plan is to pullout of Britain 
and concentrate all production overseas". 
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A company spokesman in response stated: 
"that it was ridiculous to suggest that Lucas would pull 
out of Britain. It will be illegal and impractical" (my 
emphasis)! 
In view of the uncertainty which the press reports had created, 
the SSSC convened a mass meeting of shop stewards on 9 July to publicly 
reject the Company statements .that an offer had been received. On 11 
July, management met the Senior Shop Stewards to formally present its 
offer, which had been revealed in outline on 30 June. 
The Production Workers, depending on skill grades, were being 
offered increases of between £8 and £10.50. The offer was made on the 
basis of two subsidiary conditions: 
1. That no interruptions would occur to production during the 
year, caused by internal industrial action. 
2. That the Company would have full co-operation of the 
Production Workers in order to introduce and take benefit 
from those changes in work practices and technology that 
we need to benefit from in order to become competitive. 
The Personel Manager indicated that the offer could not be 
increased because it was a Lucas Industries' policy. He stated: 
" I have a brief to work to, and I will continue to 
follow that brief regardless of opposition". 
In support of its case, Management produced a Lucas Industries' 
document on "The state of the Company" (see Appendix 4). This document 
was also made available to the financial press. It was quoted in the 
Financial Times on 9 July. 
The SSSC called another mass meeting of stewards on 15 July to 
discuss possible responses to the Company's offer. The options 
available and the prospects of a successful opposition were assumed to 
·be fairly limited. The non co-operation polfcy was being implemented 
over the redundancies, but any strike action would have to be aimed at 
overthrowing a Lucas Industries' policy, which the trade unions thought 
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of as "covering all 66,000 employees". The possibility of negotiating 
a productivity deal had been rejected by management at the meeting of 
30 June. In any case, this option would be 'anti-trade union' since it 
would facilitate the implementation of the redundancies. 
With little prospect of success, the SSSC were 'told' by the mass 
meeting to re-open negotiations with management. The stewards were 
particularly concerned to have the 'strings' attached to the Company's 
offer withdrawn. The SSSC was required to report back to the mass 
meeting of stewards without making any recommendation on the 
negotiations with management. 
The SSSC informed management of the stewards' rejection of their 
offer and objected to the conditions. Management said they would 
postpone their response until after the annual holidays, which were due 
to begin at the end of the week. The Works Conference on the 
redundancies would be held on 17 J'Jly just two days before the 
holidays. After which, most workers would be 'hard up' and not 
prepared for a strike. Many felt that this was inauspicious. 
The Works Conference! 
The Works Conference was the final stage of the disputes procedure 
and failure to achieve a setlement would herald increased industrial 
conflict, or a withdrawal of· either the Company's proposals or the 
trade unions' counter-demands. 
agreement 
The meeting was convened under rules 
between the Engineering Employers regulated 
Federation 
by national 
(EEF) and the various trade unions. The management 
negotiating team was supplemented by a representative from the EEF (in 
an observer capacity). The trade union negotiating team was led by the 
TGWU District Official. The SSSC attended as observers so as to allow 
participation in adjournment discussions, and to vote upon outcomes 
proposed in the negotiating sessions. The officials, accepted that the 
SSSC were receiving advice from the author, and permission to attend 
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the Works Conference was granted by the officials but without Company 
agreement. I questioned whether this was the most appropriate 
approach, but the general view was· that management would "not notice my 
attendance, since over fifty stewards were due to attend the meeting". 
Management responded to the officials' demand for information (my 
questionnaire) by producing a document which they said covered the 
"relevant details" (see Appendix 5). The officials had it on 15 July. 
Management's document made no reference to the questionnaire and only 
passing reference to the important issues and was incomplete, eg the 
principal financial statements of the previous five years were not 
provided, production forecasts were limited to one year and were not 
related to market potentials. 
Prior to management's entry into the conference room, the SSSC held 
a report back meeting to update the officials on the position regarding 
the 'volunteers' and sub-contracting. The Stewards reported that 
approximately 650 volunteers had left and that management continued to 
disregard procedure. The position of the SSSC was further weakened when 
three of the major skilled groups, Electricians, Toolroom and Allied 
Trades Groups accepted voluntary redundancies, and would not engage in 
any industrial action to oppose the redundancies. The briefing meeting 
was concluded wi thout any discussion of management's written 
justification of the redundancies. The author's attendance at the 
Works Conference had been accepted, however no provision was to be made 
for active participation in the evaluation of policy. Discussion would 
be confined to information exchanges at points of adjournment. 
-When management were called into the Works Conference, the Personel 
Director assumed chairmanship of the meeting. However, the trade 
unions having registered the failure to agree'were required to make the 
opening statements in negotiation. Each of the four official unions 
(TGWU, AUEW, GMWU, MSMM) with members affected by the redundancies 
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exercised their right to comment on management policies. These 
statements were prolonged by trade union standards, lasting for over an 
hour. However, in view of the opening sentence of the TGWU's District 
Official, the submission must be seen as ritualistic. He stated: 
"Since the informal Works Conference we have made little 
progress, and therefore" what we have to say may be 'old 
hat', however, it still needs to be said." 
All four officials criticized management for breaking procedure by 
letting volunteers leave without trade union agreement, for their 
refusal to apply for Government Temporary Employment Subsidy, and for 
the high level of sub-contracting work. Each highlighted management's 
unwillingness to respond to the questionnaire, yet one official felt 
able to declare that: 
"Your actions represent a clinical and soulless project 
that reeks of accountant thinking - it represents 
overkill. The scant information that you provide makes 
it impossible for us to counter the arguments you 
present". 
The last official to speak concluded with the following appeal to 
management: 
"I ask that the company stop its actions to allow a six 
month in depth study to be made of the problems, which 
could be based on a joint approach." You cannot continue 
with your present policies". 
The Personnel Director responded by stating: 
"Having regard to your lengthy submission, I would like 
to ask for an adjournment." 
In the adjournment which was to last for an hour, discussion was 
informal and the majority of stewards passed the time playing cards. 
On their return, management replied that they could not deviate 
from their policy and that having achieved half the number of 
• 
volunteers, they would now like to achieve the other half by "joint 
endeavours". Given the low level of work at Grange Road and its 
planned closure on 5 September, management indicated their willingness 
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to let "volunteers" leave this site immediately with a payment for 
wages to 5th September. In return for trade union co-operation they 
would be prepared to "take stock" of the posi tion in August. However, 
the redundancies would have to be completed by September. In response 
the District Official indicated again that alternatives existed, and 
attacked management over the "complacent attitude" about the lost 
markets in the UK and Europe. In his summing up the District Official 
said that "voluntary" redundancies might be "negotiable" in return for 
a guarantee of no compulsory redundancies. The Personnel Director 
ignored this remark and reiterated the Company's need to implement all 
the redundancies. This led one official to observe that: 
" ••• your attitude is dictatorial, and while you may be 
half way towards your target, may I remind you that a 
certain dictator in the 1940's managed to get only half 
way towards his target. May I remind you that things do 
go wrong wi th the best of plans, and our people are 
capable of throwing all your calculations back into the 
pan". 
In his final statement the Personnel Director stated that the most 
he could offer in return for trade union co-operation was the 
possibility that: 
"compulsory redundancies would not need to be announced in 
August". 
The Conference was adjourned at this point for the SSSC to consider 
its position. 
In opening the following discussion, the District Official said 
that he thought that management had not given any real considerations 
to their proposals, and that their request for no compulsory 
redundancies and 'no closures were being discounted. He thought that 
any concesions would only be won through effective industrial action, 
but he questioned whether the Personnel Director would have the 
authority to change policy. The majority of those senior stewards who 
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spoke in the review of the non co-operation policy said that they 
believed that the policy should be continued because its effect would 
be greater on the resumption of work after the holiday. Furthermore, 
to relax the policy would concede victory to management over wage 
negotiations as well as the redundancies. However, many stewards 
recognised that members were not prepared to implement the non co-
operation policy and the Senior Steward at Grange Road questioned 
whether this commitment existed amongst the stewards: 
"Today, we are all talking the same language: we know 
what its about. Unfortunately, the majority of stewards 
are not 'leaders' they are 'listeners', and they are 
influenced by the media in the same way as the members. 
However, we must fight for those who have worked for this 
company for 30-40 years, and who will leave Lucas with no 
prospect of getting a job." 
The TGWU District Official observed: 
"The Stewards are the organisation in the factory, and if 
you aren't organised there then you've lost it before you 
begin. If you've lost, then its through the weakness of 
your own organisation" (17 August, 1980). 
The AUEW Official then suggested that co-operation should be 
offered in return for a commi tment of no closures. Whilst certain 
stewards opposed this on the basis that the wage issue would be lost, a 
motion proposing that co-operation should be given in return for no 
Compulsory redundancies was passed with only 5 opposers out of 60. The 
officials and officers of the SSSC made a private approach to 
management with this proposal, and returned saying that management were 
prepared to withdraw the threat of compulsory redundancies in August, 
and would look into the possibilities of achieving job transfers 
between" Lucas Electrical and Lucas Aerospace who were recruiting some 
labour. In return the stewards would undertake to minimize the effects 
of disruption upon the departure of volunteers. The officials proposed 
that this policy should be taken back ~o a mass meeting of stewards, 
and that the Works Conference would be reconvened in the third week of 
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August, when the position would be reviewed. The Secretary of the SSSC 
subsequently told the author that in the private discussions management 
stated that Lucas Electrical were losing £100,000 per day and this 
stateme~t appeared to add "weight" to manage!llent claims that it could 
not deviate from its policy. The statement of losses was not revealed 
to the SSSC and their acceptance of the "compromise" was based on the 
belief that no significant changes could occur before the mass meeting 
of stewards, since the two-week annual holiday began the next day. 
In reality, little progress had been made at the Works Conference. 
Management's limited responses were not sufficient for a reversal of 
policy to be considered even allowing for the evident weaknesses in 
membership support for the policy of non co-operation. If policy was 
to be reversed, it would have to be on the basis of .the decision of the 
mass meeting of stewards. 
Analysis of management's redundancy and wage documents: 
The annual holidays provided a two-week interval in which the 
author could seek to develop a critique of the information presented by 
management at the Works Conference. As already indicated, management's 
response to the questionnaire was partial and did not provide a full 
justification for the redundancies. 
Two documents* were produced and are shown below (Exhibits 4 and 
5). These were made available to the SSSC in the week following the 
holidays and were therefore available at the SSSC meeting of the 6th 
August to review the non co-operation policy. At that meeting most 
site stewards reported that co-operation was being given to management, 
and the level of-volunteers was now estimated to be 700. Even stewards 
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.IS tht-'St ~'I'e to be _u ~t-thot:r t~ ph1"ot is work.ln9 or ~t. Kln.l9e-tnt 
1~1t tholt thly n.avt r"I"".r undtrUlt.tn contribution busint-H to susllin 
yol~. f'Jw oppol"tvtitiu to do I() .~!..d N ':"",..di9'2Uid. 
l, ~r.r-r-Vt.g IoIOrk V'l.th':'" u..oa.; 
Conclusions: 
M.anl~nt CAnnot "riolJsI, Mll,n t~t t~ CH" wy ~'I't provl6td j",UHle1 
the ),000 rtduncUnchS,1t Is I p.lrthl .ftd 91lb In .. 'ys\\ of • "rlous lQn09-ttnl 
·dtclslon. 
Ont Interpr~tltlon of ttwir r~lucunc:e to pro't'ld, • fully reUontd cue Is 
tk.lt th.ir intentions .rt either: 
(I) to reduc, the 'oIOrk.(orce In prl!'p.lratlon (or the I"troduetiotl of I'\otW 
lI!'chnotogy. or 
(b) to contract U'!' UK optr.tlon to benerit Dvctllle,. .rId oth.r or th.\r 
oyen,u ccnp'n\'L 
tn r,plylng to rh, Qutstiotls on tM c~ny'~ cliplul InvtStJIiIotr"lt .. (\d 
R " 0 progr.1Ifl'!t OYer tl"lt 1.ast (\v, ytars ... ,...~ .. nt con(lM"d th,lr ~plI 
to • sut~nt of tht tot.1 In'l'ut.nt Itv'" In the Uk: .I'\d OVHSfU. They 
~ru,t<! to Indic .. tt l!-ot .. plo.r-ent er£tets or tht-se In'l'uu.ents •• nd hilt<! 
to pro.,.\~ dtt.ils of the crlt,rh \,IS~ to "v.luat, SIKh f'lptndltvT""s. 
In replY\(\9 to Qutstlons on the Icthltlts or subsidIAry .nd .Hoci .. tt 
cOClplnltS """na!ff'1lltnt fallt"d to pro ... l/H ~"y d,ul1s. lnod th,lr ,ut~t 
,.lIth r'Spotct to Due,lliH contradicts su~U .. de el~re. t.9. tl'I' 
.Inutu or Works JIIot"rting Z5 on the 8th AV9ust 1979 Sly tN;l -durlr'!(J tht 
first (l'I'e yurs lucu Mve operlt10Ni ~sponslbn1ty for Dvcel1it .... (p.a~ C) 
""n .. ~nt's refuul to pro'l'lde re1e .... nt d,Ulls which will justify thotlr 
eue sut}9t-Hs tnty .re ,...lllcUnt to 1nd1c .. te the r ..... 1 rtUOf1S (Or their actlol 
To Justify their _ctions tn,y .. st It leut: 
1) SlIbsunthtt t""'t tNr, Iws bftft a dr ... tlc fall In Vw ~l'Id for 
lucu products. 
2) Show tJ\.t alter,...tl ... , work oP90rtunltlu ""'vt bun Invutl~tl'd .rId 
"'-N~nt Idilit thlt SCftie \Nil c~~nts Ire 'nte~n.an9 ... ble ~ thAlt _11 rl!ulbl, .ltertWltlv.l N;ve b~n ttlplretntt-d. 
"'UoJl1, f~ lower to hlgP'ltr tf'<hnOloqy flctode, - but !'\#W1" viet 
versa. lllCU [Itel h..l Is CQrlsldtr.d by "'Ngtwe'nt to ~ a lower 
ttchnolQV' busln,u ,rod b«.u'U of this they dtny f"t'en the poud,ilit~ 
or work tr .. ns(,r. HoI,AoJ.1". to QW" b.oI..II.dg. t"'v ,..,~ ".", .. r t·r"Il.! •• ti9'lt.d 
~t~r t~ ... opport....,t,f. i .. erU-t. 
3) ShO"ol th.t th. e~.ny's flNncrs dO not .llow (or In.y IlttT"l'\ltlV •• 
olMr th"n r~undlncies, 
A REPlY TO IWIAGEI€NT'S STATEI€NT ON THE "STATE or THE C_ANY" 
I" their st.t.eont to the .,rUorc. lucas Nnl.getJltnt cht. thlt th' clJI"Plny is 
tn I critical situation. nn:. i. aft .",..,.t" bUI.N "nt.",NtatiOJl 01 "-
f-", 
Lucu "l"LIgeftlrnt Sly th.t: 
(I) The COIIPI"Y IS I wholl h unprof'lUble, .nd 
(b) lucas T,.,ding • the bulk of Luell UK operations, including lUels 
[lectric.al. Lucil IItterin. CAV. G1rl tng and lucas Service 4' is in 
long-tlrw declfn'. 
!obi' Profttlbh is Lucas Industrhs1 
MiN981ent chi. that the loss in the UK of fl." (or the first hllf yt.r to 
J,lnu,"y 1980 is cle.r evidence of In iMpending '1n1ne1al crhh. 
• 
Ther. Ire It lent t..o nasons why thiS conelus 10n should not be drawn: 
1. 
2. 
TJw UK'. r.ftllt" aN QCtlldU, ",",ell batt"r , ..... tv L1. "" to ••• &I(Igcat •• 
firstly, 1n • no"..1 ye.r profits would hive bHn 120M grelter .. that h. 
th ... _Id hi., be .. a. £18.210 pmfit • if tho '''9t ... rt''9 .trtk, IIId 
been .voided. lueu Nnlgetnent nys that the strike (.used • ".J'9lldrlent 
loss of ord!rs. In fact, it ts -ore likely that their fulftl-ent has 
atrely been delayed so thlt the 1201 will be recoverl'd. As the stockbrokers, 
laurie, Millblnk aad Co. say 1n their review of Lucas' hit' year "sutts 
(publlshtd o. till 12th 9f ... ,1980) "I. tho IbI",e. of I .. thor ...... Vt'" 
'"V'.,.rt"9 .trik, 1980{81 'hould ... I .trong .1_.t of roc ... ,.,. 
...... _i" •• « dwl! _ blcgrownd" (rage I, our tulte.). 
Sfocondl" bec.uSI Of lucu' unusu.lly consenative accounting procedures, 
the UK operations Nve rKent1y hid to bear exclssive nor9lntsatton 
ctt.rges Witdl Mve depresud current proftts. 
2'r'aditioPlatt¥. l.&o2 • .,.,.. ..,,.. 01 iu prol't_ tIuri,.. tM .tI«1rtd Itdll 
of tho ~ ............ " do ..... tho fi,.. •• 
'n fact, l,urie, Mt11b1nt and Co. (in their "POrt rtftrrtd to larlier) 
forecasted that .~ profit- f01' th. cntr"Nnt J'NJ" GN 
Iik.l¥ to "" _. c_ ~ for tho foIlcuiotp M- £6:""(_ JI. 
Charl" one half year's results cannot be .,iewd 11'1 tsolatton. 
Is Lucas Trading 1n Long-ttMl Ortc11ne'P 
..... 9_nt argue tlllt tho boUte probl .. flet"9 th, eOOOJ)l"Y Is the fill t. till 
nUllber of vehicles produced in the Uk. However, the vehicle cDII'pOMnt .. net 
is ,,"Cn"fIationclZ and (as reported by stockbrokers 51.,n and tOIUS on the 
15th of HovMber. 1979) • •• n.gelbent ch1.s that no-less than tw thirds of 
the Grouop', business now uhes outside the UK •••• ·(page 3). Why ehe trlIOuld 
"NgeMnt bother to cl'llnge ,11 sPK1f1catton, to European Sbnd.rds? 
In fact, f'rottI tJr. /igwrw. wIIicA: IfU1Iag"""C: In''011'C4 • • irIC. 1110 eM lkJooptldn 
tINl ""1'td"'1tlid. ~c"," 01 aU CW-_ 01 u.IrioZ •• ha. "...atl." u.cr.a..d. 
Managaent's figures show (see below) that pr"Oductlon of Slfven of the world's 
..Jar veMcle lftInuficturfl"1 Increased by 3 •• 41. Taking Just the EuroPHn 
produe ... t. thotr list tho inc ...... ..... ttll 8.6S. 
Iwest rll,.,..ny 
;f~.nc. 
, 
SPit. 
luly 
UK 
oul Europe 
'SA 
ape. 
VEHICL£ PRODUCTION 8' TltE WORLO'S MAJOA IWIUFACTURERS 
"tllton. of V.hiel •• 
1970 1979 CIII"9' 
3.9 4.25 + 0.35 
2.75 3.62 + 0.87 
0.54 1.12 + 0.58 
1.85 1.63 • 0.22 
2.10 1.48 • 0.62 
11.14 12.1 + 0.96 
8.28 11.47 + 3.19 
5.29 9.63 + 4.:14 
24.71 33. 2 + 8.49 
• ".n 
• +:M •• 
51.t hrl", o.,.r the lISt fh' ye,rs thl sa_ countries have increased their 
productton of dt ... 1 tn9tne. by 6lS(f .... 2.8500 ,"vtne. to 4.&1 "'vtnes). 
-~ 
~ 
C1.,r1y, o..,.H.Il tl'l. airllet '01' ..,.eh,(. h ctwapOnenh h.as incrusl'd ,nd 1n the 
longer~tt,... will (.onllnue to to so, 
~ver ...... ".Qtf"oe"t Sly tlwt ul11~ Ibrold 1$ MCO,.dn9 Il10" difficult. 
To ut.blhh ,tt'lls cue .. n,g~nt s!'lOw !'low IllUch producers have increned 
ttt.1r prices over the lut f·ve yurs: 
G,trNIny 
trlnce 
USA 
Japan 
It.ly 
Uk 
t. incrflu in Prices chirged 
by vehicle component producers 
frOM .1d 1975 to !lid 1980 
·22't 
+ 59't 
+ SH 
+ 27't 
.'07't 
+9H 
The Inference ~ lr! suppos~ to d" .... fr(.lfl this tablt h th.t lncrusin9 costs 
In tM UK: h • ..,.! !orc,d !lcustve price rises here. 
C .. rta~"tv 1JafJ .... I-r::IV .. P\Ot forc.d 'P"f'""Ccu tq' b.C(71.j .... a. a proport~OI1 of 
.aL .. , 1.Xl'P'" ,IVfl''' f'atI"" ~ f2.~ to J3.";t: 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
UK Wlges IS " 
~~les ''t'Il~ 
'1.6 
'1.0 
'0.1 
37.9 
38.' 
39.6 
Proft t earned by 
each E"'Ploy~ 
r 
'18 
6.7 
99. 
1.163 
1.10 
1.1'8 
()rI the oth{,r hand profits {before depreciation} and dividends IS • proportion 
of Sllu, hHe \~1"4<U,.d frca l 8':. to 10.2t of Slles: 
~~. 
197. 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Profit ~for' Depreciation 
IS' " of !oll.s 
7.8 
9.' 
10.9 
11.0 
11.0 
10.1 
Dividtnds u a 
~
0.77 
0.65 
0.91 
0.87 
0.89 
0.97 
ct.arljf, 1IIWlI"Io.:lt1~t ~t."II ~~r.a .. d pric". tc Vtproov .. prof~t.. A.pnt fr(ll 
increulng dividends Nn.ge-"lent hlV' usP<! SOlW of th. lncreuf'd profits to 
invest 1n labour-slVing Clpital t'qulptllfnt whlcl'l will further increase prof1ts 
in the 1980's (for exallple, th. 3,OCXi rf'dundlncits proposed It lucas Electr1cal 
would slYe the CQaIP.ny Sent £12'11 ev.ry 1'111"). In lOul lucu {Mustr1u to....,.. 
1nnsted S~ t67C. slnet 1971. 
I1I th.. ptut !Mea. pric.d to ~ ... pr'Ofih. /IoIfoJ it .~I.d b .. pr'~N'd tc 
tl""iM it. profit. to M:7{"tav, it. IPICD"'k.t .1ttZ:r.I cmd prct«>t it. ~toV" '. ~9"'. 
Managt1l'lent ha..,.e also c0f'lP1.ined .bout tt'l. currtnt1y overvalued t. So long .s the 
t r-eaeins overvalued it 1s true th.t Lucu w111 ,arn 1Iss on its t;tporu 
th.n it othentise 'IfOuld. HOwtver. -ost u~rts pr.dict tnat IS UK interest 
raUs fll1 (currently UK. 1nvestor\ get a 51 higher rttUrTt on tM1r MOM)' lend1ng 
ICt1vit1.s IS COlflPlr~ ~1th th«1r USA count,rparts) so w111 the ""alue of t~ 
L Howev,r, Lucu nave the ch01" of either accepting lower prices to .. inta'" 
their voll.ftes or increasing priCes (h~ct pushing Y'01,.,s deJo,m) to .. 'nU'n 
profi ts. Agei", if !.uoa. i. r.aU~ wcm.d czbo1,.t ""1"",,,. ~t I.I'itt b. Prlrar--d 
to tau d C\oIt i." p7"0!it.t to .,..t;;a(" iu eaL4 •• 
COHCLUS1OHS: 
(a) D~8p'it. tJuo r"port.d tou ftn' La..:o::,.. UK for the f~r.t 'nIf of IR7g/80~ 
Luoa. Irsdu.tri". i. profitabt •. 
(b) o.lfpit" tM laIt in UK v • .Jrict. p7"0<'iuct"icl1 ~ trading ~. I'IOt ~'" 
l..::rnp t.l"'I' d"et,:." •. In fact, as r.ported by stockbrok.ers S1-on and Co.tu 
-dup1U a prob41ble dow'fIturn 1n Europoe.n cn production ntxt ye." (thlt 
h, for 1980) -.nagewnt Sly they art confid,"t of • furthf'r substanthl 
rise in exports'·, (15th NoVfC>cr, 1979, pig' 1.) 
(c) wotll cal'! afford to pa~ r.a.onabl. 1ot1g .. cmd ...ai"ta~" it. voz.w,..,.. 
~caust as r.portPd by stockbrokers Lauri •• M111bank a ... d Co. (1 ... ~y 
1980) -lucas 1s an 1MQP"'ns1n Co-pt.ny invo1vtd i" sev.r_.l .. jor 9rCJlll'th 
Mlrkets.rod 11 ftninchlly strong-,(p.aOt 1.) 
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who had argued at the Works Conference that non co-operation would only 
become effective after the holidays had to admit that they had been 
unable to maintain policy. A meeting between the senior stewards of 
. Chester Street '. and the site wh~ch was receiving Chester Sq'eet work· 
had been concluded without agreement. One of the Chester Street senior 
stewards reported that: 
"They seem to be saying, "I'm alright Jack." 
The non co-operation policy was evidently not holding and one of 
the senior stewards summed up the position as follows: 
"The problem is that we cannot motivate the members, 
since they cannot see 
had 16 lines, now we 
aren't fully occupied. 
any work. 
are down 
Its not a 
Before the holiday we 
to 10, and even those 
matter of having to co-
operate with management - they have no need for us. 
Having received the report backs on the limited effectiveness of 
the non co-operation policy, the Chairman of the SSSC opened a 
discussion on the redundancies by stating: 
"We are not going to the mass meeting with any 
recommendation •••• For Monday's meeting (of stewards) we 
must be prepared to argue the case. We need to 
understand the position." 
I was asked to review the two documents prepared. I was given 
approximately fifteen minutes to review both of my documents. In 
conclusion, I argued that the value of an information approach to 
negotiation lay in the fact that: 
••• you can show that they (management). are changing 
their position. For example, management in Works Meeting 
No 20 recognises the company's interest in supplying the 
European market yet in justifying the redundancy they 
deny having any real interest in this market. It is only 
by knocking down each argument that you will get to know 
their real reasons. To do that you need information and 
you can benefit by pressing management to provide more 
information." • 
The documents raised only one directly related question about 
marketing agreements between companies in Europe to which I responded 
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"Wi th regard to Europe and marketing arrangements 
between companies, I feel it is important that you defend 
yourselves against the dual sourcing/falling demand 
argument by countering that 98% of the European market is 
non-Lucas and that dual sourcing away from others can 
benefit Lucas, and that the company's satisfaction with a 
2% market share cannot be accepted." 
Thereafter, discussion returned to the general problems of 
motivating membership opposition to management policy given the high 
- levels of unemployment. The prevailing air of pessimism is indicated 
by the following statement made by a shop steward at the meeting: 
"The main problem is that there's no work in the factory. 
The members are not concerned about the pay claim or 
about someone else's job. All they are concerned with is 
not being one of the two million on the dole. That's the 
problem ... 
To quote the Chairman of the SSSC: 
"We cannot ignore the position with regard to the 
volunteers. We might find that at the mass meeting the 
shop stewards will capitulate, and if that is the case we 
are in danger of accepting changes in work practices for 
nothing. We must try to resist this, however it is 
exceedingly difficult when you get members queuing up for 
volunteers' jobs: we have two such cases at BW3 where 
management are looking to fill vacancies which offer an 
extra £6-8 per week. That's the real difficulty; members 
are beginning to see us as obstructing them from getting 
a better paid job. Our policy isn't holding, its no good 
having a policy on paper, it's got to be real and if it's 
not then we will need to change policy. We will be told 
what we are supposed to do on Monday" (my emphasis). 
Evidently nothing said in the meeting or presented by me had 
influenced the Chairman. He accepted that SSSC would not make policy 
recommendations to the mass meeting of stewards who would have to 
formulate their own. 
The stewards would not only be influenced by the "extended 
holidays" caused -by lay-offs at many sites, and the new post war record 
levels of unemployment, the July figures having increased by 237,000 to 
1,897,000, two stories reported by the Birmingham Post relayed even 
more pointed messages. (See exhibits 6 & 7.) 
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Exhibit 6. Birmingham Evening Post, 22nd July, 1980 
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The first, on 22 July, was headlined ."B.L fires a warning to part 
firms", which reported B.L's intentions to "withdraw business from car 
component makers where B.L thought the cost increases had been due to 
high pay settlements". This story may have been news for the mass of 
the workforce, however for the SSSC it merely "confirmed" information 
that had been contained in ~he Lucas Industries document issued in 
support of the non-negotiable wage offer. The Company's document 
state, for example, that: 
"We have already been served notice by two large 
customers (B.L and Talbot) that they will not entertain 
price increases in the next 12 months which include 
labour elements in excess of 7 1/2%. They will be 
seeking to source from the most competitive source" 
(State of the Company, 11 July, 1980). 
Interestingly, a B.L spokesman stated: 
"The company has not laid down a specific limit on what 
increases in components it will tolerate·' (Birmingham 
Post, 22 July, 1980). 
The general view was that the intent of the Company's message ~s 
to say 10% looks good against a 7 1/2% maximum. 
The second message from the Birmingham Post came on 6 August in the 
feature story. It was headlined ·'80,000 Jobs At Risk In Car Crisis". 
It reported a meeting between MP's and representatives of the British 
Automotive Parts Promotion Council. The representatives stated: 
"Britain must maintain a viable motor manufacturing 
industry or many of the larger component manufacturers 
will be forced to move to those countries where 
governments encourage volume motor manufacturers·' 
(Birmingham Post, 6 August, 1980). 
The reporter stated: 
··1 understand that the confidential warning to MP's 
contains a prediction that by the end of the year 30,000 
jobs will be lost in the British component industry 
mostly in the Midlands. • 
And if the trend towards assembly of imported kits 
continues, there will be another 50,000 jobs destroyed" 
(6 August, 1980). 
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In view of the above and the pessimism expressed at the SSSC 
meeting on the day of the above Birmingham Post report, the decision of 
the mass meeting of the stewards to re-affirm the non co-operation 
policy came as a surprise to most Senior Stewards. Also surprised was 
the TGWU Official, who had absented himself from the mass meeting even 
though he had previously proposed the non co-operation policy to the 
stewards. 
Shop Stewards re-affirm the non co-operation policy: 
The mass meeting of stewards on 11 August was relatively poorly 
attended with over a hundred stewards being absent since their sites 
were laid off. Also missing were the full-time officials who had 
attended the Works Conference. The Chairman of the SSSC after making 
his report back stated the need to discuss policy. As at the SSSC 
meeting of 6 August, the author's documents were reviewed and appeared 
to be well received. Thereafter, the Chairman accepted a motion from 
the floor which proposed that co-operation should be given to implement 
voluntary redundancies in return for a substantial wage increase. 
Moves to declare the motion 'out of order' on the basis that the 
meeting had been convened to discuss the redundancies was overruled 
after considerable discussion. 
In discussing the motion most speakers argued on the basis of 
general principles, only two of the. nine making any direct reference to 
the documents produced by the author. The principal argument in favour 
of a 'productivity deal' was put in the following terms by one steward: 
··We are due to lose three members, and 1 know this 
saving represents a 28% pay rise to those that remain; 
that's witho~t any extra cost to the company. We should 
-aim for co-operation on the basis of consultation. The 
company are dictating to us with regard to timing; it's 
about time we started dictating to them on some issues". 
Two main arguments were employed by the opposers of the motion. 
The first was: 
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"If I had 30 pieces of silver I would give· it gladly 
to the movers of this motion. We have no right to sell 
jobs. If we give the company the co-operation they are 
asking for they will be making us our own executioners. 
We'd be expected to identify who should go, we'd be 
expected to identify the next 1000. No thank you, we 
must reject this motion." 
The second line of opposition was to argue that the control of work 
practices was the primary concern. One steward summed up the position 
as follows: 
"The moment we rubber stamp a deal which gives up our 
control of work practices, then we give up all that we 
have striven for over the years." 
The motion was overwhelmingly defeated. The Chairman stressed the need 
to take this decision back to members who should be made aware of the 
issues involved by a discussion of the documents prepared. The non co-
operation policy had to be re-asserted and stewards should be prepared 
to bring the factories to a standstill. In his view 
"(t)he officials have accepted that compulsory 
redundancies are not on, and we must be determined to 
show the company of our intentions to hold to this 
policy ••. 
When the officers of the SSSC reported this decision to management, 
the latter seemed to be unperturbed. One Senior Steward stated: 
"They didn't blink an eyelid" (12 August, 1980). 
The full time officials were surprised by the decision and would 
have to reconvene the Works Conference on 19 August. 
Management's final wage offer: 
Management's response to the shop stewards rejection of the wage 
offer and conditions attached had been postponed by the annual holiday 
and ·lay-offs. The issue was not to be finally discussed with 
management until a meeting on 18 August. Before that meeting, the SSSC 
responded to a Lucas Aerospace Combine Committee initiative which 
proposed that delegations from all Lucas Industries' negotiating groups 
should meet to discuss the Company's "non-negotiable wage offer". 
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The meeting was held in Birmingham and attendance was mainly 
confined to factories from the immediate area. All delegates 
recognised that effectively "corporate bargaining" had arrived, and 
that the purpose of the meeting was to investigate whether it was 
possible to make a co-ordinated response. Without this it seemed 
likely that the Company would achieve its aims, since no one group was 
strong enough to challenge a wage policy that covered 66,000 workers. 
It was pointed out to the meeting that Lucas Aerospace Combine 
Committee had combatted redundancies on a company-wide basis by 
identifying a site which would undertake industrial action and 
financially supported it by collections at other sites. As one steward 
stated: 
"The Company can be defied as was illustrated by the 
Burnley fight against redundancies, which was made 
effective by 20p collections throughout all sites. They 
didn't save all the jobs, however they managed to reduce 
the number involved, and they were seen to have won. 
However, it was recognised that no organisation existed to take 
such decisions on a Lucas Industries' basis and that the official trade 
unions would object. One steward observed: 
"There are problems with the officials - they don't like 
us talking to each ·other, and some of the officials are 
not pleased with the fact that this meeting is taking 
place." 
Furthermore, the parochial attitudes of their own organisations 
were recognised: 
"At. Lucas Electrical we have eight negotiating groups. 
It's like the KIu Klux Klan with everyone protecting 
their own little patch." 
One of the senior shop stewards from Chester Street, stated that he 
thought it was unrealistic to expect co-ordination with respect to 
wages if co-ordination couldn't be established over redundancies. 
"Employment is number one ••• It'.s no good talking about a 
wage claim, it you haven't got a plant." 
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Even if the meeting had been 100% representative of the Lucas 
Industries' negotiating groups, the possibilities of initiating co-
ordinated action would still have been subject to membership approval. 
This, however, was not an immediate concern because co-ordination did 
not exist, all that was possible was to pass a resolution which 
proposed that negotiating groups should "continue to resist the current 
wage offer", and that "consideration should be given to ways in which 
co-ordinated policies could be developed." 
The SSSC attended the 18 August meeting with management knowing 
that membership opposition to the wage offer was greatly influenced by 
the redundancies. There was no possibility that they would be leading 
the fight to overturn Lucas Industries' offer. However, they wished to 
retain some control over work practices. The SSSC restated shop 
steward objections to the "no strike clause" and requested that the 
principle of ·'mutuality" be accepted with regard to changes in work 
practices. Management were not prepared to reply immediately and a 
further meeting was to be arranged. 
At the reconvened meeting of 22 August management presented the 
final wage offer. Management were not prepared to increase the weekly 
payments, but the conditions attached to the offer had been redefined. 
The "no strike clause" had been removed and the agreement required 
that: 
"Both parties mutually agree that in the present very 
difficult commercial situation it is imperative that 
every effort is made to maximize the effectiveness of 
our manufacturing resources. 
The unions concerned in this agreement accept that 
this means they will give their support to the removal 
of ineffective working practices. 
Additionally, it will be necessary to look at 
existing systems of working" which will be subject to 
negotiation between the company and unipns concerned in 
the established manner" (22 August, 1980). 
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The Secretary of the SSSC indicated that senior stewards found the 
above more acceptable because "mutuality" was recognised. They 
objected to the term "ineffective working practices" and asked 
management to provide examples. 
the examples quoted did not 
Management were unable to be specific, 
relate to the production workers. 
Management said that they were not prepared to change the offer, and 
suggested that the SSSC should put the offer to the stewards. It was 
also suggested that if stewards rejected the offer, management would 
consider balloting all production workers, since they claimed that 
stewards were not representing the views of members. The SSSC 
presented their case to stewards via the handout shown in Exhibit 8. 
The shop stewards would also have to be updated on the redundancy 
negotiations at the re-convened works conference which had been held on 
19th August. 
The Reconvened Works Conference: 
In the week between the mass meeting of shop stewards 'and the Works 
Conference both local and national newspapers carried stories of 
further redundancies (at Jaguar and Massey· Ferguson) and reported 
Talbot's decision to put 11 ,000 workers on a two-day week. The 
officials and the SSSC could not have been confident about the outcome 
of the Works Conference. However, they were obliged to restate their 
case, which had now been given formal expression by the two documents 
produced by the author. Management had apparently been told of my 
attendance at the previous Works Conference and they refused to re-
convene the Conference if the SSSC insisted on having "unauthorised" 
persons as part of their delegation. The officials and the SSSC 
recognised that they' had "weakened" their position by not formally 
agreeing with management to receive outside advice, and accepted that 
my attendance at negotiating sessions was not now tenable. 
Consultation would have to be restricted to adjournment sessions. 
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Exhibit 8. SSSC Response to the Non-Negotiable Wage Offer 
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After this delay and a short pre-meeting to review the findings of the 
sub-contracting committee, the Works Conference was reconvened wi th 
management having to make the first statement because the original 
conference had been adjourned at their request. 
According to the TGWU District Official' report-back management 
opened the conference by stating that of 2,146 redundancies (unskilled 
and skilled workers only) 1,056 had left the Company by the annual 
holidays, a further 126 had left since then, and that ·160 'volunteers' 
were ready to go if the SSSC would agree to co-operation. This left 
the Company 814 short of its target, and if the SSSC would not help to 
secure further volunteers, the compulsory redundancies would have to be 
declared on the coming Friday (22 August). Management warned that 
continued opposition by the SSSC would result in higher redundancies 
and that the offer of job transfers to employees at Chester Street 
would have to be withdrawn. The officials responded by stating that 
alternatives existed, and that short time working and work transfer 
from Lucas Aerospace should allow the outstanding redundancies to be 
avoided. The officials requested a meeting with the Board .of 
Directors, which led management to adjourn temporarily for discussions. 
On their return, management refused the request stating: 
"We are speaking with one voice, and that a meeting with 
the Board of Directors would not produce any change in 
policy" • 
Management said that if the SSSC would co-operate over the 
redundancies, the Company were prepared to delay the notification of 
compulsory redundancies by 2 weeks (ie, 5 September) in the hope that 
the required 'volunieers' could be obtained. Management claimed that 
the redundancies were necessary to save further job losses, which would 
, 
otherwise occur. The Conference was adjourned, while the SSSC 
considered their position. 
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The District Official, after summing up the position continued, 
"(w)hat they are saying is this if you don't give 
in now, it will get worse. 
One of the problems we face is that the people with 
whom we are speaking have no power to change policy. 
We may need to see the puppet masters rather than the 
puppets. We're not dealing with the policy makers, and 
if we were to present the Warwick analysis of 
management's case, 1 don't think that would produce a 
change of mind. 
We've got a case, and it would stand up to 
exmination. The trouble is, we're not putting it 
before an independent arbiter, they are jury and judge. 
They're going to shake out 1,000 more. They are 
providing us with no alternative to taking up the 
cudgels. We all know of the problems with the members. 
We are however leaders and if we think this has to be 
fought, then we should be prepared to lead H. 
There followed a period of discussion when the Senior Stewards were 
divided into two separate lobbies. The first, arguing that co-
operation should be given, so that the number of internal transfers 
could be maximised. The second arguing that they could not accept 
closures, and that they had a duty to protect the interest of those 
that remained. Co-operation would mean accepting the conditions 
attached to the wage offer; full mobility and flexibility and an 
unconditional commitment to the introduction of new technology. The 
debate reflected the sentiments expressed by the AUEW and TGWU District 
Officials. 
The AUEW official argued as follows: 
.... 1 believe that we've got a Government whose policy is 
to destroy your industry. I've no love for the Gaffer, 
but I feel we have to co-operate in order to soften the 
blows. There is a lot of talk about sub-contracting, the 
only work I. see being created is for Bill and myself. 
The shop stewards have not come up with a policy for when 
the Company takes the gloves off. 
Some of the arguments could be taken to higher level. 
1 don't think that would change anything. We have a mock 
battle between ourselves and the employer, while our real 
enemy the Government stands on the side lines. The rest 
of the industry is on short-time working, Lucas has a 
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minimal redundancy, and I'm fearful that your actions 
might not amount to anything more than words. I recall 
another very powerful shop steward organisation which 
kept saying ••• oppose, oppose, resist. You've not got an 
Edwardes* yet, but you've got a Board of Directors who 
are following his example. The choice is between co-
operating with Management or reading of their decisions 
on the noticeboards. At the end of the day, they will 
impose their will." 
The TGWU official responded as follows: 
"We've got a good case. We cannot change the objective 
circumstances we find ourselves in, and we may not be 
able to take members along with us. When you look at the 
Company's reply to the questionnaire and the Warwick 
Uni versi ty answer to that reply, you've got to believe 
that we have a good case, which needs to be discussed 
with higher management. 
The Company says that it has only a 2% share of the 
European market - well that's 200,000 vehicles. Another 
2% would be another 200,000 vehicles, and that would 
represent a huge workload to the UK factories. The 
Company can penetrate this market if they choose to do 
so, and we must argue this case with top management. 
Their denial of these rights is putting us on the course 
of confrontation. 
Let me draw your attention to the two conclusions 
drawn by the Warwick report as to why management has 
announced these redundancies. 
Firstly, Management may be reducing the workforce in 
preparation for the introduction of new technology. Last 
week, we had a Conference with the Company with regard to 
new technology. We didn't get an agreement regarding 
negotiating rights for manual workers, so that no change 
would take place without consultation, and we were unable 
to get any guarantee as to redundancies. It would seem 
to me that the Warwick conclusion may well be right. If 
not, management should refute the claim. 
Secondly, Management may be seeking to contract its 
UK operating to benefit Ducellier and other of their 
overseas companies. Is that a reasonable conclusion? 
I'd say it's a fair assumption, until the Company proves 
otherwise. We know that they are trying to close Chester 
Street and Grange Road. Will the time come when we will 
be talking about the future of Great King Street? 
Yes, there are problems with the motor industry, we 
don't have to be told ••• we cannot handle that. However 
we do know that Lucas Industries is.a multi-national 
company which has adequate reserves to get through this 
difficult period. They should be able to sit down with 
* At the time Michael Edwardes, Chairman of BL, had just hit the 
headlines for successfully getting 'tough' with the trade 
unions. 
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us and come to some reasoned conclusion. They don't 
wish to pursue this course, and this must have 
ramifications for you in the future. If they aren't 
prepared to listen now, then they'll not listen in the 
future. 
There may be a lot 
can be made to listen. 
asking us to sanction 
of people who at a higher level 
This Company is at the moment 
30 hours per month overtime in 
Lucas Aerospace, and at the very same time is telling us 
that we must co-operate'in making our members redundant. 
It's not on, and we must demand consultation at a higher 
level. 
If we are denied these rights, I think that we 
should register a failure to agree, and then it's up to 
you to get the members to fight, since this is the only 
language they understand." 
The SSSC agreed that a meeting with higher management should be 
requested. This request was refused again on the basis that the 
"decision had been well researched". Management offered to delay the 
announcement of the compulsory redundancies by another two weeks (ie, 
19 September) on the understanding that the SSSC undertook to recommend 
the acceptance of this offer to members. The SSSC remained divided on 
the issue, Grange Road feeling particularly aggrieved since the site 
was to close on 5 September, and that would be the effective date of 
the compulsory redundancies. The two· officials again argued their 
respective positions. The TGWU official emphasising the fact that they 
had a case, and that they should be prepared to recommend industrial 
action, even if this recommendation was rejected by members. Their 
responsibility was to lead and to do what they believed was right. The 
AUEW official warned that: 
"A mismanaged opposition could result in a further 1,000 
redundancies ••• Our job is not just to oppose management, 
it's part of our job to solve problems. We've put 
alternatives to the Company and they haven't responded". 
The SSSC could not reach agreement, and management accepted that 
the decision would have to be taken at a mass meeting of stewards to be 
arranged for 25 August. This meeting would also have to respond to the 
Company's final wage offer. 
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Mass meeting of stewards to decide the redundancy and wage issues: 
The mass meeting of shop stewards was held on 25 August (a Bank 
Holiday for the officials and they did not attend). The purpose was to 
vote on both the redundancy and wage issues on the same day. In both 
instances there would be no policy recommendation from the SSSC. The 
last mass meeting of stewards had told the SSSC to report on the wage 
negotiation without making any recommendation, whilst the SSSC had 
voluntarily set aside its policy recommendation role regarding the 
redundancies, being unable to establish an agreed policy amongst 
themselves. Since certain stewards involved in the redundancy issue 
had no rights of representation regarding wages, the meeting was taken 
into two sessions. The redundancy issue was considered first. 
Having made his report back on the redundancy negotiations, the 
Chairman asked for contributions from the floor. The speakers mirrored 
the opinions expressed by the AUEW and TGWU officials at the Works 
Conference. 
Those who wanted to co-operate stated that opposition would not 
stop management implementing the redundancies, and would allow them to 
decide who would leave. Accepting co-operation would deny the foremen 
the right to have the last word. Fears were also expressed that the 
proposed action which was not acceptable to members would lead to the 
trade union organisations being discredited. Whilst expressing 
sympathy for Grange Road and Chester Street, these stewards stated that 
YOu had to recognise members' feelings. One steward said: 
"There's a lot of sympathy for Grange Road and Chester 
Street, however members are saying 'but for the Grace of 
God go I'. _ -They are frightened, and I am frightened." 
Those who wanted to resist stressed that a trade union organisation 
~hich wasn't prepared to demand basic rights wou~d not be able to 
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resist any future closure plans. They claimed that without resistance 
there would be further redundancies. The 'co-operators' were 
cri ticised for not implementing agreed policy, whilst membership fears 
could be partially overcome if shop stewards fulfilled their duties to 
the SSSC by reporting back to members the reasons for the policies 
adopted. The duty of a shop steward was to decide policy and argue in 
favour of the majority decision. The members had the right to reject 
policy. One steward summarised the position as follows: 
"I'm saying that it's necessary to lead the members in 
this situation. You must estimate the problem and decide 
the proper course of action. You are closer to the 
problems, you talk to the Gaffer, and the members are 
always asking for your opinion, because it's valued. The 
fact is quite clear, if there's going to be 814 
compulsory redundancies, then that means that some of 
your members are going to be sacked. Nobody knows 
whether they have a secure job. Will you support action 
to keep those jobs?" 
The stewards were given the opportunity to express their opinions 
when the following motion was put to the vote: 
"If the Company declares any compulsory redundancies, 
that there will be immediate industrial action in the 
form of an all-out strike." 
The motion was defeated by 154 votes to 103 votes with 23 
abstentions. (Seven SSSC members out of 58 voted for the motion). 
Having removed what appeared to be the only means of opposing 
management's proposals, the remaining business was a formality. Co-
operation would be given to 12 September to maximise the number of 
'volunteers' and in the case of any compulsory redundancies the SSSC 
were requested to negotiate improved severance terms. The above was 
. 
only a recommendation to members, whose votes on the issue are given in 
Exhibit 9 below. 
The outcome of the wage negotiations was effectively decided by the 
rejection of strike action above. The stewards did not like the 
references to "ineffective working practices", and neither were they 
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Exhibit 9. Voting Results of Production Workers - Redundancies 
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particularly happy with the amount of money on offer. However they 
recognised that nothing further would be gained by negotiations and 
therefore the choice seemed to be between putting the offer to the 
members themselves, or letting management organise a secret ballot. 
The stewards preferred the former option, but were not prepared to make 
any recommendations as to ac~eptance or rejection. To be seen to 
concede two victories to management on one day seemed to be too painful 
to contemplate. The votes made by members are given in Exhibit 10 
below. 
As Exhibits 9 and 10 indicate, a large majority accepted both the 
wage offer and the redundancies. There was slightly more opposition to 
the wage offer however even in this case members voted 4 to 1 in favour 
of management policy. In the case of the redundancy, the decisions did 
not reflect the threat of redundancy as such. For example, voters at 
Chester Street, a site to be closed, voted unanimously for this course 
of action. This may reflect the fact that management had offered a 
considerable number of job transfers and employees wished not to 
endanger this offer by further opposition to the redundancy. 
A detailed understanding of what information was used by employees 
to decide these issues is not available. However there can be 1i tt1e 
doubt as to the confusion involved. The Birmingham Evening Mail, 
reporting the above decisions quoted Mr Bob Griffiths, a shop steward 
involved in negotiations with management as saying: 
"They told us there was no more money to give us, and we 
know they were telling the truth" (2 September, 1980, 
emphasis added) • 
.on 2 September the Guardian reported: 
"One union official yesterday accused the Company of 
"bamboozling" the workforce. A Lucas spokesman described 
the settlement as a "victory for common~ense:·. He added, 
however that it did not mean guaranteed job security for 
all Lucas manual workers" (2 September, 1980, emphasis 
added). 
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By 11 September the Company had secured its target reduction in the 
workforce. Compulsory redundancies occurred at Grange Road; elsewhere 
volunteers came forward to accept the Company's severance payments. Of 
the fifty-eight strong SSSC, fifteen volunteers decided that their own 
future interests would not be served by remaining with Lucas 
Electrical. In cases where the' internal rebalancing of the workforce 
resulted in a loss of earnings to individuals, management undertook to 
introduce a twelve week sliding scale to aid the adjustment process. 
The reconvened Works Conference of 11 September to discuss higher 
severance payment for those made compulsorily redundant should have 
been the end of the redundancy process. However, management reported 
that because of a further 13% fall in UK vehicle build there was a need 
to discuss further redundancies and the warning sounded by the Lucas 
spokesman on 2 September hadn't taken long to materialise. Management 
stated ~hat they would involve the trade unions in further discussions 
in. about a month's time. Because of higher stock levels all but two 
sites would be subject to 'substantial selective lay-offs' in the 
immediate future. 
The redundancy process had been brought to a temporary halt. In 
Table 8.2 below the "settlement" that arose from the 3 months of 
negotiations is set out in the tabular form below to contrast the 
objectives and achievements of the two parties. 
At a meeting on 9 October to further discuss the redundancies, the 
SSSC had the choice of accepting immediate short-time working to 
-
postpone the redundancy decision by six months (utilizing a Government 
short-time working compensation scheme) or opt to fight the proposed 
redundancies, as they had done in June. Given the failures recorded 
oVer the three intervening months, the decisio~ was not subject to any 
degree of critical review. 
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Table 8.2. - The "Settlement" of the June 1980 Redundancies 
Management's Initial Proposal 
3,000 redundancies implemented 
by 5 September 
Closure of Grange Road and 
Chester Street 
Severance Terms as specified 
4 June 1980 
Senior Shop Steward Committee 
co-operation to re-balance 
workforce from 4 June 1980 
Total cost - about £10 million 
Non-negotiable wage offer of 
10% 
Full flexibility/mobility -
no strike clause 
Senior Shop Steward Committee 
Counter-Proposal 
No Redundancies 
No Closures 
Government subsidized short-time 
working 
Alternative work - via pricing/ 
resourcing policy changes, transfer 
of work from Lucas Aerospace, 
reduce sub-contracting 
£25 increase plus index-linking 
Mutuality 
The "Settlement" 
3,000 redundancies implemented by 19 September 1980. Closure of 
Grange Road and Chester Street on schedule, severance terms as 4 
June except for Grange Road. Senior Shop Steward Committee co-
operation to re-balance workforce from 2 September. 
Total cost about £10 million in redundancy payments 
10% wage settlement - no productivity increases Senior Shop 
Steward commitment to changes in work practices to eliminate 
'ineffective work practices' and to introduce new technology. 
Comment on "Settlement"* 
We would have preferred to have 
achieved the above with Senior 
Shop Steward Committee 
consent so that the legitimacy 
of our actions would have been 
accepted by Stewards and 
employees 
* written by the author 
Comment on "Settlement"* 
Our influence on the above was 
minimal. We have maintained some 
'control' over work practices and 
we did not sign a 'no strike' clause. 
There were closures, compulsory 
redundancies, and 3,000 jobs have 
been lost. Some members have lost 
pay through having to transfer jobs. 
Our claims to alternative work were 
denied, and we were not allowed to 
present our case to the decision 
makers. We were deprived of our wage 
negotiating rights, and the Company 
introduced changed work practices 
without making the customary 
productivity payments. These 
'concessions' have not increased our job security prospects for the 
future. Moreover, management have 
indicated future redundancies pending 
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A suggestion from one senior steward that the need for the 
redundancies should be questioned was dismissed by the majority of the 
SSSC. According to the Secretary of the SSSC, the general opinion was 
that: 
"We can't bury our heads in the sand. The work doesn't 
exist - anyway some workers will welcome the extra day 
off" (9 October, 1980). 
The SSSC had finally accepted that their role was to negotiate the 
terms of redundancies with a framework of collective bargaining 
established by management. The policy of militancy based on trade 
union principle had, at least temporarily, been laid to rest. 
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Chapter 9.· An Interpretation of Trade Union Policies and Management 
Strategies 
The SSSC, like most other trade union organisations in the late 
1970's and early 1980's, was unable to resist the redundancy plans of 
management. As was shown in Chapter 5, most redundancies of this time 
were implemented without trade union opposition. Whilst a minority of 
trade unionists at Lucas Electrical were prepared to oppose management 
on the basis of trade union principle, the majority were not. The SSSC 
did not seek to mobilize majority opinion behind a policy of 
opposition, in reality, the policy of non co-operation simply delayed 
the redundancy implementation and provided the SSSC with a bargaining 
counter in negotiating the terms of implementation. Trade union 
disinterest in available information regarding the company's strategic 
policy options ensured that its policy would be re-active and set 
within constraints reflecting strategic decisions already initiated by 
management. This outcome was in part determined by the ability of 
management to control strategic planning and the framework of 
collective bargaining, but must also be related to the weaknesses in 
trade union organization and strategy. These two interrelated aspects 
of the SSSC's failure to oppose the redundancy will be given further 
consideration below. 
The power of management. 
Management's ability to implement the redundancy plan was based on 
the unilateral control it exercises over strategic planning and the 
issues subject tu collective bargaining with trade unions. 
a) The control of strategic planning 
The case study illustrates that manageme~t encouraged stewards to 
believe that .their detailed involvement in issues of strategic planning 
Was unnecessary. Throughout the five-year period, management at Joint 
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Policy Communication Meetings implied that employee interests were a 
central concern of their strategic planning processes, and in 
consequence the impression was given that the SSSC need not be involved 
in this area. Recall management's statements claiming that UK job 
security could best be advanced by direct exporting to Europe in 
conjunction with Ducellier. No other policy option was ever presented 
to the SSSC, and moreover even this policy was never to be fully 
elaborated for them. In fact, the SSSC only found out the detailed 
consequences of Duce11ier agreements as they revealed themselves, and 
this was often a long time after the policy had been decided, and then 
information only became available by indirect means. For example, the 
creation of 800 jobs in France was revealed in a press statement made 
by the Lucas Industries Chairman, his audience being shareholders 
rather than employees, and the use of Ducel1ier as a second source of 
supply to UK car assemblers was only revealed when employees observed 
its parts on Lucas premises. The details of the final agreement were 
never to be disclosed to the SSSC. 
Management's unwillingness to discuss issues of strategy was also 
illustrated by the information which they prOVided to justify the 
redundancy. Initially, when they declared the 3,000 redundanCies, 
management provided no written justification for their actions. All 
management would commit to paper for the SSSC were the terms available 
to those who were prepared to accept voluntary redundancy (See p. 179 
above). Subsequently, in responding to the information request 
developed by the author and submitted by the TGWU official, 
management's reply was poorly structured and omitted much of the 
requested information about the redundancy decision. This information 
must have been available to management, they slmply chose not to give 
it. As they said in their response: 
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"These notes cover what we regard are the relevant 
details" (L.E. Information Relevant to Redundancies 
Announced, 4 June, 1980, p. 1). 
The information provided related to past performance and did not 
contain the information necessary to make strategic decisions involving 
projected future events. In fact, management implied that planning 
beyond one year was not possible. They stated: 
"No-one can forecast beyond one year wi th any accuracy in 
this business" (L. E, Information Relevant to 
Redundancies, Announced 4 June, 1980, p. 1). 
Whilst it might not be possible to forecast accurately more than 
one year ahead, this does not mean that planning is not undertaken. As 
has been shown, Lucas Industries plan in detail up to two years ahead, 
and in outline ten years ahead. Could this reluctance of management to 
discuss these issues be related to the knowledge that further 
redundancies were to be announced in October 1980 and beyond? 
Evidently management did not wish to engage in any discussions of 
strategy. They made no attempt to justify the strategy which had 
previously been advanced to the SSSC. As has been seen, management's 
commit ment to Europe was set aside and no direct reference was made to 
Duce11ier, which had figured in all previous management discussions of 
strategy. 
Management obviously were very concerned to maintain their 
strategic planning prerogative. 
b) Controlling the structure of collective bargaining. 
- Management usually succeeded in defining the issues and level at 
which negotiations. took place. Whilst management were prepared to 
negotiate an annual wage claim with the SSSC, no effective negotiations 
were initiated on strategic deCiSions, such as Duce1lier and new 
, 
technology. During the redundancy, management attempted to define the 
nature of negotiation by accepting certain claims as being legitimate 
whereas others were set aside and given no real consideration. 
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On the declaration of the redundancies, the role assigned to the 
SSSC by management was in effect to negotiate the timing and terms of 
the redundancy implementation. Trade union attempts to broaden the 
issues of negotiation were repeatedly blocked by management's 
insistence that "no other course of action was- available". As was 
indicated above, management were unprepared to discuss issues of 
strategy, and the SSSC were rebuked by management for their attempt to 
seek outside advice from the author. A similar attitude was taken to 
other SSSC initiatives. Thus the possibility of short-time working and 
the transfer of work from Lucas Aerospace were at that time dismissed 
without investigation and, whilst it was agreed that the SSSC would 
. investigate the level of sub-contracting, senior stewards were not 
allowed to meet plant management to discuss the issue. The SSSC 
undertook investigations over a three month period, however, at the 
meeting of 9 October to discuss further redundancies, management said 
that the SSSC sub-committee on sub-contracting should be disbanded. A 
suggestion from the SSSC that Joint Management/Union Committees should 
be established at sites to control sub-contracting was rejected. 
Management proposed to set up a Central Committee of Management to 
monitor this aspect of operation, and trade union involvement was not 
required. 
Not only were the issues of bargaining to be restricted. 
Management also sought to conduct negotiation through the personnel 
director, who was working to a remit, and the trade union request for a 
meeting with the Board of Directors was dismissed as unnecessary. The 
-personnel director said that in any event, this meeting would not lead 
to a change of policy. As he put it: 
"The decision had been 
speaking with one voice·'. 
well res~arched ••• and we are 
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Until the SSSC were prepared to negotiate, management acted 
unilaterally. Management broke agreed procedures allowing volunteers 
to leave the company irrespective of the wishes of the trade unions, 
and at no time were the number of redundancies an issue of negotiation. 
Whilst willing to accept wages procedure strategic decisions, such as 
a major redundancy, provide no' basis of shared interest. Until the 
SSSC accepted this, management systematically applied both 'carrots and 
sticks'. They increased the levels of redundancy payments to 
volunteers and simultaneously threatened to withdraw the offer of job 
transfer to some employees who would otherwise be made redundant. 
After 12 weeks, when it was recognised that management would not 
negotiate a reduction in the number of redundancies, the SSSC's 
impotence was revealed when they were unable to recommend to members 
whether management plans should be accepted or opposed by strike 
action. When asked for strategic policy evaluation trade union 
organization proves to be very fragile and breaks under stress. 
Employees pursue individual and sectionalist interests and not 
collective interests. Whilst job security and the maintenance of 
employment opportunities are accepted collective goals of trade 
unionists, redundancies are specific to individuals and once declared, 
as we have seen, there is a tendancy for members to evaluate the case 
in their own terms. 
Ironically, therefore, the declaration of redundancies which should 
highlight the inadequacies of management strategic planning practices 
-
results in a situation whereby employees become more dependent on 
management, and le'ss willing to challenge the way in which management 
exercise their strategic planning prerogatives. The SSSC, having 
. relied on collective bargaining as a way of identifying and advancing 
employee interest, were now unable to provide any alternative to the 
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proposals advanced by management, since collective bargaining does not 
require trade union organization to develop an ability to plan. 
The vulnerability of trade unions is connected with the differences 
in organizing. principles upon which management and trade union 
, 
organizations have been developed. The former have used the authority 
which they derive from shareholders to develop organizations with 
highly differentiated roles in which the majority of employees 
undertake unskilled manual tasks that require Ii ttle understanding of 
business issues. This is especially significant given the democratic 
character of trade union decision making. As the case study showed, 
trade union policy could in principle be established by trade union 
representative bodies, such as the SSSC. However, the enactment of 
policy (eg, the non co-operation policy) requires action by the 
membership. From the outset, trade union members were highly 
sceptical of the SSSC's ability to oppose the redundancies. There was 
a widespread feeling of 'fatalism' amongst employees demonstrated by 
their unwillingness to attend a mass meeting to discuss the 
redundancies. Knowing that the effectiveness of trade union action 
normally depends on majori ty support, and knowing that 'only 13%' of 
employees were to be made redundant, management could expect majority 
support for their proposals. Even at Chester Street, which was to be 
totally closed, employee dependence on management was such that no-one 
voted for strike action to oppose closure, presumably fearing that 
opposi tion would lead management to enact its threat to withdraw job 
transfer for half the workforce at Chester Street. Those voting for 
management policy must have hoped to be amongst those transferred. 
Fundamentally, management's ability to exclude trade unions from 
• 
strategic planning is based upon the construction of organizations in 
which the majority are excluded from decision making. Trade unions 
organize this majority. They find it difficult to challenge 
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management's strategic planning prerogatives because of their lack of 
power to oppose management plans, a situation which is perpetuated by 
the way in which public policy is framed, especially in such areas as 
information disclosure and redundancy procedures (Hasting, 1984; Levie 
et aI, 1984). In such circumstances, management's power of decision is 
self-perpetuating, because opposition can generally be overcome. This 
re-inforces management's control by making such outcomes seem both 
economically and technologically 'inevitable' - because these changes 
almost always happen! In redundancy situations management plans are 
almost always enacted - the trade unions' role is to negotiate the 
terms of implementation within a structure of negotiation established 
by managemenr plans. 
Trade Union Weaknesses 
In contrast to management, the SSSC were never able to develop 
policy by reference to an agreed information base, and at no time was a 
collective interest of Lucas Electrical employees identified. The 
SSSC's predicament is most vividly illustrated by an extended analysis 
of its inability to recommend an agreed policy to members regarding 
management's final' redundancy offer. The voluntary devolution of 
decisions to individual employees and work group shop stewards is the 
antithesis of planning. Fundamentally, the SSSC's inability to oppose 
the redundancies can be attributed to its disinterest in planning, 
which is both caused by and reflected in the sectionalist nature of 
trade union organization. 
a) SSSC disinterest in strategic planning. 
As has been shown in Chapter 7, management's control of information 
is not complete, especially information relating to strategic 
. decisions. Neither SSSC nor official unions so~ght to use external and 
internal sources of information to identify the strategic issues which 
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should have been made the subject of collective bargaining. The re-
orientation of Lucas Electrical to the fall in UK vehicle output was an 
issue left to management's discretion, the exercise of this discretion 
resulting in the declaration of redundancies. Moreover, having failed 
to address this issue earlier, and having no information on past 
decisions, the SSSC were unable to broaden the focus of negotiation 
when the redundancies were declared. Had alternative plans been 
available it would at least have been more difficult for management to 
by-pass the SSSC when the redundancies were being implemented. In 
particular, the availability of alternative plans undermines 
management claims that there is only one policy alternative, that which 
they propose to implement. The SSSC were never able to effectively 
challenge this claim, especially to the satisfaction of members .. who 
held decision making power in the trade union organizational structure. 
In my opinion, had information of the kind presented in Chapter 7 been 
available and used in developing trade union opposition to management 
policy, and had the disclosure of information been a major issue of 
dispute, management authority over employees would have been more 
vulnerable and open to question. This may not have avoided the June 
1980 redundancies, but more information at this stage would have made 
future management deCisions more open and subject to trade union 
scrutiny, as was evidently not the case when management announced the 
second instalment of redundancies in October 1980. 
The same attitue to planning is also revealed by the trade unions' 
a-cceptance of plant management's refusal to allow a meeting with the 
Board of Directo·rs, and their unpreparedness to contest management's 
view that 'outside' advice from the author was not apermissab1e in the 
redundancy negotiation. 
b) The sectionalist nature of trade union organization. 
By failing to engage in any planning activity the SSSC were forced 
to address the consequences of management's long term strategic 
decision at the time of implementation, rather than at the point of 
decision. Generally, at times of implementation, only short-term, 
individual or sectionalist solutions to the problem are available. 
In 1975 Lucas Electrical employees had a collective interest in how 
the company was to respond to the falling level of UK vehicle output 
but no action was taken. When the fall in output materialized, the 
issue had become a question of who should leave the company and who 
should stay, and which of the 17 sites should be closed. The problem 
was now a short-term sectionalist issue, which divided employees • 
. At the first meeting of the SSSC there was evidence that individual 
trade groups, such as the Electricians, were prepared to negotiate 
voluntary redundancies and the commitment of certain individual sites 
to the non co-operation policy was in doubt. These divisions were 
exploited to the full by management, to the extent that the SSSC were 
never engaged in any significant negotiation. Management from the 
outset indicated that the number of redundancies was not negotiable, 
the only flexibility related to marginal changes in timing and terms of 
severance payment. The divisions amongst employees and trade unions 
ensured that management policy prevailed. 
Trade Union Policies at Lucas Electrical. 
The trade unions' failure to become comprehensively involved in 
planning meant that their policy would be based on negotiation or would 
involve opposit~on based on trade union principle. 
The non co-operation policy, which although apparently· formulated 
on a multi-union, multi-site basis, was accept~ble precisely because it 
did not require collective commitment. This left union factions free 
to ·achieve 'local' negotiated outcome·s. Many of those in relatively 
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weak positions hoped that the interdependence which had always 
previously existed between management and trade unions, as a corporate 
group, would ensure that management ameliorated their demands. However 
from the outset management made it clear that they no longer recognised 
this taken-for-granted interdependence, and began to implement 
voluntary redundancies without _ regard to either existing procedural 
agreements or the trade union's non co-operation policy. 
Because management could with impunity ignore trade union policies 
individuals volunteered for redundancy without fear of sanction, and 
those employees who remained had to decide whether to challenge 
management as an individual. As noted earlier an individual's refusal 
to co-operate in work re-arrangement could lead to a stoppage of 
production throughout a site, a decision of considerable magnitude for 
the individual against management. Not surprisingly, the employees 
involved, including stewards, generally co-operated with management 
and, in effect, the trade union was by-passed until the SSSC was 
prepared to change its policy and formally negotiate the terms of 
redundancy implementation. When, in October 1980, management announced 
the second round of redundancies, the SSSC were not even prepared to 
question the validity of management's decision and from the outset 
accepted that the SSSC could only negotiate the terms of policy 
implementation. 
The policy of opposing management on trade union principle was 
initiated by senior stewards from the two plants to be closed. The 
polity of non co-operation was established by these stewards by 
referring the issu~· to the TGWU District Official before the SSSC had 
formally met to discuss the redundancy issue. The policy of militant 
itl.dustrial action aimed to forestall any managellJent move to implement 
either compulsory or voluntary redundancies. In Lucas Electrical this 
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policy was supported by a relatively small 'militant'* minority of 
stewards, who not only rejected the closure of particular plants, but 
also denied the right of employees to receive redundancy payments. It 
was argued that individuals did not have the right to 'sell jobs' 
because 'they belonged to the community' and not to the individual. 
These stewards saw the power of trade unionism in the enforcement of 
collective will. One steward summarized their philosophy as follows: 
"No matter what facts and arguments we marshall, the 
company has the key answer - they just say no. It 
doesn't matter whether a company earns £100 million or 
£500 million, if you don't have the organization then 
that counts for nothing. It's the organization that 
gives the worker the confidence to stand up and fight" 
(Shop Steward interview 14 August, 1980). 
This form of 'militancy' was not simply a reaction to management's 
threat of redundancy. The 1,218 employees who were prepared to oppose 
management plans by strike action were spread widely on a minority 
basis across sites, the biggest concentration of opposition occurring 
in the following work groups shown in Table 9.1. below: 
Table 9.1. Lucas Electrical Where Opposition 
to Rudundancies Was Strongest. 
For Strike Against Strike Number of Redundancy 
Action Action Redundancies % 
B.W.3 - Day Shift 520 33 } - Setters 67 1 
- Nightshift 3 228 
291 18% 
Garrison Lane 37 5 12% 
Plume St. 48 5 10% 
Fire & Security 80 10 12% 
External Transport 110 2 6 5% 
865 264 317 
Other Sites 353 7216 1324 12% 
Total 1218 7480 1641 13% 
-C 
" 
=r-
Source - Statistics from SecretarySSSC. 
*Batstone et ale (1977) has produced a fourfold classification of 
stewards. The 'militant' minority would be drawn from those stewards 
Whom he identifies as 'leaders' together with work fellows who actively 
Support them on the basis of trade union principles. 
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This pattern of opposition probably reflected a developed 
commitment to trade union principles that rejected management's right 
to declare employees redundant. However, it did not challenge 
management's plans. These stewards could not effectively challenge 
management's claim that there was 'no alternative' to the policies 
which management were implementing. 
The co-existence of the two above policies within the trade union 
organizations at Lucas Electrical contributed in part to the 
ineffectiveness of both responses. However, there is little evidence 
to suggest that either policy by itself would have led to the reversal 
of management policy. Had a co-operative policy based on bargaining 
the terms of implementation been accepted from the outset, then a 
productivity deal may have been possible, although this was highly 
unlikely given the Lucas Industries 'non-negotiable wage offer'. The 
policy of militancy based on trade union principles was a minority 
viewpoint which failed to win support because employees feared for 
their jobs as individuals, and the 'militants' could not provide any 
realistic alternative to that proposed by management. The option of 
evolving long term policy bargaining based on the trade unions being 
comprehensively involved in planning has been consistently rejected by 
Lucas Electrical. Management could have avoided the temporary 
breakdown in relations with the SSSC, and possibly have avoided the 
industrial disputes which were the subject of frequent complaint, by 
allowing full trade, union participation in planning. Obviously this 
would require trade unions to accept the consequences of management's 
strategic planning, otherwise it would simply lead to conflict at 
another time. The case study shows that management had a five year 
lead time to implement policies which allowed for the contraction in UK 
vehicle output. However, their policies, based on investment abroad, 
could not be shared by trade unions. 'Therefore, management chose to 
inform trade unions of these policies after they had been implemented, 
knowing that, at this time, trade unions would not be able to 
effectively challenge these policies. 
The option of developing alternative plans based upon an 
information approach could not be realized between the declaration of 
the redundancy and its implementation. As was indicated earlier, the 
analysis of management policy given in Chapter 7 was only completed 
three months after the redundancies had been implemented. However, 
this analysis does illustrate that relevant information was available 
and that given sufficient commitment, the development of alternative 
plans seems to be a feasible objective. 
We now turn to the question of the usefulnes of accounting 
information to trade unions. From the analysis so far it is clear that 
the usefulness of accounting will depend on 
a) the accepted definition of what trade unions are for 
and 
b) the extent to which there is an independent trade union 
involvement in strategic planning. 
We shall see that a) is more fundamental. 
Part 3. Conclusions 
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Chapter 10. Accounting Research and The Usefulness of Information to 
Trade Unions 
Introduction 
Strategic decisions are set wi thin a context which give~ priority 
to the interests of shareholders. Trade unions have consistently been 
unable to effectively challenge strategic decisions yet, surprisingly 
other than in exceptional cases, this has not led them to develop an 
independent ahili ty to moni tor the strategic planning practices of 
management. Moreover in supporting legislative, proposals for worker 
directors such as those proposed by 'Bullock', trade unions are 
perpetuating the situation whereby strategic planning remains a 
prerogative of management. 
Little academic research has been directed to the problems and 
implica tions of trade union policy-making capabilities. Research has 
been conducted into trade union sources of information and office 
holder understanding of financial information (Owen and Broad, 1983; 
Hussey and Marsh, 1983; Sherer et aI, 1981; Mitchell et aI, 1980; 
Cooper and Essex, 1977; Lyall, 1975). However accounting researchers 
have rarely been prepared to evaluate business policy decisions from an 
employee perspective, and the implicit acceptance of management 
strategic planning prerogatives has even underwritten research which 
sets the evaluation of trade union information use as a major 
priority. 
As will be seen below, this research invariably adopts a 
'pluralist' perspective (cf. Fox, 1966) which assumes that trade unions 
maintain a dependent relationship with a 'neutral' management. The 
. 
role of the trade union is therefore restricted to the negotiation of 
ei ther short or long-term collec ti ve bargaining agreements wi thin an 
unchanged strategic planning framework and it provides for only a 
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marginal re-orientation of current trade union practices in which the 
use of information by them remains arbitrarily restricted. Moreover, 
this change depends upon management initiative rather than independent 
trade uni.on action. It will also be argued that a 'radical' critique 
of trade unionism, which promotes militancy based on trade union 
principles undervalues the potential usefulness of accounting 
information and perpetuates trade union commitment to re-active, 
oppositional policies which allow management strategic planning 
prerogatives to remain effectively unchallenged. Finally, it will be 
argued that the usefulness of accounting information to trade unions 
can only be assessed by researchers developing a comprehensive 
involvement in strategic planning issues which will allow employee 
interests to be evaluated independently of management. 
The Pluralist Model in Industrial Relations Research 
The legislative justification for extending trade union information 
rights has generally been presented as a· requirement placed on 
management to foster 'good industrial relations practice' (ACAS, 1977). 
This concept is closely linked to the dominant academic industrial 
relations perspective of the post war period, the liberal pluralist 
perspective of the Oxford School. 
Supporters of this view see conflict as inherent in industry 
because of the very nature of industrial society, but tend to assume 
that it is possible to achieve accommodation between the various 
conflicting interest groups. Trade unions, as representatives of 
employees, are supposed to be a powerful counterforce to the interests 
of shareho1ders~ Implicit in the pluralist approach to industrial 
relations is the view that 'good industrial relations practice' 
requires conflicts of interests between workers and workers, and 
workers and management to be diagnosed, articulated and 'resolved' 
through a system of collective bargaining. Within this context, the 
237 
disclosure of information to trade unions is advocated as a way of 
making the collective bargaining process more 'rational' because, 
presumably, both parties have some common information to evaluate the 
common interests in their positions. 
Accounting researchers have also typically accepted that existing 
collective bargaining arrangements facilitate at least some of the 
major interests of both trade unions and management, although their 
attempts at defining and measuring trade union interests has not 
matched the efforts that others devoted to understanding shareholder 
interests. Because of this (often implicit) assumption, the policy 
recommendations of these researchers have been restricted to marginal 
changes in organizational responsibilities or reporting relationships. 
In their schemes, the trade unions have usually retained are-active 
stance to the process of strategic planning, which has remained a 
management prerogative. 
Models of the collective bargaining process (Nash, 1950; Pen, 1959; 
Cross, 1969; Stevens, 1963) are generally confined in the scope of 
issues addressed, the main focus being the negotiation of pay rates. 
Given the accountants' concern to monitor the economic viability of the 
enterprise, and the associated concept of 'ability to pay', it is 
surprising that accountants have not been prominent researchers in this 
area. 
The first major survey of accounting interest in industrial 
relations was by Foley and Maunders (1977) who provide a broad review 
of the collective bargaining models to evaluate management disclosure 
policies and the role of the accountant in existing collective 
bargaining arrangements. They argue that the Walton and McKersie 
(1965) model, which identifies four inter-retated bargaining processes 
(distributive, integrative, attitudinal structuring and intra-
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organizational bargaining) provides an appropriate means for evaluating 
disclosure policies. 
They accept the typical industrial relations view of labour 
negotiations as a joint problem-solving process which can be enhanced 
by the provision of relevant financial information, and advise 
management to adopt a non-selec ti ve, open di sclosure policy. This, 
they believe, would lead to a reduction in conflict, since the 
bargaining would focus on long-term integrative issues rather than 
short-term distributive issues. Management, they say, should not seek 
to use financial information tactically as a short-term bargaining 
ploy, but must extend its provision in systematic and verifiable forms, 
so that trade unions accept its use in evaluating policy options 
available to the enterprise. They state: 
..... it is suggested that ••• systematic information 
disclosure should be the subject of a policy decision, 
to be taken at top management level. This is 
necessary because ••• the effects of disclosure can only 
be properly evaluated on an organization-wide and 
long-term basis. There is a particular danger of sub-
optimisation where functional managers are left to 
take disclosure decisions, since they are, 
understandably, likely to focus on the short run, 
tactical effects of providing information (p. 194, 
emphasis is original). 
Pope and Peel (1981) utilizing a 'rational expectation approach' 
also advise management to adopt a non-selective, open disclosure 
policy. They argue that wage disputes arise from 'differential 
information sets' and that bargaining will be facilitated by a 
reduction in trade union 'forecasting errors' • 
.. These recommendations are founded on the belief that wage payments 
are the central issue of dispute between management and trade unions, 
and that the long-term interests of both mapagement and trade unions 
can be advanced by decision-making based on profit generation. Were 
this to be so greater disclosure'· might further enhance management 
control of industrial relations. However, as shown in Chapter 3, the 
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wage-effort bargain is only one point of conflict arising from planning 
based on profit generation. Other areas of conflict such as redundancy 
and de-skilling have perhaps seemed less susceptible to negotiation 
because early disclosure of these plans could be expected to seriously 
weaken management's strategic control of the enterprise. For example, 
Craft (1981) recognises this potential conflict when criticizing Foley 
and Maunders for their recommendation of increased, non-selective 
disclosure of financial information. He shows that experiences in the 
public sector (Craft, 1970) suggest that when union wage aspirations 
are indicated to be financially unrealizable, the negotiations focus on 
formerly unquestioned areas of management prerogative, such as resource 
allocation decisions, capital budgeting and the meaning and 
appropriateness of accounting principles. Craft's objective is to 
preserve this key area of management prerogative, and he argues that 
disclosure of information is a contingent decision. In his view: 
"Perhaps the most important factor affecting 
managerial interest and willingness to disclose 
financial information is the nature of the collective 
bargaining relationship with the union. This 
influences management's perception of whether 
information will be used for the mutual benefit of the 
parties, and to what extent it will be used 
responsibly in negotiation" (p. 99). 
Predictably, open disclosure is only considered appropriate where a 
trade union 'accepts management problems as its own concern' (p. 99). 
Typically, disclosure research had involved comparative surveys of 
management disclosure practice across a range of employing 
organizations. The principle objective had been to assess whether 
greater disclosure leads to a change in management and trade union 
relationships. In 1978, the Social Science Research Council provided a 
major stimulus to this kind of research by funding four simultaneous 
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research projects in this area.* I shall consider three of these 
projects which address the issue of information use by trade unions. 
(1) Jackson-Cox J., Mcqueeney J., and Thiske11 J.E.M. (1983) 
This research compared disclosure practices in 17 companies. It 
sought to identify what might be called "best practice' from both a 
management and trade union perspective. However, this necessarily 
limited the depth of their analysis and led them to make apparently 
naive recommendations as to how the ACAS Code of Information Disclosure 
might be amended. The research shows that management have taken the 
initiative in providing trade unions with more information, trade union 
representatives generally being disinterested in seeking out 
information, although they do in a limited sense 'use' the information 
supplied by management. 
They identify two distinct management disclosure policies, the 
'integrated' and the 'ad hoc' approaches. The objective of the former 
is to systematically supply information within a consultative framework 
to promote 'employee identification' with company and management 
objectives. Effectively, the ultimate aim of this policy is to 
exercise greater control over the internal labour market. In achieving 
this objective, management have not only provided information but, 
crucially, have also encouraged the formation of multi-union shop 
steward committees (p. 257, the senior stewards that run them 
undertaking an important 'personnel' function for management by 
providing a focus for 'the process of intra-organizational bargaining' 
(Jackson-Cox et aI, p. 262). Management's accomodation' of the 
'informal system t of trade unionism has been discussed in Chapter 4. 
*The four research projects involved the following research teams: 
J. Jackson-Cox, J. McQueeny, and J.E.M. Thirke1l (University of Kent) 
H. Levie and R.E. Moore (Ruskin College, Oxford) 
F~ Mitchell, H.I. Sam and P.J. White (University of Edinburgh) (This 
project's principal concern was information for employees rather than 
trade unions.) 
T.K. Reeves and T. McGovern (Anglian Regional Management Centre). 
241 
In the companies studied, greater disclosure of information was 
generally related to the introduction and monitoring of value-added 
payment schemes, together with bilateral consultative processes. In 
such circumstances, information availability and use was generally seen 
to be high. 
In companies where disclosure was not systematic and related to 
specific issues (the ad hoc approach), the researches viewed it less 
favourably since they felt that information disclosed was directed at 
the 'wrong issues'. For example, in Company B, the researchers 
identify company organization structure as the main issue of concern to 
trade unions, 're-organiza tion' having raised fears of redundancies 
about which management gave no information. The researchers note that 
management 'misdirected' their information disclosure by not 
recognising re-organization as the main issue of concern, but they fail 
to consider why it was in management's interest to conceal this 
information and whether alternatives more favourable to the trade union 
existed. An examination of management plans might. have provided good 
reasons for the failure to disclose information about re-organization. 
The failure to analyse management decisions may also partly explain why 
the researchers conclude that information was otherwise 'generally 
available' to the trade unions: 
"In the situations studied, there was a general 
recognition and accordance by management of the right 
of employees and domestic trade union representatives 
to have access to company informa tion and to senior 
management for the purpose of disclosure" (p. 256). 
This conclusion clearly contrasts with my analysis of management 
practice in the Lucas case study, where no such 'rights' were 
recognised when there was a reai prospect of trade unions using the 
information made available to analyse alternatives to their plans. Nor 
were they in Company B. And this co~c1usion is drawn in the context of 
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the researchers' own observations regarding trade union involvement in 
'non-routine' (often strategic) issues. An analysis of these strongly 
suggests that the trade unions were in fact operating in an information 
context controlled by management, and the researchers recognise that 
the trade unions only become involved in these issues after management 
decisions have already been taken (p. 269) and that the provision of 
post-decision information has little relevance! 
The acknowledgement that management do not involve trade unions in· 
, 
certain decisions prompts the researchers to identify the 
'intelligence' (Wilensky, 1967) role of information. As in the Lucas 
Electrical situation, they found that trade unions were generally 
unable to match or use information from different sources to provide an 
integrated understanding of company strategic policy making. The 
recognition that such information is available to trade unions is an 
important finding since lack of information is often advanced as a 
reason for trade union inability to contest management strategic 
decision-making, but the researchers draw no conclusions from this. 
Although they recognise, as I did at Lucas Electrical, that the use of 
information is constrained by the sectionalist nature of domestic trade 
union organization, and the limited expectations of members, they fail 
to relate those trade union restraints to management strategies of 
control, especially the policy of limiting the issues and structure of 
collective bargaining. In consequence, the major practical 
recommendation of the research, that the ACAS 'shopping list' approach 
to information disclosure be revised so that shop steward issue 
identification is· facilitated by the linking of different kinds of 
information to different issues, must be viewed. with scepticism. 
Although it may be true that the linking of information to issues will 
widen the 'perceptual field' of shop stewards and promote the use of 
'intelligence' as a way of extending collective bargaining to embrace 
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strategic issues, no grounds are given for supposing that this policy 
could ever be implemented. Underlying it is a belief, that management 
will voluntarily co-operate in the extension of collective bargaining 
to issues of a strategic kind, and that information would in fact be 
disclosed in line with the 'Code of Practice' •. The researchers 
apparently foresee no problem in finding 'bilaterally agreed standards' 
about the legitimate negotiating issues (p. 265). They evidently 
believe that the collective bargaining process invariably provides a 
means of reaching agreement on any issue. However, some issues are 
clearly not open to negotiation. 
(2) Reeves T.K. and McGovern T. (1981) 
The case studies in this research review 'shop steward use of 
information in their day-to-day roles'. However, in reporting their 
findings the researchers attempt to evaluate disclosure practices as 
part of a movement towards industrial democracy. They state: 
"It should •••• be noted that the present research, 
although ostensibly concerned with disclosure, is also 
relevant to understanding how employee participation 
might be more effectively developed" (p. 3). 
Nine of the ten case studies supposedly reflect situations where 
management are purposively seeking to involve trade unions in joint 
decision-making, as evidenced by the establishment of employee 
communication policies, consultative committees, provision of 
information to trade unions etc. The other case study involves a trade 
union attempt to resist a redundancy decision by promoting an 
alternative financial case to that advanced by management. 
The case studies are presented according to the researchers' 
quali tative assessment of the degree of 'openness· of communication' 
displayed by management. 'Openness of conuhunication' according to 
Reeves (1980) is not a simple one-way transmission of information from 
management to employees and trade unions, but an exchange of 'facts' 
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between the two parties (p. 14). A high degree of openness involves a 
high transmission and receipt of facts by both parties, and a mutual 
understanding of the significance each side attaches to the 
information. Reeves argues that 'it is not sensible to define it 
(openness) in any kind of absolute terms, since there is no such thing 
as complete openness' (p. 4). However, by using this admittedly!!!: 
defined concept to classify and order the case studies, the authors 
fail to make the crucial distinction between joint· consultation and· 
joint decision-making arrangements (Poole, 1975). And this failure is 
compounded by a failure to effectively evaluate the disclosure 
practices of management. In eight of the ten case studies, the 
researchers report instances where management refuse to divulge 
information requested by trade unions, on matters ranging from pricing 
policy and unit costs, manning levels and disaggregate profit 
statements, yet management are perceived as pursuing a policy of 
'openness'! For example, in Case 7 the researchers note that 
information is not released when an issue is subject to negotiation and 
record a standing order from divisional management to subsidiary 
management 'not to reveal advance information about planned re-
organizations or redundancies' (p. 35). 
A lack of critical evaluation of data pervades the study. For 
example, in discussing the difficulties of getting research access, it 
is noted that management would only allow investigations 'when no 
critical issues were being negotiated'. However, as has been seen in 
the Lucas case study, 'critical issues' are a major factor influencing 
management disclosure policies, yet no indication of this fact is given 
in the research findings. There is no recognition in the research that 
management may be seeking to control is~ues of negotiation by 
attempting not only to control information, but also the structure and 
Scope of bargaining. For example, no explanation is given as to why 
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the bank in Case 9 is willing to disclose the corporate plan, yet is 
unwilling to negotiate a technology agreement with the trade union. A 
logical explanation for this apparent 'contradiction', which should 
perhaps have been the subject of research, is that the expansionary 
corporate plan provides a basis for co-operation with the trade unions, 
whereas the introduction of new technology will involve a conflict of 
interest which will not be allowed to surface until management plans 
are fully developed and to a large degree are uncontestable. 
Unfortunately, the research design did not even allow such questions to 
be raised and without such understanding any conclusions are likely to 
be superficial and subject to doubt. 
In examining the trade union use or lack of use of information, the 
research findings are subject to much less need of interpretation. 
Trade union adherence to re-active opposi tional policies in all cases 
limited the scope of information use, since as Case 10 illustrates, 
information relating to redundancies has no relevance when management 
decisions have been made, and there is no intent to involve trade 
unions in negotiations. Like the other SSRC studies, this research 
identifies a number of other factors which inhibit information use, 
such as inadequate expertise, lack of membership support, and mistrust 
of information supplied by management. 
On implementation of disclosure policy, Reeves and McGovern argue 
that trade union information use can be stimulated by a change in 
company law. Following 'Bullock' they argue that Boards of Directors 
should be made legally accountable to employees as well as shareholders 
and that trade unions should act as agents of .. accountabili ty for 
employees. This the researchers believe would give the trade unions 
. . . 
both the 'opportunity' and 'purpose' to develop an interest in the use 
of information. The declaration of redundancy evidently is not viewed 
as a sufficient reason for trade unions to develop such an interest! 
246 
The failure to investigate strategic decision-making and areas of 
trade union - management conflict again leads the researchers to make 
apparently naive recommendations, such as the advice given to 
management to 'give ample forewarning of policy or operating changes 
about which shop stewards wish to negotiate' (p. 57). As the Lucas 
case study has shown, and as Reeves and McGovern's own study of the 
Dunlop closure indicates, management have no intention of forewarning 
shop stewards of closures and redundancies in a way which allows such 
issues to become negotiable. . As the recommendations made by the 
authors are unlikely ever to be implemented by management, a major 
issue is how can trade unions made effective use of what information is 
available. At least this issue was addressed by the 'Ruskin project' 
considered next. 
(3) Gold M., Levie H., and Moore R. (1979), and Moore R.E. and Levie 
H. (1981) 
Moore et a1 provide case study material developed whilst acting as 
consultants to trade union organizations which sought help from the 
Trade Union Research Unit at Ruskin College, Oxford. The research 
sought to identify the 'constraints' which limit the effective use of 
information by trade unions. 
Moore et aI's (1979) pilot study provides some empirical basis for 
evaluating problems encountered in adopting a 'decision-orientated' 
approach, (Cooper and Essex, 1977), or a 'user approach' to 
information, as opposed to a 'shopping list' approach (Gospe11, 1978). 
They argue that: 
..... information is a means to an end, ••• it makes sense 
only within its context, that it must be used within a 
strategy; and that a 'wedge' of the union or unions 
has to co-operate together to' ensure its 
effectiveness" (p. 34). 
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By examining 4 case studies* they identify constraints on trade 
union information use which arise from either management or trade union 
organization and practice. The initial constraint model as described 
by Moore (1980) is presented in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1. Constraints' On Trade Union Information Use. 
CATEGORY OF CONSTRAINT 
Company Constraints 
Managerial attitudes 
Industrial relations machinery 
Company structure 
'Formal' trade union constraints 
Union structure 
Union policy 
Union servicing 
'Informal' trade union constraints 
Shop stewards' committee 
*organisation and structure 
. *forwardthinking 
Source. Moore [1980, p. 37] 
EXAMPLE 
Special reluctance of middle 
management to disclose 
Mismatch. between negotiating 
or participation system and 
levels of company decision 
making 
Financial, management and 
industrial relations 
frameworks may not match 
Information not passed within 
or between unions effectively 
Policy vacuum in key policy 
area such as new technology, 
work organisation or pensions 
Education or research 
facilities do not meet needs 
of representatives 
Inadequate co-ordination 
wi thin or between unions or 
across company structure 
Absence of agreed and defined 
policy objectives or 
strategy 
*The case studies were concerned with the following issues: an anti-
merger campaign (Odhams), the introduction' of a new participation 
scheme (British Leyland), action taken in attempt to prevent a closure 
(British Steel at Ebbw Vale), un:l.on reorganisation to accommodate 
company bargaining structure (Lucas Electrical). 
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The four case studies indicate the kinds of problems which inhibit 
the use of information by trade unions, and the constraints model 
provides a systematic representation of the major factors. 
However, Moore et al did not attempt to assess whether any causal 
relationships existed between the various constraints. Each constraint 
is given equal weight. In this way, the authors avoid critical' 
evaluation of the principal parties and they explain the situations 
they examined by institutional factors. For example they state: 
"All the constraints then may prevent a steward from 
using information he has, even if it has been accurately 
examined by a trained accountant. 
The real point we are making is that the use of 
information is less a matter of interpretation - for 
which skills can be learnt - but rather more a matter of 
recognising and overcoming a host of constraints imposed 
by organizational structure. Some of these constraints, 
especially from the company side may be introduced 
deliberately..... However, the majority are 
unintentional and come about through the workings of the 
organization itself" (p. 37). 
This conclusion in part results from the researchers' apparent wish 
to highlight instances where trade unions adopt a positive approach to 
the use of information. In particular, it is noticeable that they fail 
to adequately report and draw conclusions on the more contentious 
aspects of the observed situations. 
For example, in all the cases analysed, management I s refusal to 
provide information and denial of trade union involvement in planning 
is reported but not systematically analysed. At Odhams, they report on 
how a 'Forum' for fi ghting a closure became a consul ta tion commi t tee 
under management control without any trade union rights to discuss 
future plans (p. - -46). At Leyland, they recognise that 'participation 
s tope s) when management want it .to" (p. 52) • At BSC Ebbw Vale, 
management's denial of the authenticity of. a 'stolen document' 
reporting plant closures is shown to have been untrue, yet their 
analysis of management's case is limited to observing that 'Disclosure 
249 
took place only at management's convenience and on its own terms' (p. 
73). In their Lucas case study, the information which management 
provide for consultative meetings is seen to 'lack sufficient detail or 
consistency to allow satisfactory qUE!stions to be raised' (p •. 64). To 
a degree this is typical. However, as my case study shows, 
management's position can be facilitated by trade union failure to 
supplement this information from other external sources. 
On the part of trade unions, lack of service and inepti tude is 
reported but criticism is at best passing. For example, at Lucas it is 
recorded that over a two-year period the Head Office Officials of APEX 
failed to provide stewards with any advice on appropriate policies 
regarding technological changes which threatened job security (p. 66). 
Furthermore, in the case of Ebbw Vale, ISTC's failure to support a 
local campaign to fight redundancies is explained as a consequence of 
poor communication between Head Office and district levels, rather than 
being due to a lack of competence on the part of ISTC to evaluate BSC's 
ten year corporate strategy, which sets the context of the redundancy 
decision (p. 60) (cf. Bryer et aI, 1981). 
These apparent oversights may reflect Moore et aI's wish to provide 
a 'best practice' model of information use by trade unions, the main 
recommendation being the development of 'forward thinking' by trade 
union representatives. This is, however, not a recommendation that 
trade unions develop an independent ability to plan at company level, a 
trade union re-ac ti ve stance is maintained. Thus they describe the 
evolvement of 'strategy' thus: 
••••• the - likely chain of events is: rough information, 
possi bly a rumour or a newspaper report, the 0" first 
inkling of what to do, the elaboration of a strategy, 
the need for more information and so on~' (p. 93). 
Information is therefore perceived as being used in one-off 
situations rather than continuously within an evolving plan. 
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In a second study, Moore and Levie (1981) explore the link between 
trade union policy and information use by examining three further case 
studies,* and in so doing extend the constraints model by adding a new 
constraint category, the 'nature of industry'. The main features of 
this new dimension are seen as size and number of employers, payment 
systems, employment tradition and inter-union relations within the 
industry, rather than market history and current strategic options. 
However, a dynamic dimension is given to the original descriptive model 
by identifying factors which influence disclosure practices at 
particular points in time. The factors identified are management style 
and industrial relations strategy, the state of the economy (ie, 
companies are perceived as being more willing to disclose information 
when things are going badly) and according to the authors, most 
importantly, the ambi tion of union demands. These are viewed as the 
most important 'change agent for disclosure practice', the trade unions 
moving along an 'information scale' (See Figure 10.1 below) as issues 
subject to collective bargaining are extended. 
This focus on trade union attitudes to disclosure as the critical 
change agent is appropriate since there is little evidence to suggest 
that management style and industrial relations strategy will be 
voluntarily adjusted in favour of open disclosure! However, the 
authors' emphasis on the management 'information system' as opposed to 
the financial planning system is less well-founded. Undoubtedly, 
whilst it is true that annual accounts and the accounting principles 
upon which they are based have certain limitations from a trade union 
. 
perspective (eg, the failure to take account of social costs), these 
failings do not mean that the information is 'invalid' or of no use. 
It is, rather, a question of interpreting and using imperfect 
*The case studies were concerned with the following issues: setting of 
national wage rates in the construction industry (UCATT), disclosure 
and use of information on a Pension Fund (Lucas Industries) and 
acquisition and use of information in Local Education Authorities 
(NUT). 
I 
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l Source: 
Figure 10.1. 
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Moore and Levie [1981, p. 9). 
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information in a way which is consistent with the objective sought by 
the decision maker. However, along with many other trade unionists, 
the authors in large measure reject the accounting system in the belief 
that accounting prinCiples are 'no more than political judgements' 
(p. 13). In their view: 
e •••• the company accounts represent an external audit 
and accountability process and not necessarily 
operational data within the MIS. 
For this reason amongst others, trade unionists will 
normally regard the 'accounting apex' of the 
information pyramid as being totally apart from their 
own world" (p. 15) • 
.• 
The abstract nature of accounting and the difficulty for the 
'average' trade unionist to overcome the conceptual divide between 
• 
accounting and operating data, lead Moore and Levie to emphasise the 
MIS as the main avenue for devel<?ping trade union understanding of 
management practice. Thus Moore (1980) states: 
"MIS, unlike annual reports and accounts, represent 
operational data which is more likely to be related to 
company decision-making processes and to industrial 
relations machinery. By becoming acquainted with 
these, trade union representatives will be enabled to 
perceive the reality of the company's structure and 
organization and the information system which 
underpins it. The emphasis is thus placed more on the 
function and use of information so that requests for 
more information by unions can be better founded" 
(p. 38). 
252 
This recommendation does not allow for the fact that management 
information systems at this level are designed to provide control 
rather than strategic planning information and in consequence is 
unlikely to provide trade unionists any strategic awareness as to how 
company policy is developed. 
This wish to engage management at an operational level is 
consistent with current trade union practice and also avoids the 
potential conflict between democracy and expertise by reconciling it at 
its lowest common denominator. This reconciliation should take place 
at a higher level. However, like many other trade unionists, Moore and 
Levie avoid this potential problem by viewing democracy as a sufficient 
condition of change. They state: 
..... union democracy is the yardstick of its (the 
unions) ability to improve the use of company 
information. The more democratic a union is, the more 
chance that the constraints on use of information 
experienced by a shop steward committee or a district 
official are identified and tackled" (p. 19). 
In discussing trade union democracy, the authors distinguish 
between 'formal' and 'active' democracy and argue that the latter 
requires high levels of membership involvement, bargaining structures 
at every 1ev.el of the company and a high level of co-operation or at 
least discussion between unions. The main catalyst of change is the 
generalization of best practice through the democratic process. They 
state: 
"It is the democratic process in a union that 
should facilitate debate so that progress in 
collective bargaining made in one setting can be used 
or at least considered elsewhere. And similarly, 
constraints on new uses of company information posed 
by the union itself should also be discussed 
elsewhere, so that it becomes possible to consider 
joint action to alleviate those constraints" (p. 19). 
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This recommendation, whilst commendable in its intent, fails to 
examine the role of management in modern organization and, as'with all 
the other research considered here, it implicitly assumes that the 
process of collective bargaining in itself will provide a basis for 
significant organizational changes. This assumption is reflected in 
the authors' view that information agreements of a procedural kind (p. 
11) can be negotiated despite the many observed instances in the case 
studies where management act to control the availability of information 
to their own advantage. 
It seems fair to conclude that the authors have not realistically 
assessed the process whereby trade unions can acquire necessary 
information independently of management. Nor has sufficient 
consideration been given to the problems involved in reconciling the 
need for expertise, especially regarding the interpretation of the 
necessary abstract accounting and other information, whilst respecting 
the democratic principles which underlie trade unionism. 
Summary 
Pluralist approaches, both theoretical and empirical, which have 
advocated increased disclosure of information to trade unions are 
implicitly founded on the belief that collective bargaining is a 
conflict-resolving process which can facilitate the interests of all 
parties. In recommending increased disclosure they seek to re-
orientate trade union policy so that negot1ati~ns are centred on long 
term policy choices rather than bargaining over the terms of policy 
implementation. Undoubtedly, whilst collective bargaining does produce 
'settlements' of disputes, the Lucas case study shows that when 
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strategic long term issues are· involved negotiated 'settlements' are 
not based on a mutual reconciliation of interests, but rather a 
domination of shareholder interests over employee interests. 
Management at Lucas (and more widely) have shown no interest in 
extending the area of joint decision-making with trade unions, and this 
suggests that management accepts that they are agents of shareholder 
interests rather than in any sense a neutral arbiter of multiple 
interests as suggested by the pluralist model. For managemen t , a 
change in disclosure practice, and a re-orientation of negotiation 
would only lead to conflict at a time less well-suited to their 
interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, none of the researchers 
anticipate difficulty in establishing bilaterally agreed changes to 
disclosure practice. 
Because pluralist analyses do not take account of the real conflict 
between management and trade union interest it leads to recommendations 
which assign management the principle role of change agent and which 
are therefore unlikely to be enacted. 
to pursue their existing policies. 
Meanwhile, trade unions are left 
Not surprisingly a 'radical' 
critique of the pluralist view in accounting research has emerged, but 
it too has limitations as we shall see. 
The Radical Perspective On The Disclosure Of Information 
Bougen and Ogden (1981, forthcoming 1985) adopting a 'radical 
perspective' (following Fox, 1973; Goldthorpe, 1974; Hyman, 1975) have 
argued that management disclosure of financial information to trade 
unions is a strategy which aims to win employee 'consent' for 
management policies, whilst leaving fundamental aspects of the 
employment relationship unchanged. 
(1977), Palmer (1977), and Pope 
They criticize Foley and Maunders 
and Peel (1981) for analyses of 
collective bargaining as a rational economic decision process which can 
be enhanced to the benefit of both parties by the provision of 
255 
accounting information. Bougenand Ogden (1985) argue that these authors are 
mistaken in seeing accounting information as a neutral information 
input into the bargaining process. In their view, attention must be 
given to the latent functions of accounting information as 
" ••• an ideological mechanism for propogating and re-
inforcing managerial values and purposes" (p. 25). 
They correctly view accounting .information as having been primarily 
developed to promote shareholder interests and management control of 
the enterprise by emphasising the need for profitability within a 
market context. However, the economic interests of employees, which 
sustain much trade union activity, and to which we have seen accounting 
information has a considerable relevance, is viewed by them as a 
'secondary'objective of trade unionism. In their view, the 
fundamental objective of trade unionism is to contest managerial 
control of the enterprise (following Goodrich, 1920; Beynon, 1973; 
Hinton, 1973). 
Accounting information is seen to embody values such as profit, 
rationality and efficiency which, within a market context, prevents 
trade unions pursuing other values, such as the quality of working life 
and democratic control of the enterprise. The introduction of 
accounting information into collective bargaining is seen by them to 
distract trade unions froID these latter objectives and, as such: 
" ••• accounting may be used as a means of socialising 
trade unions into endorsing the primacy of market 
criteria for manageme~t decision making" (p. 30). 
In these circumstances, disclosure of information provides 
management with a means of 'ideological recruitment' (p. 28), promotes 
'a new basis for the legitimate exercise of management authority' 
(p. 28), and promotes 'a channelling of union arguments into a 
discourse which is singularly concerned with management priorities' 
(p. 30). 
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Disclosure, if it produced the above outcomes, would have obvious 
appeal for management. However, the authors do not take account of the 
fact that the recommendations for greater disclosure made by academics 
such as Foley and Maunders have largely been disregarded by management! 
This would suggest that management is less certain about the 
ideological role of accounting information. This reflects the fact 
that accounting information in itself does not dictate decision 
outcomes, and that concepts such as 'financial viability', even within 
a market context, are subject to interpretation in line with the 
objectives of the decision-maker. 
Bougen and Ogden, like other 'radicals', tend to dismiss the 
possibility that trade unions can use accounting information to promote 
employee interests. Normally this dismissal is justified by two main 
arguments. Firstly, the structure of trade unionism is seen to limit 
trade union objectives to economic aspects of the employment 
relationship and thereby exclude the promotion of policies which 
involve political changes within society. Secondly, expertise 
developed within a capitalist society is thought to be irreconcilable 
with trade union democratic principles. These arguments will be 
reviewed in turn. 
As regards trade union structure, Chapter 4 showed that the 
historical development of collective bargaining has resulted in a 
complex structure of unionism, whereby official unions, as external 
organizations, negotiate national and industry-wide agreements on a 
sectionalist basis, whilst shop stewards negotiate limited issues with 
internal managements. The 'radical' argues that trade unions, by 
becoming committed to the institutions and practices of collective 
bargaining, h~ve effectively set aside demands for fundamental change 
in management/trade union relationships which are underwritten by an 
understanding that a compromise solution is generally attainable, 
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because each party has set its demands within the 'negotiating 
framework' (Fox, 1973). Moreover, by focusing on industrial issues 
without setting these in a political context, trade union practice 
promotes a division of responsibility between trade unions and a 
political party, as in the UK. Hyman (1975) argues that this division 
of responsibility weakens trade. unionism. He states: 
"This commitment to the institutions of collective 
bargaining mesh neatly with the ideological segregation 
of industrial and political action, each requiring 
distinctive organizations and strategies. Within this 
conception to strike for a 'political' rather than an 
'industrial' demand is altogether illegitimate, the 
'poli tical' must be pursued through lobbying, electoral 
activity and the Labour Party. Today, such traditional 
assumptions are increasingly inappropriate, whatever 
their original rationale. In the face of monopoly 
capital, sectional action spells weakness, in the face of 
the recurrent crises of late capitalism, the scope for 
piecemeal reform shrinks; in the face of state and 
economic activity, the distinction between industrial and 
the political loses all meaning: unions disarm themselves 
if they continue to respect a demarcation which employers 
and governments define" (p. 147-48). 
Radicals' argue that this situation will be perpetuated so long as 
trade unions are organized on a sectionalist basis, and restrict their 
objectives within an industrial context. Again, Hyman (1975) states: 
"The principle 
radicalization of 
obstacle 
objectives of 
to a coherent 
industrial struggle 
has already been much discussed - the sectionalism 
inherent in trade union action ••• Sectionalism is 
incorporated in the organizational structure of trade 
unionism itself, and so is resistent to the necessary 
political character. of any programme, which would 
articulate common class interests" (p. 178). 
This opinion appears to be based on the repeated failure of trade 
unions to successfully oppose strategic decisions of management. 
Undoubtedly the sectionalist nature of trade unions organization at 
'. Lucas Electrical allowed management to 'divid~ and rule'. However,.I 
have argued that this, in itself, was not the critical factor. More 
important was trade union commitment to reactive oppositional policies 
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because from 1975 it was this that allowed management to unilaterally 
make all major decisions about how the company was to respond to the 
forecast fall in UK vehicle output. Having failed to address this 
issue prior to the declaration of the redundancies, trade unions lacked 
time and information to develop any alternative to the plans proposed 
by management. In these circumstances, arguments advanced by Hyman and 
other 'radicals' (eg, Clarke, 1977; Lilja and Wood, 1979) that 
management plans are dictated by market forces can appear to be 
convincing. However, as Bryer et al (1984) show, the rundown of UK 
manufacturing industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s may be better 
understood as the planned outcome of decisions taken to promote 
shareholder interests, and not simply the outcome of unalterable 
'market forces'. They argue that if trade unions were to undertake 
'shadow planning' at least the logic of capi tal1st decision making 
could be questioned from an employee perpsective, and on this basis 
other inadequacies in trade union organization might be ameliorated. 
As was shown in Chapter 2, the development of management planning 
is an important mechanism of learning which allows time for 
alternatives to be developed and allows organizations to be evolved, 
and provides the information to control and further develop the 
objectives sought by the planner. Trade unions are weak in all these 
areas, and although sectionalism is often provided as an explanation 
for such inadequacies, in my view, it is a symptom rather than a cause. 
For example, the planning activities of the Lucas Aerospace Shop 
Steward Combine Committee showed how sectionalism could be partially 
overcome. By developing alternative plans the Combine created time so 
that not only were plans produced but also organization and unity 
wi thin the work force was fostered. Furthermore, the process of 
planning provided a basis for organising and collecting information to 
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evaluate employee interests as the first step in realizing those 
interests (Wainwright and Elliott, 1982). 
This said, the initiative in itself was unable to provide 
sufficient impetus to embrace Lucas Industries as a company, let alone 
provide for the co-ordination of plans across industrial sectors. 
Nonetheless, it partially, if only temporarily, moved the trade union 
structure within Lucas Aerospace into a position whereby sectionalist 
interests were secondary to employee interests, and this limited 
management's ability to adopt 'divide and rule' tactics. Because 
official trade unions in contrast have failed to engage in 'shadow 
planning', the rundown of UK manufactruing industry from the mid 19705 
has progressed in a way which allowed management to employ 'divide and 
rule' tactics, despite an obvious employee interest in sustaining such 
industries. Planning is a pre-requisite to a unified response, 
sectionalism is an unplanned response to management planning. The 
consequence of this lack of action must not be underestimated, since 
management power over employees is largely dependent upon employee 
acceptance of the legitimacy of management control, and failures help 
perpetuate the belief amongst employees that no alternative to 
management plans can exist. 
Although the 'radical' rightly criticizes the sectional1st nature 
of current trade union practice, it will be argued below, that by 
completely rejecting business expertise and planning the radicals are 
unable to illustrate how sectionalist divisions could ever be overcome. 
Chapter 3 showed how management control of the business enterprise has 
been evolved, allowing for a division of· tasks, whereby strategic 
planning activities and associated expert knowledge is a restricted 
"'~ -
area of managerial prerogative. In contrast, trade unions have evolved 
according to democratic principles whereby members cannot 
systematically be excluded from decision making processes. Formally, 
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each member is accorded equal rights within the organization, and has 
equal opportunity to determine trade union objectives and policies. 
'Radicals' argue that the fundamental purpose of trade unionism is to 
promote democratic control of industry through trade unionism. 
Hyman (1975) states: 
"If unions are agencies of power for the working class, 
elements in a strategy for exerting control over a 
hostile work environment, it follows that their purpose 
must be defined in terms of members' own aspirations. 
Whether or not union democracy is an efficient means of 
achieving union objectives, it is subversive of the very 
rationale of unionism to divorce democracy from the 
formulation of these objectives" (p. 84). 
Thus 
Often for many trade unionists, this commitment to democratic 
practice is related to the belief that expert knowledge regarding 
business affairs is not a necessary aid to trade union decision making. 
In fact, the promotion of expert knowledge within trade unionism is 
sometimes viewed as a threat to trade union democracy. Clarke (1977), 
Scargill (1978), Lilja and Wood (1981) and Hyman (1975), for example, 
all argue that a fundamental change in society is only realizable by 
the prior abolition of the capitalist system of production and the 
hierarchical system of authority on which it is based. Business 
expertise is seen only to be relevant to a market economy which the 
radical wants to replace. For example, Clarke (1977) states: 
"In capitalist society, the management function is 
largely to interpret, influence and respond to the 
dictates of the market... The anarchy of the market is 
beyond the control of the worker representatives at the 
individual company-level. What is needed is a 
transformation of the general production relationships of 
capitalist society" (pp. 365-6). 
Radicals argue that fundamental economic and political change will 
only arise ~hen workers are made aware of the class nature of society 
by engaging management in industrial conflict. Ideally, trade union 
demands should not only be'based upon an aggressive advancement of 
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members' economic interests, but should also challenge management's 
authority within the employing firm. Such policies have been advocated 
by miners'leader, Arthur Scargill (1978) in the following terms: 
"There is only one way to advance our movement, there 
is only one way to advance our class, by taking on the 
system under which we live. By' so doing, we will in the 
short term wrench from this society in return for what we 
put in, the maximum amo.unt of wages and conditions. We 
will at the same time have to use whatever influence we 
can to preserve the jobs of our members, wherever they 
are threatened. But in the long' term, what we really 
need is a complete transformation of society" (p. 6). 
Successful militant action serves two purposes. Firstly, it 
heightens the political awareness of members, so as to establish that 
there is a fundamental conflict of interests between workers and 
employers, which can only be overcome by political change. Members who 
accept this view have developed what Hyman (op cit) has termed an 
'oppositional ideology' (p. 177). Secondly, worker experience of 
collective decision making is seen to undermine the hierarchical nature 
of management authority, and according to Hyman (1975), at such times 
worker viewpoints can be subject to radical transformation. He states: 
"When engaged in collective struggle, workers are 
most susceptible to the appeal of new world views, the 
'deviant' element in working class attitudes are thrust 
to the fore, while the conventional 'official' society 
momentarily lose their hold" (p. 177). 
The involvement of trade union members in discussions to formulate 
trade union demands, and the pursuance of these demands through 
industrial action is seen as a crucial way of developing 'class 
consciousness'. Hyman states: 
..... there is a positive dimension to rank and file 
action, it represents the practice of the working class, 
containing intimation of a different form of social and 
industrial order in which the character of relations of 
production would be transformed" (p. 200). 
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Hyman is of the opinion that during the 1960s and early 1970s many 
workers engaged in militant trade unionism without any awareness of the 
political significance of their actions. He states: 
"Workplace organization and action have come to perform 
an increasingly important role in a growing number of 
industries, and their cumulative effect has been 
exceedingly corrosive of', capitalist order in industry. 
Workplace controls have 'undermined management power to 
utilize labour at will as a passive resource; competitive 
wage bargaining has increased labour costs in a period 
when stabilization (and indeed reduction) has been 
urgently required, shop floor militancy has disrupted 
production schedules and forced an array of unplanned 
concessions by employers. • •• Yet the economic, and to 
some extent political and social, instability resulting 
from rank and file organization and action is intended by 
no more than an insignificant fraction of trade 
unionists. For the vast majority, their piecemeal 
actions are legitimate within the terms of the political 
economy of capital, no systematic challenge is envisaged" 
( pp • 174-75). 
For radicals, such experiences are significant since not only do 
they threaten the existing institutionalized aspects of collective 
bargaining, they are also based upon the democratic ideal so 
fundamental to the socialist transformation of society. 
Unfortunately, radicals do not explain how these experiences of 
democratic decision making in an oppositional mode prepares workers for 
applying such prinCiples to the complex problems of co-ordinating 
production activities within the transformed society or, indeed, how it 
prepares workers to confront management strategic plans in the process 
of transforming society. There is a tendency to assert that the 
democratic procedures are causally sufficient in themselves to ensure 
the realization of the 'socialist alternative'. Hyman (1975), for 
_ example, is of the opinion that no plan could encompass the spontaneous 
creativity of worker initiatives. He states: 
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"The character of the socialist alternative to 
capitalist industry is rarely described in detail. This 
is understandable for if socialism is to be established 
by the creativity of the workers' own collective action, 
it will not be according to any pre-determined blue-
print" (p. 201). 
Such visionary ideals have to date failed to convince workers as to 
the dispensibility of management~ As the Lucas case study indicated, 
in times of recession, workers readily accept that their company's 
current problems are best solved by managers who are expert in business 
affairs. This readiness is invariably unhindered by trade union 
promotion of alternative plans, a failing in conventional trade 
unionism which the radical feels able to condone. Lilja and Wood's 
(1979) review of the Lucas Aerospace 'alternative corporate plan' is 
forced to welcome the initiative to the extent that it is a multi-union 
action which. challenges management's prerogative at the level of 
strategic decision. However, they criticize the lack of coherence in 
the implementation proposals of the Combine, suggesting that it 
reflects a 'kind of naive realism' and a form of 'utopian socialism'. 
In their view: 
.. • •• there is underlying much of the 11 terature on the 
(Lucas) campaign a 'rationalist theory of change'. 
Accordingly obstacles to the acceptance of the ideas 
presented are seen as primarily irrational based on 
misconceptions and inadequate discussion of new, self-
eviden tly progressi ve ideas. In search for the 
acceptance of 'all parties' (Government, management) the 
plan is presented not so much in class terms as in terms 
of the most enlightened management literature. This is, 
for example, the case wi th the presentations of demands 
for job redesign and· an end to deskilling. Overall the 
plan is seen as putting some flesh on an idea often 
expounded by management, ie, that of social responsible 
business. The Lucas management are seen as being offered 
a challenge to put its money where its mouth is, that is 
to see if 'it really is prepared to take its social 
responsibility seriously or not.' 
Whatever the conclusion one could or' would draw from 
the Lucas case, the resort to the thesis of 'Corporate 
Social Responsibility' supports the spreading of this 
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ideology and may give pretence to the idea that it 
could exist without a fundamental change in society~ The 
offering of such a challenge to management may re-inforce 
paternalistic and deferential definitions of management" 
(p. 93). 
Furthermore, they argue that the combine placed too much emphasis 
on the power of knowledge, thereby relegating the importance of 
militant trade union action. They state: 
Summary 
"Relying on the government support and the emphasis on 
the discussions with management within the frame of 
reference of the 'rationalist theory of change~ has meant 
not enough attention has been paid to the need to extend 
the organization of the rank and file, and relate it to 
the campaign for the plan. The conception seems to be 
based on the power of knowledge and not on the only real 
power of the working class, namely, the power to withdraw 
their labour" (p. 94). 
In my opinion the radical view point is valuable in that it 
legitimately criticizes traditional trade union practice for its over-
reliance on the process of collective bargaining, and for its critique 
of the artificial separation which is made between industrial and 
political issues. However, by disregarding business expertise, and 
failing to examine ways in which expert knowledge might be made 
accountable to trade union members, radicals are forced to rely on 
opposi~ional policies which are based on trade union principles rather 
than promoting employee opposition to management plans by an analysis 
of employee interests. Thus the radical necessarily diverts trade 
union attention from the use of accounting information which can be 
used to support trade union objectives. As a result, radicals do not 
consider the possible poli tical consequences of a co-ordinated trade 
union effort to 'shadow plan' major investor strategies. In my view, 
265 
the dismissal of expert knowledge as being an unnecessary complement to 
trade union democratic principles can only result in the perpetuation 
of the situation whereby trade union members are asked to assess their 
interests on the basis of information provided by management experts. 
The promotion of oppositional ·policies on the basis of trade union 
principles, rather than employee interests, is fraught with difficulty. 
In the context of industrial disputes, Batstone et a1 (1977) have shown 
how trade union principles are open to re-interpretation and cannot 
provide a basis for consistent decision making. Furthermore, research 
by Nie1ken (1975) suggests that questions of principles and values only 
influence decision-making when technical/expert advice has been 
neutralized by dispute amongst the experts. The role of the expert in 
trade unions could therefore be to at least neutralize management 
claims that 'there is only one way' to overcome an identified problem. 
The failure of trade unions to provide members with expert knowledge 
can only sustain a situation where management plans go unchallenged 
because no alternative is on offer. 
In the next secion, it will be argued that many of the perceived 
obstacles to independent strategic planning by trade unions, could in 
principle be overcome, if trade unions were prepared to commit 
themselves to this course of action. 
Conclusions: Planning and Trade Union Information Needs 
The fourth policy option available to trade unions, militancy based 
on alternative plans, adopts a different perspective to the 
identification of trade union information needs. The three other 
policy options generally, (implicitly) assume that the decisions in 
Which trade unions have an interest are easily fdentified, and moreover 
it is normal to assume that these decisions are confined to so-called 
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industrial relations issues •. In contrast, it is argued here that trade 
unions must engage in the planning process as a necessary pre-requisite 
of being able to identify decisions in which they have an interest. 
This accords with the view that successful organizational decision-
making is related to the ability to continually recognise and define 
important problems and a wide range of alternative courses of action, 
rather than being based on a careful choice of identified options 
(Newell et a1, 1958). It is now widely recognised that successful 
problem-orientated organizations are characterized by a rich flow of 
information both formal and informal (Burns and Stalker, 1961). 
For trade unions to successfully contest strategic decisions of 
management, they must realize that the above conditions are equally 
applicable to them. As Chapter 2 has shown, planning is a fundamental 
aspect of organizational development, a major function of planning 
being to promote learning and adaption which involves a continuous 
process of relating the organization to its environment. To a large 
extent, information can only be meaningfully interpreted in relation to 
an evolving plan. It is often argued that trade union access to 
informa tion is a major constraint on trade union planning ability, 
however, below it will be argued that this problem has been overstated. 
The disclosure debate is to a large degree founded on the belief that 
trade unions have inadequate sources of information. However, it may 
be that trade unions have not tried to utilize the information 
currently available. 
Shareholder control of strategic decision-making requires that 
relevant financial information is publicly-available. The best 
financial ana~ysts use both public and 'private' information to build 
financial models of companies, industries and economies (Sharpe, 1981). 
Trade unions, in developing their own financial models, might not have 
access to company managers. However, as employees, trade unionists 
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could develop direct access to relevant information circulating in the 
company, and moreover, access to this information could become a 
primary collective bargaining objective. Case study research, such as 
Bryer et aI's (1981) study of BSC, mine in the Lucas study, and the 
SSRC studies all indicate that lack of information use can be related 
to trade union disinterest rather than non-availability. 
It is sometimes argued (Owen and Lloyd, forthcoming 1985; Cooper 
and Essex, 1977) that trade union disinterest in available information 
reflects inadequacies in the characteristics of information. The two 
main criticisms are that accounting information is too historical and 
too aggregated. 
Firstly, it 
These criticisms will be examined first. 
is usually argued that the historical nature of 
accounting information reduces its relevance to trade unions and 
therefore the call is for future-orientated information such as company 
plans. However, as Bryer et aI's (1981) study shows, access to plans 
does not necessarily lead to their effective evaluation. The TUC' s 
Steel Committee had access to BSC's ten year corporate strategy, yet 
this went unevaluated because the committee lacked the expertise which 
arises from an ongoing involvement with planning and a reasonable 
technical education. Without reconstructing the plan presented by 
management, or developing a plan of their own, the Steel Committee were 
unable to identify the critical factors which required an evaluation 
from an employee perspective, and in consequence trade union support 
was given to the BSC plan without any effective valuation. Without an 
evaluation the belief can easily develop that there is only one way in 
which an organization can respond to changes in its environment. The 
Steel Committee developed this view of the corporate strategy developed 
by BSC management, accepting that 'technological advance' was an 
inexorable force to which BSC was responding. However, the analysis 
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provided by Bryer et a1 shows that there were other, clearly 
preferable, alternatives. 
As trade unions cannot rely on management to prepare plans, they 
must use what accounting information is now available in the same way 
as management and analysts. Company plans generally result from a 
process whereby past performance as represented by historical 
accounting information, is projected into the future by taking account 
of changes occurring in the organization's environment, eg, inflation 
accounting. Also as was seen in the Lucas case study, much strategic 
information is not company specific and is publicly available. 
Clearly, the challenge to trade unions is to make effective use of 
existing accounting information. Unfortunately, many trade unionists 
share the same prejudices as accounting researchers and dismiss 
accounting information as a 'malleable resource' (Bougen and Ogden, 
1981) which is 'inherently subjective' (Hird, 1983), and which can be 
manipulated to support plans advanced by management. In the view of 
Clive Jenkins, for example, the general secretary of ASTMS, 'published 
accounts are utterly and absolutely useless' (quoted by Holmes and 
Sugden, 1982). However, this is inconsistent with the three 
fundamental objectives of financial statements identified by the 
Society of Investment Analysts (The Investment Analyst, September, 
1974). To quote them at length: 
..... the fundamental objective of periodic financial 
statements is to provide the investor with information 
useful for predicting his expected return from the 
investment, evaluating the risks involved and comparing 
with the returns expected from other investments. 
••• a second objective (is).. the need to provide the 
user with information which is useful for predicting the 
. company's cash flow and potential earning power •••• 
••• a.third fundamental objective ••• ia to provide the 
users of accounts with information about the primary 
policy aims of management, to enable judgements to be 
made about their ability to achieve those aims" (p. 27). 
-------"'t'i.i6~:;;----.............. 
To the extent that these are met (cL Beaver, 1981), accounts do 
provide much information of relevance to trade unions and the problem 
would appear to be that trade unions do' not possess the requisite 
skills necessary to interpret relevant information. This accords with 
the view that possession of information is only a power resource when 
you are able to effectively use it. As Pettigrew (1972) puts it: 
"Power resources must not only be possessed by an actor, 
they must be controlled by him ••• Control may not be 
enough, there is also the issue of the skillful use of 
resources" (p. 202). 
According to Bryer et a1 (1984) the effective use of historical 
accounting information on the part of trade unions in the mid 1970s 
could in principle have involved the development of an alternative 
strategy for UK manufacturing industry, based on value-added rather 
than profit-generation criteria of evaluation. The relevant 
information was available, the ability to use the information was 
lacking. 
Secondly, the aggregate nature of company financial information has 
been criticized. This criticism reflects the fact that most pay 
bargaining has a plant rather than a company focus, and if you accept 
this as the relevant level for bargaining, then the criticism is well-
founded, although segmented reports help. However, it can be argued 
that the diversification of business interests within one company is a 
way of spreading risk. Currently, risk-spreading has been undertaken 
to benefit shareholder interests. A case can be made for the view that 
trade unions should use similar structures to provide greater stability 
for employee interests, regarding not only questions of pay, but also 
employment factors. For example, in the Lucas case study, overtime was 
being worked in Lucas Aerospace, whilst redundancies were being 
implemented- at Lucas Electrical. However, • the possi bili ty of jo b 
transfer was limited by the ,different worker skills utilized in each 
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division. Trade unions in developing company structure might wish to 
emphasise the possibility of job transfer between divisions in 
evaluating diversification policies. Moreover, it can be argued that 
bargaining at a company level is consistent with trade union objectives 
to promote social justice as between employees. If the latter 
objective is viewed as operative then company information is relevant 
and currently available. Finally, in that management make their 
strategic decisions by utilizing aggregate data, it would seem 
necessary for trade unions to contest decisions at this level' before 
considering the distributional issues which are involved in 
implementing the strategic decisions. 
In short, trade unions cannot evaluate the usefulness of existing 
information until they attempt to use it. As has already been argued, 
planning is a major means of promoting learning, and for this reason 
planning cannot be done on behalf of an organization by a third party. 
Only by engaging in planning will trade unions be able to identify 
decisions for which information is necessary, and thereafter make an 
assessment of the adequacy of existing information. More 
fundamentally, by ignoring planning trade unions policies are not only 
re-active, they become isolated and divided from the rest of society. 
This situation is the antithesis of planning. 
Concluding Remarks: 
Planning is the fundamental management process which has 
underwritten the development of modern large-scale business 
enterprises. It represents a proactive process whereby alternatives 
are evaluated against objectives as a first step in realizing a 
preferred alternative. Throughout their history, trade unions have, 
failed to engage in serious planning activities despite apparent early 
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recognition that it was a necessary condition for advancing the 
interests of employees. Thus, for example, over sixty years ago Tawney 
(1964) argued: 
"If the workers are to be able to veto the solution of 
industrial problems propounded by the employer, their 
status in industry must be such that they can offer an 
alternative solution themselves. If they are to resist 
effectively the types of organization which menace them, 
they must not merely resist; they must take their part 
in discovering equally effective types of organizations 
which do not. If they are to exercise corporate 
freedom, they must be ready to undertake corporate 
responsibility" (p. 112). 
Trade unions have never met this challenge, and have remained 
simply representative organizations committed to reactive, oppositional 
policies. Ironically, it is the disruptive consequences of these 
policies that has contributed to the hostile public image of trade 
unions as 'over mighty subjects'. In reality, because of their stance 
on planning, trade union 'powers' are highly constrained being set 
within the context of management's strategic plans. 
A re-orientation of trade union practice to planning will not be 
easily realized, because even its radicals do not appear to realize how 
fundamental are the changes required. As has been seen, the 
negotiation of short-term sectionalist issues within a collective 
bargaining context provides no automatic stimulus to trade union 
decision-making capabilites. The problem for trade unions is how to 
shift from short-term and sectionalist perspectives to long-term and 
collective perspectives. This change can only occur when trade unions 
are organized to collect, assess, assemble and review information 
against predetermined objectives in the process of developing their own 
-long-term 'shadow' plans in employee interests: The need to separate 
long and short term decision making has long been recognised by 
management, and within the modern business enterprisse, decision making 
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is an increasingly specialized skill. This alone limits the immediate 
prospects of a rapid and dramatic change to 'workers' control' as 
proposed by radicals because they simply do not have the knowledge to 
implement it. Even where the need for a trade union planning 
perspective is recognised (eg, Lane, 1981), the origin of the 
resistance to change which lies deep within the structure and self-
conception of what trade unions are for, is nowhere analysed. 
Certainly management can be expected to resist change, but the central 
message of this thesis is that the fundamental constraint on the 
usefulness of accounting information to trade unions, is trade unions 
themselves. 
Appendices 
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Appendix 1. Exploratory Questionaire: 
Wage Bargaining at Lucas Electrical 
This questionaire was the subject of interview discussions with all 
negotiating groups which are affiliated to the SSSC. 
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- CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE WAGE BARGAINING PROCESS IN LUCAS, AND WHAT IS 
,-
YOUR INVOLVEMENT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE NEGOTIATING 
GROUPS? 
WHAT INFORMATION DO YOU CURRENTLY USE IN WAGE NEGOTIATIONS? 
WHAT INFORMATION WOULD YOU LIKE BUT WHICH YOU ARE UNABLE TO GET? 
WHAT LEVEL OF COMPANY INFORMATION IS RELEVANT: 
- LUCAS INDUSTRIES? 
- LUCAS ELECTRICAL? 
- PLANT? 
- WORK PLACE? 
WHAT FINANCIAL INFORMATION DO YOU OBTAIN REGARDING LUCAS 
- OFFICIALLY? 
- UNOFFICALLY? 
WHAT OTHER INFORMATION DO YOU USE, AND WHAT IS ITS SOURCE 
- OFFICIAL UNION/LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT/OTHER? 
WHAT ARGUMENTS DO MANAGEMENT FORWARD TO COUNTER YOUR CLAIMS? 
HOW, IF AT ALL, DO YOU ATTEMPT TO CHALLENGE THESE ARGUMENTS? 
DO YOU THINK THAT UNION REPRESENTATIVES HAVE A RIGHT TO BE 
CONSULTED WHEN THE COMPANY IS DECIDING ITS INVESTMENT PLANS? 
TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD TRADE UNIONS BE INVOLVED IN SUCH DECISIONS? 
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT DIFFERENT UNION ORGANIZATION AT LUCAS 
ELECTRICAL SHOULD 'POOL' THEIR INFORMATION? 
WHAT PROBLEMS WOULD YOU ANTICIPATE FROM SUCH AN APPROACH? 
DO YOU THINK THAT WITH RELEVANT INFORMATION TRADE UNIONS COULD 
DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO THOSE DEVELOPED BY MANAGEMENT AND 
IN WHAT WAYS WOULD THOSE POLICIES DIFFER? 
Appendix 2. Sample Minutes of Business Review 
and Joint Policy Communication Meetings 
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Documents of this kind are provided by Lucas Electrical management 
to the SSSC approximately 4-5 times a year. 
LUCAS ELECTRICAL 
SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS OF THE 
GENERAL MANAGER'S 
BUS I N E S S REV lEW - 1 977 /7 8 
WITH 
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Appendix 2a , 
BIRMINGHAM AREA SENIOR UNION REPRESENTATIVES 
October 1977 
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BUSINESS REVIEW 1977/18 
MARKET BACKGROUND 
Current worldwide vehicle production is 41.1 million per annum, including 10.7 million 
vehicles per annum produced in Europe. UK vehicle production is 1.9 million per annum 
and the constraints of the home rriarket necessitate lucas Electrical expansion into other 
markets via exports, licences/ioint ventures and all makes activities. 
There seems to be no opportunity to break into Japan, but the compa.ny is seeking to pene-
trate American markets. Undoubtedly, however, the market with highest potential is 
Europe. 
ACHIEVEMENT TO DATE 
GROWTH 
NEW PRODUCTS 
NEW FACILITIES 
new business to the value of £6.9 million has been gained since 
1975(76; this will increase to £10.6 million by the end of 
1977/18 
we now have a technologically advanced international range of 
products 
we spent over £21 million in capital and revenue expenditure in 
1976(77 and this year plan to spend over £29 million providing 
productive use can be made of the expenditure. 
DIVISIONAL HIGHLIGHTS 
Electronics and Systems 
Product development includes: EFI - Lucas control box manufacture beginning 
in 1978 
small motors - screenwiper range opening up 
European markets 
new competitive' range of horns for production 
early in 1978 • 
electronic ignition - Phase 4, late 1978. 
278 
-2-
Significant new business has been obtained already with VW (coils and small motors), 
Fiat and Simco (screenwipers). Prospects are good for securing electronic ignition on 
new Citroen models. 
An investment programme is underway to support new products and to replace overage 
plating and presses. In 1977/18 Mere· Green diode capacity is to be extended and com-
puter-oided testing introduced for wipers and distributors. 
lighting 
Reorganisation remains the key factor to restoring the division to profitability. Progress 
has been delayed but the Joint Union Management Committee is now moving forward. 
Investment is allied to the reorganisation. last year a new aluminising plant was installed 
at Cannock, and DMC facilities extended; a new plating plant has been commissioned 
at BW4i 1977;78 will see re-tooling of transfer press and round headlamp assembly which 
will move to Cannock. 
DMC has a major role in the Lighting divisionis future. DMC head lamp business has 
already been achieved on the Princess, UK Alpine, and Chevette. The division is at-
tempting to secure the new Renault and Peugeot models as well as split DMC reflector 
business at 8W\W. There is also significant licensing potential with DMC. 
Starters and Generators 
The product range has been extended to provide shorter versions with higher power suitable 
for international application. Starters manufactured in Australia and South Africa will 
lead to all makes potential in home and European markets. 
Diesel business is a major growth area: lucas is strongly equipped to supply export markets, 
opening up opportunities for other company products. Diesel starters are currently on 
test at Peugeot. 
~witchgear 
The division has secured a high level of business gains including the wiper switch at 
Peugeot. Product development includes: 
oi I pressure transmitter 
battery master switch 
miniature rela)1 
wlenoid valves for diesel starters. 
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The investment programme has included extension of the Eastern Avenue factory and in-: 
slallation of automatic process control on moulding machines. In 19n /18 facilities are 
to be laid dOwn in support of 30% soles increase over the next 3/4 years- half of it 
being for exports, particularly to France and USA. 
Plastics, Diecasting and Rubber 
Plastics 
Oiecasting 
Rubber 
Emphasis is being placed on improved quality and productivity, with 
automatic process/production control. New fan for Fiesta and new 
horn body have been introduced recently. 
Output improvements were achieved during 1976/17. £! million was 
spent on new aluminium diecasting plant and development is underway 
on thin wall diecasting technology. 
Expansion is planned to give a five fold increase in turnover by 1981. 
The Girling brake seal business has been recovered, and efforts are 
now being concentrated on securing more business with outside companies. 
A new mixing plant is being installed. 
Parts and Service 
Promotions during 1976/17 contributed to a substantial increase in sales over 1975/76 
and included: 
TV commercials 
Egon Ronay Guides 
Lucas Sport 
B90 compa i gns 
Motostock 
Output from the manufacturing divisions was redirected to Parts and Service during the 
Leyland strike in Spring 1977. The strike at Cowley Parts warehouse enabled Lucas to 
supply agents "direct at the expense" of "the l~yland" Llnit Exchange Scheme. 
All-makes business is growing; contact sets are now being manufactured for VW and 
Datsun cars. In addition, improvements have been achieved in core collection and re-
clamation. " 
Overseas 
New developments within the existing businesses continue. 
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In particular, India, where £4 million expansion is planned for this year to meet market 
growth and maintain market share. Exports and bi-Iateral trading opportunities are 
available with countries inaccessible from the UK (eg Egypt). The political scene in the 
country gives cause for co~cern. 
New" projects are as follows:-
Yugoslavia 
Iran 
Philippines 
Poland 
The new factory, to be opened late 1977, will initially manu-
facture screenwipers and fan motors. The joint venture will 
open up opportunities for exports to Eastern Bloc countries. 
We have already had substantial benefits in the UK factories 
from CKD supplies for this venture. 
This joint venture will cover starters, alternators, distributors, 
and coUs. Plant and canponents are now in transit in pre-
paration ,for commencement of production late 1977. 
This project will mean substantial CKD business. 
A licence agreement for starters, alternators and screenwipers 
will give the company a toehold in an expanding economy and 
a defence agoinst Japan. There is, in addition, export potential 
to Brazil and Nigeria. 
A licence agreement, initially for starters and column switches, 
is due to be signed this year. This agreement, which will open 
up further opportunities with Fi at, wi II involve CKD exports 
from the UK. 
The company is in the final stages of negotiating a licence with Ducellier and is seeking 
to increase its shareholding. This will give Lucas a much stronger position in France and 
help us to compete with Bosch in Europe. Lucas Electrical will obtain substantial benefits 
from component supplies to Ducellier - particularly in the Electronics and Sys1ems division 
since Ducellier will source its silicon processing requirements on Lucas. 
MAJOR MAnERS FOR 1977/78 
Everyone in the company must playa part in ensuring maximum quality and reliability, 
which will increase the company's prospects of further. business gains. 
After having been- considered by our customers as a good, supplier of a quality product our 
reputation was severely damaged by the poor rate of recovery after the toolmakers' strike. 
Although we would have been forgiven for the strike we will not be forgiven for failing to 
get supplies back to normal as quickly as possible. Because of this, all customers are now 
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making enquiries with alternative suppliers worldwide and we are under serious threat of 
permanently losing a large amount of business unless output improves. It is therefore es-
sential that we restore our previous image as a good suppl ier and to do this we need to 
maintain a substantially improved output performance throug.out the remainder of this 
financial year. . '
Continued emphasis is to be laid on the importance of communications, consultation and, 
where appropriate, joint decision making. 
Increases in output give the opportunity for all employees to increase their earnings from 
self financing schemes which can be operated during this special year of pay policy and 
will be in addition to the stage II payment. 
Provided this opportunity is seized, there is good expectation that the company will 
continue to grow. If not, there is surplus capacity on our products throughout the world, 
with foreign competitors very ready to benefit from any of our shortcomings. In this event, 
the company would become weaker and smaller: the choice therefore is jointly ours. 
, . 
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Appendix 2b 
\vOIU~ l-IEETING NO. 25 
GTP/JE\{ 
9 AlJGUST 1979 
NOTES ON TilE GENEHAL HANA<"lER I S JOINT POL1CY CONHUNICATJON HEETING 
HELD OT'\ ./1 AUGUST 1979 
'HTH SENIOR HANlJAL 'WRKEHS I HFPnESENTATI VES 
Hr Wil kinsoll introduced l-tr Brown, recentl y appointed Director nnd General 
l-1;Hlager, Lucas Electrical Limited, and 'said that 1-11' DrO\m would chair 
future meetina s • 
Hr \Vilkinson revimvcd Group pt:'rforlllllllC0., indicatina that all the major 
operating Companies had experienced difficulties: 
Lucas CAV 
Lucns Girling 
. had been affected by the genet"al d(>\\'nturn in the 
<tUricul tural market hut had m.:.lll.\~!cd to oJfs(Jt some 
of the Dhortfall with I~W contracts 
had suffered a sethnck ns a result of the prolon(Jcd 
.Ford st.rike, but Loth Companies had recovered \:ell 
, Lucns Aerospace \,'as enjoying record demand for its products, bu t 
""as expel" lencing pI"odllction difficul ticr.; 
Lucas Batteries had expel'lenced a IIl<1jol' di8putc which hml seriollsly 
affected its position -imlliediately alld lonner term, 
customers resourcillU hll~;il1css to competitor!>. 
Lucas El ectrical l'CrfOl"mflnCe hnd Leen nf [eci:er1 by a nt!'l:Lc,: of serious 
pJ'oblerns t.hrolluliout tho year, Lut '1'1(1 suflcred nrjtn.,rily as a l'CGuI t of the 
contraction of tile U~K. market. The untj.clpa·ccCl vcnl.clc l1ulld j:or t.he 
yea" was only 1. 7rn, cOlr.pi1rc~cl , .. i th t.llt! ori.oin.:J.1 forccast of 1. 9 tJln, an(1 this 
harl led to pro),I elils ',lIich the' COl11p.-my h:,cl Of;(.Hct on~'y partially 'Qj:- good 
perfornt;tI1ce in the af1.crmnrlwj; and OVCl::;;C(lS. 
The vchicle produc:Uon forccw.;t fOJ' 19'19/(30, 1.7m, ~llo\ ... ed no Ul'owth. 
The fundamentill proLlt·m of i he industry could be slllI;lllar:i f.".e(l in (HI allalysis 
of vehicl c productj on ill recent years. in the UK, 1'I-"l1ce, und Gern,mlY: 
in 19(1:; t;J( vcldcle production stood at 2.5m per Lllllltlln, cl level 
comparaLl c wi th Gel'r.:any and Ut'<!i.li.cr that) the Luild ill France. 
in 1978/79 thc v('hicI C! producti Oil :\11'11 ysif.; uho''''cli: 
UK 
Fq\l1cc 
Gel'mnilY 
1.'1111 
3.:;111 
h.5iil 
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This analysis clearly highlighted the contrn~t,ion of the UK mnrl.<et, n 
trend un!lf<ery to be reversed in the ncar, future, anl1 ,served to emphasise 
the need for the Company to penetrate' i.he huoy8nt markets of continental 
Europe. -:>ome prouress,had been made: 
during the last three years all Divisions had developed product 
ranges capahle of securing business in European marl,ets 
significant contracts Ilad been secured with some major continental 
custo»~rs : five years ngo direct exports were negligible, but in 
1978/79 the total was npproxitnil t.el y £l!6m. 
Over the next two years, ho,~ever) the Company planned to increase export 
business to £80mj if this t.:u-:~Iet was not met contrnction of th(~ Company 
would folIo'''. The Iwy to the future stahility and subiJequcllt UJ'o\,·th, of 
the Company lay in increased export business; opportunities could be 
maxj lIli::-cd only if the Company learned from previous expel"iences and toolt 
appropriate stcps now to improve efficiency and competitiveness. 
Achievement of the planncd ;\()c.lition<ll cxport bUBiness, therefore, ,,,as a 
cr it i cal ob j ect i ve, a tid Rhort tel'm }H"CSSU1'CS, such as the strclI!Jthenino 
in the value of the pound Itlust not bc allmvcd to impede proUrc8s. It was 
clear, however, that the Company faced ficI"ce commendal pressures; 
in particular the Company 'vas competing ,vi th European, J apallese, and 
American component suppliers, all of ,,'hom had hirJh volum~ home: markets, 
from "'hich they coulc.l launch their HfforLs to sccure further business. 
To be succc8sf·tl in export marl,ets, thereforc, the Company Iwd to improve 
its pCl'fornwnccj comparisons ,dth competitors had been made, and soma 
examples of critical arcas for improvem0.nt could be detailed: 
continental motor manufacturers, very professional and exactillg 
customers, demanded that components '''l!l:'C! to r.pccification. liigh 
stalldards \,'cr'.~ critical if busine;,;.; ,,'as to be secured and maintained 
in the face of altenw.tive suppliers. 
customers insisted on rapid response on, for example, enquiries, 
prototypes, Rnd samples. 
continuity and reliability of supply '"as vitali the custolHers 
coulc1 cnsily divert b1l5in~::;s to an alt.ernativc f;upplier, identified 
as pnrt. of their dual sourcillU pulicies. 
t.he nhil i ty tlJ wlI1aUc the incTensecl proc.luct ,variety, LI gJ'm:inD 
proulcm ill several Divisions, liaS a major factur in cleterlnilling 
sueccss 01' fnil ure ill Europe<111 lII;).r),etn. 
The essential improvcmcllt ill those areas '"ould be OCJ1l:'rai.ml by: 
continued investment t.o el113ure that the Company's fo'lcili ti es ,"ere 
compatible \d th the busillen~ dCll1illlU~; 
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Manaoement in the Divisiolls would be enlisting the jnvolvement of 
appropriate representatives in joint effort to facilitate Hlld improve 
export cilpability and potcntini. In thi~ context it vOls not the COlllpany's 
intention to foc\ls on matters of principlc; J"ather it W,IS nccesHary that 
wherevcr impediments to !1)"()wth in e:xpOl-t \lIar'l~ets '''ore idcntified 
locally, joint effort should be concentrated on nteering a courr~e Which did 
not prejudice the Company's objectives. 
Given the current business position and the associated markcting strategy, 
the Company '''as looking to hold its ecollomic situation wi tl>out resort to 
rcc.lUlldancy. Existing controls, incl wlilln those dosi.lJned· to l~eep (\0\\'11 
oyertime and suhcontract ",ork to an irreducible ntinilllum, would be retained, 
but it was "(lsfH.mtial al1'.o that the COIIlP:lJlY recc~i \'ed continui ng COOpCI"nt ion 
from its worl<forcc. The cooperation uiven to d.:1te ''ILlS reco!,Juised, aud 
efforts such a::; the recent work at nh'h on the Ford Teresa lamps were 
particularly noted. Exteuded cooperation and commi tlllent ,,'.:1S no,.,. cri tiCDl to 
maximise hoth export busines!> and employment opportunities. 
2. HATTEnS AH1SHiG FHO!>I HEPIH~SENTATIVES' QUESTIONS 
a) All 1-lnkes 
• 
In response to a question concerninn the Company's appronch to the 
increasinn foreign vehicle pare in the UK, Hr Wilkinsoll st~ted that the 
Company's stratcgy fell into two parts: 
the drive to secure orioinni equipment busineRH ,dth foreign 
vcllicl e manufacturers, which ill turll op(;ned up aftermarket 
opportunities. 
the All 1-lal<c5 progranullc, whereby t.ho CompcU1y \Va::; n1>l c to offer, 
pronrcGsL vely, a l"LlIlge of parts to repInce non Lucas original 
equipment. 
The All }Inl<cs business, \\'h i ch Jwd st arted only thn:~c yeArs ago, 
had an expected turnover next ·year of ::.20rn, it clear indicntion of 
tlH-l grO\dh Achieved and the onooillg P()tcllt~al. 
1» Ducc] J ie]" 
'lhe rcpreHcllt[ltivcr; iuvitecl COnll11011t 011 thc prO!ll'CSB rCljnnlin!llJuccJ.)jf!r'1 
hinhliohtillfl in )1L\rticulm' the po:d.tjon of Fcrodo and thc impact on the 
UK worl~force, and l'l'peatccl their n~<JueHt 1'0)- a dclcoatioll to visit 
Duccllicr. 
1-h" Hilldllr:oll illclicntClI tllilt ]"C"ccnt Ilcooti"U Ol1f; \dth Fpl'odo hnd 
rcsul tc(l in llUl'eC'l11cllt heb ... ~en the two COll1p:nd es* It !3ho'..lJd be llot.ed, 
hOWeVel", tlwt t.\~0 furt.her cievelopments were necessary before the 
a!)rcelllent could 1>e operational: 
~'l.ppro\'al of the- arrullgcmcnt::.: by the FrclIch Government 
ilurecment of Bendix DBA to sell· their shni"cr; in Duccll ier 
It ,,'as lmlil{(:ly, th(!reforc, th~t there ,·:ould be illl opcl-atioll.:ll <l[lreCllleJlL 
bef(ll'C .TanllnI"y 1')t\O. 
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Tho agreC'ment ,d th Ferodo had heen concluded since it provided 
for arral1acments consistent with the COlllpaIlY'.s marJ<cting stratcoy. 
The following features could be highligl1tel.1: 
Duccllier would be establif;hed as a second source to meet, 
abovo all, the requirements of European customers. 
t.he volume of business available to Lucas and Duccllier, 
should he sufficient to facilitate ongoing expenditure 
on Engineering and Design. 
thcre will be growth opportunities for both Lucas and 
Duccllior. 
the UK factories , .. ill bencH t from being ablo to supply 
Ducellior as the latter,lIlovcd progressively into the Lucas 
product range. 
Tho terms of the £I0re~ment ,d th Ferodo specified that durin'l the first 
five years ~~as would have operational responsibility for Ducellier. 
This ped od '''auld be used by Lucas and Ferodo to explore the potential 
advantages of increased cooperatiOtl. If, nfter five years, an 
ongoing arrnnoement had 1I0t been ilgreed het",(~en the bo:o Companies, 
the next five years ",ould see rotatitlg operational responsibility. 
In tho unlikely event of no agreement after ten years, then a 
position of deadlock had conl:;ciously been provided for. 
The Company l'E"mained committe(1 to 8upport a visit to Dllcellier, 
providing tC1111S of l"cferr)t1ce alltl npprorrintc arrangemonts "'ere a[woed. 
The timino of such a visit, hO\,ov(~r, remained sensitivc and Sprint! 19130 
,,"ould Le the first opportunity, cOIlc1itiotwl of course· IIpon final 
ratific<1t:iol\ of" the Lucils-Ferndo llurecmcnt. 
c) BL!IIo11di.l 
Heplying t.o a questioll concerninG the implicntions of the proposed 
link Lct.\,'cen DL and Honda, J·lr Hillcinsoll clad.fied t.hat a fi!lal 
decision all the arral1~el11(mt bet,;eell t.he t"o Companies \,',:U3 expected 
Ly December 1<)79. Al UJ()u~lh it was too early to make definitive 
slntC>IllCnts 011 the implication:-.; for LlIc.)!; Elc'r.trical, th(' impact wOllld 
clearly depelld Oll the extent to \·:ldclt ilL liliport.pd "drN:f;cc.l" elluitwn. 
The Comp,'IIY had al )"cady rcoisterp(l \'Ii th Honda i 1".s intent to "dress" the 
cnuillPs ill the UI~, and would be takillg all lIppropriate measures to 
safcguard its positi.on. 
d) Soda] Cl1lh 
In rcsJl(lI1~'P tn thc rCprC!1elltatjvef' ;H;)dll!1 ,,'hei-her' UtC ClI'Point.lllenL 
of Nr BrO\\'Il ,15 Dircctor and Gt'ncrnl tl;lIIaucr, LIIC:l!J El cct.l'i.cnl Lillli ted, 
would leael to allY channc ill the Company's ill'J>l"oach t.o\ .... nh~ the propolSed 
Socilll ClulJ, ~Ir \o/ill,ill;;OIl cOllfi.J'III<'<1lllat. tit(, Comp"tIY' H por.i tioll '''oIlJ <l 
continue to bc h;l~;(~d on PCl't..itH:llL cou:;jdl.~l";ttlol\:; on1y. 'rhl'! r<'~;\Ilt}; of 1.1 
plannillg .Ippl:i C;Jti OILS ;Jnl! inveF.ti!Fltiolls into the fi:~c.1.1 j 1Il})1 i cations 
were a\\'ai ted and ":ou] cl determine future proGress. 
286 
-5-
e) nought out work 
Referring to the COJllpany's policy of bringing bnck into the 
factori.es "lOrl, sourced externall y, the representati ves expressed 
concern at the difficulties experienced in sOnle areas in securing 
relevant information. They £lIsa queried ,\'hether iHldi tional 
impetus Was necessary, quoting n number of specific jobs whi«;h 
they felt could be carried out in the Diecasting factory. 
Hr lHlldnson reaffirmed the Company I s intention to hold sub-contract 
, .. orl< at an irreducible mii1imum. Over the course of the last financial 
year sub-contract expenditure, wi thout allowing for inflat:i_on, had 
been reduced by ~, a clear indicati,on of the effort which , ... as 
?f)'~ continuing. \J 'e, 
All Di vj :;;ions were bringing in ',ork consistent ,'lith the efficient 
operati on of the Company, and General Hana~Jers would ensure that 
appropriate information was not ,'Ii thheld from rcprcsentati ves. 
The specific jobs qUQted \\'ould be the subject of detailed discussioli in. 
the Di~casting factory. 
f) Shidey f;Hc : Suppl ios fad1 i t.in.s 
G '1' Plumley 
In response to a request for the currellt p1fms for the Shirl ey si te, 
H1' Willdnson confinnecl that it remained the Company's intention to 
relocate tile supplies L:lcilit.ir.io to Shirley. The clcnl" priority 
\vas to llIovn tim Ooz.clls Street emu Garrh;oll Lane opcl':ltioIlS j the 
trallspol't acti vi ty, less of a priOl'i ty I \~()lIlcl follow. 
'rite timin!J of the moves bad to be cOllr;istent with continuing {p'o,\'th 
in export uusiness ,1nd the bU!Jc cash invf!stmcnt needNi. In the interim 
the COll1p.'IIY hud taken a leane on the Anlen E:;tate to relieve some 
of the stl"ilin on the Oozclls Street facil i ty. 
lli visi onA1 Pcrsonncl 1-1,\l1<10c1' 
E & S Divison 
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Appendix 3. Lucas Electrical Limited: Information Request 
This information request was prepared by the author on behalf of 
the SSSC and was submitted to management by the T.G.W.U. District 
Official. 
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LUCAS ELECTRICAL LIMITED 
INFORMATION REQUEST 
1. Please provide details of the case used to make the decision . 
to reduce the workforce by some 3,000 employees. 
2. .Please provide Profit and Loss Accounts, Balance Sheets and 
Funds Flow State~ents for Lucas Electrical Limited for the 
last five years and the current year (to date) as these are 
not publ~~ned independently of Lucas Tradinq Limited. State 
whether forecasts of these finanCial statements exist. If so, 
please provide them. 
3. Please provide the other background information requested below. 
SEC~ION 1 - SALES IN~ORMAT!ON 
1.1. Please provide data for Vehicle Production (cars, C.Vs. tractors) 
by country of manufacture. 
a) Detail Lucas Electricals market share for each country 
by oroduct group (e.g. Lighting, Starters etc.) and represent 
tnese market shares as sales volumes (units and revenue) 
by manufacturing site. 
The above information should be provioed for 
(i) The last 5 years. 
(ii) The current year. 
(iii) The next 5 years a) Without redur.cancies 
b) With redundancies 
How sensitive are these market shares to changes in pricin9 policies 
vis a vis competitors, and state orice elasticities by prOduct 
group. Indicate the proportion of business secured by lono t~rm 
cortraC~5. Are such long term contracts rp~otiated in sterling or 
local currencies. Please state rates of exchange used to convert 
foreign currencies to sterling. 
1.2. Please orovide data with respect to replacement business and detail 
as in 1.1. above. 
1.3. General Motors have plans to produce a 'world carl in Saragossa and Cadiz 
from 1982. Within 1.1. and 1.2. what levels of rroduction are assumed 
with respect to this business . 
. 
1.4. Where Lucas Industries subsidiary or associated companies supply mar~ets 
identified in 1.1. and 1.2., provide details"of tneir sales volume (units 
and revenue) by country, by product grouping, ~y manufacturin~ site. 
II 
I 
2 
SECTION 2 - PRODUCTION CAPACITY AND UTILISATION 
2.1. 
2.2. 
t.. 3. 
2.4. 
Please provide details of productive capacity (defined by such 
measures as standard hours; number of employees etc. please indicate 
which definition is used) and indicate the level of utilisation by 
a) Site 
b) Product 
The above information should be. provided for 
;1 The 1 ast 5 years 
ii) The current yea r 
; ii) The next 5 years a) Without redundancies 
b) With redundancies 
For each product group detail by site,-the amount of work currently 
sub-contracted. State the number of standard hours involved, and for 
those oroducts which are both sub-contracted and produced in-house 
indlcate direct product cost, and the average sUb-contracted cost. 
per unit. 
Where subsidiary companies of Lucas Industries are sub-contractinr 
work, how does the tendering system work? Also, do soecial provisions 
exist to direct work to otner Lucas SUbsidiarv companies in oreference 
to external suppliers? Please state wnether L~cas Elec:rical has 
undertaken such work; and whether future plans allow for such work. 
State the number of standard hours invoived by site. 
Wha! is the aporaisal system for determinina whether components 
should be 'bought-in' or 'made-in'. Does the Division currently have 
facilities to reduce the level of 'bouoht-in' comoonents; and if so, 
please state the number of standard hours of work involved, currently 
and over the next five years. 
2.5. .Is lucas Electrical prepared to undertake work on a 'contribution basis'? 
Define how 'contrihution' is calculated. Is the Division currently under-
takin~ 'contribution business' and are there any plans to undertaKe 
more of this type of business? State number of standard hours involved. 
!ECTION 3 - MANUFACTURING AND OVERHEAD COST INFORMATION 
3.1. For the Lucas Electrical sales identified in Section 1.1. and 1.2. 
provide a cost analysis by site; by product group (original· equipment 
and replacement) and by country Showing 
a) Direct Materials 
b) Direct Labour 
c) Overheaqs Production 
Engineering and Design 
Production Engineering 
Sales . 
Distribution 
Personnel 
Adm;n. and Accounting 
Rents, rates and insurance 
Payment to Government 
e. q. NI. 
Depreciation 
3 
The above information should be provided for 
1) The last 5 years 
ii) The current year 
iii)' The next 5 years a) 
b) 
Without redundancies 
With redundancies 
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SECTION 4 - PROFIT AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS 
-
4.1. For the Lucas' Electrical sales identified in Section 1.1. and 1.2. 
provide statements of profit (before tax and interest) by site, 
by product (O/E and Replacement) and by country of sale. 
The above information should be provided for 
i) The last 5 years 
; i) The current year 
iii) The next 5 years a} Without redundancies 
b) With redunaancies 
4.2. Express profit performance as detailed in 4.1. as a percentage 
of capital employed by product group and site. Please define 
the measure of capital emp1oyed. 
4.3. For product groups and site provide Cash Flow Statements for the 
time periodS stated in 4.1. 
~ECTION 5 - CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND R&D EXPENDITURES 
5.1. Please provide details of Lucas Electrical's capital investment 
pro9ramme (inc1uding low value capital items. installation cost etc. 
charged to revenue); R&D expenditure, both expenditure~ to be identified 
by site (both UK and overseas) and product group, and classified 
by purpose etc. cost reduction; product development, machine replacement 
etc. 
The above information should be provided for 
i) The 1 ast 5 years 
i;) The current year 
i i 1) The next 5 years "a) ~!ithout redundancies 
b) With redundancies 
Where such investments have led to a direct change in the levels 
of eMployment please give details. 
-5.2. What criteria are used to judge the various types of investment? . 
What are the Oivision's minimum objectives a9ainst each of these 
criteria? 
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5.3. Lucas Electrical has recently suspended the development of a 
'small motor' factory at Chester Road. At which site is this 
investment now to be undertaken? c 
5.4. In the last 5 years have any 'employment creating' investments (such as in 5.3. above) been rejected on the basis of financial 
or other criteria? If so, please give details regarding nature, 
employment effects, capital investment required etc. 
5.S. What capital investment expenditure would be required to'eliminate/ 
reduce the level of 'bought-in' work identified in 2.4. above. 
What would be the 'employment effects' of such investments? 
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Appendix 4. Lucas Industries: Statement to Employee Representatives 
on the State of the Company 
This document was circulated to all Lucas Industries wage 
negotiating groups to explain the company's 'non-negotiable' wage 
offer. 
LUCAS I HDUSIELLS 
STATEMENT TO EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES ON 
THE STATE OF THE COMPANY 
INTRODUCTION 
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THE OBJECT OF THIS STATEMENT IS TO CONVEY TO OUR EMrLOYEES 
VIA YOU THEIR REPRESENTATIVES THE SITUATIOU If~ y!HICH 
LUCAS INDUSTRIES IS AT PRESENT TRADING AND IS FACING IN THE 
NEXT F I NANC I AL YEAR. I TIS BE I NG MADE I N THE HOPE Arm 
EXPECTATION THAT IN SUCH DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AS ARE 
CLEARLY WITH US NOW - AND ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE INTO THE 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE - YOU AND THOSE YOU REPRESENT CAN SEE THE 
t~EED TO ACT h'I TH THE UTf>mST COt1MONSENSE.I CAUT I or~ AND 
REASONABLENESS SO THAT THE COMPANY MAY EMERGE FROM WHAT 
ALREADY IS AND PROMISES TO BE THE MOST ADVERSE SITUATION 
IT HAS EVER FACED.I AND EMERGE IN A CONDITION IN WHICH IT 
WILL BE ABLE TO BENEFIT FROM FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES. 
WHAT IS TH~ SITUATION? 
A) TH~ FIRST POIfn OF REFERENCE MUSI BE THE LUCAS INDUSTRIES 
LIMITED lfHERIM REPORT \>JHI CH COVERED THE PERIOD FOR THE 
HALF YEAR TO 31 JAtWARY 1980. Y'OU WILL RET'IEMBER TH IS 
PER) OD n;CLUDED THE EUG I N EER I NG STFd KE. OVE R.t.LL OUR 
PROFITS WERE ONLY £12.3 MILLIONS - (HALF THE LEVEL OF 
THE PREVIOUS YEAR) AND THIS CONTAINED A LOSS IN THE UK 
OF £1.8 tiILLIotlS. IH~ REST CAr1E FRor1 ABROAD. THE COST 
OF THE STRIKE \'/AS £20 r1ILLJOfJ ItJ F)ROFITS AtJD ALSO MEANT 
A LOSS OF CASH - \~H I CH I S LOST.I NE \IE R 10 BE RETR I EVED. 
1 WOULD LIKE ALSO 10 POINT OUT THAT THE PROFIT F1GURES 
JUST MENTIONED ARE BASED UPON PRESENTLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNT-
ING METHODS WHICH TAKE NQ ACCOUNT OF THE EFFECTS OF 
1 NFLAT ION. A MEASURE OF SUCH EFFECT WAS SHOWi~ IN TJr4 
1979 LUCAS ACCOUNTS - WHEN THE PROFIT BEFORE TAX FOR 
THAT YEAR AT r 71 MILLIONS BECAME QliLY £29 MILLIONS 
AFTER PROVIDING FOR INFLATION. IN EFFECT J THIS MEASURES 
THE EXTRA COST OF PROVIDING FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF OUR 
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT AT PRESENT PURCHASE PRICES RATHER 
THAN WHAT WAS ORIGINALLY PAID MORE THAN 15/20 YEARS 
AGO - AND ALSO MEASURES THE EXTRA COST OF HOLDING STOCKS 
OF RAW MATERIALS J BOUGHT~OUT PARTS J WORK IN PROGRESS 
AND FINISHED GOODS .. 
BASED. UPON THAT GAP - £ 71m DOWN TO £29 MILLIONS -IE 
£41 MILLIONS IN A FULL YEAR - IT IS NOT DIFFICULT'TO SEE 
THAT ON THE SAME BASIS HAD SUCH FIGURES BEEN PUBLISHED 
AT THE HALF YEAR STAGE I THE WHOLE GROUP.WOULD HAVE SHOWN 
A SIGNIFICANT OVERALL LOSS AND A VERY HEAVY LOSS IN THE UK. 
MAY I EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS NQIJUST TO MAKE THE FIGURES 
LOOK WORSE - THEY ARE WORSE AND THAT IS WHYJAS A PUBLICLY 
QUOTED COMPANY J WE ARE OBLIGED TO DECLARE THEM IN THIS 
WAY IN OUR 12 MONTHS ACCOUNTS - AND WHY THE GOVERNMENT 
ALLOWS SOME OF THIS TO BE OFFSET AGAINST OUR TAX BILL TO 
AVOID PAYING TAX OUT OF THE MONEY WE NEED TO SUSTAIN OUR 
BUSINESS ASSETS. 
B) ALTHOUGH THE FIRST 'SIX MONTHS WERE ESPECIALLY BADI THEY 
WERE NEVERTHELESS A REFLECTION OF THE TREND DOWNWARDS 
THAT HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN OUR PERFORMANCE FOR SOME 
TIME. 
THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF VERY SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 
WHICH HAVE MADE SUCCESS DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE: 
I) FIRST AND FOREMOSTJ WE NOW HAVE IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY IN THE UK A VERY WEAK AND DECLINING HOME 
MANUFACTURING BASE INTO WHICH WE CAN SELL OUR 
PRODUCTS. 
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THE FIGURES ARE SO BAD~ THEY ARE HARD TO BELIEVE 
VIZ: 
IN 1970 THE VEHICLE PRODUCTION IN THE MAJOR 
PRODUCING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD WAS AS FOLLOWS: 
Mlli.lOOS OF CfJ 
YEtil CL£S CIW4GE 
1970 1979 
WEST GERMANY 3.9 4.25 + 9 
FRANCE 2.75 3.62 + 32 
. ·SPAIN 0.54 1.12 +107 
USA 8.28 11.47 + 38 
JAPAN 5.29 9.63 + 82 
ITALY 1.85 1 .. 63 - 12 
UK 2.10 1.48 - 30 
THE EFFECT OF THIS IS TWO EDGED: 
IT WEAKENS US AS OUR BASE BUSINESS REDUCES ANll IT 
STRENGTHENS OUR COMPETITORS AS THEIR HOME BASES 
EXPAND. 
THIS HAS ALSO BEEN THE PICTURE~BUT NOT SO BAD~ IN 
OUR OTHER PRIME MARKET~ DIESEL ENGINES. 
OOOIS. OF % 
E;r~~ I rES CHt\~GE 
1973/4 1979/80 
UK 633 614 - 3 
FRANCE 252 428 + 70 
WEST GERMANY 539 1,045 + 94 
ITALY. 238 328 + 38 
SPAIN 132 191 + 45 
USA 523 995 + 90 
JAPAN 537 1,002 + 87 
I, 
t 
! , 
\,...\. 'II t j I' U _ 1-' 
THE ONLY r-1ARKET SHOHING DECLINE SINCE 1973/4 
IS THE UK. THE PRINCIPAL MARKET IN WHICH OUR 
MAJOR COMPETITOR OPERATES HAS ALMOST DOUBLED. 
11) OUR ANTICIPATIOO OF THIS CONTRACTION HAD LED US 
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TO PURSUE I WITH SOME SUCCESS} THE PATH OF EXPORT-
ING FROM OUR UK FACTORIES INTO THOSE MARKETS. 
ABROAD WHERE EXPANSION HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE. 
HOWEVER 1 THIS STRATEGY - WHICH MUST BE AND IS THE 
MOST CONSTRUCTIVE IN TERMS OF PRESERVING THE WELL 
BEING OF OUR UK FACTORIES AND THOSE WHO WORK IN THEM 
HAS BEEN GETTING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT. THIS IS 
BECAUSE OF THE COMBINED EFFECT OF TWO FACTORS: 
1) INFLATION IN COSTS AND DOMESTIC PRICES IN THE 
UK HAS BEEN FAR HIGHER THAN IN THE COUNTRIES 
INTO WHICH WE SELL OUR PRODUCTS AND COUNTRIES 
WHERE OUR COMPETITORS MANUFACTURE. 
EG MID 75 TO MID 80 
PRODtK:ER PRICES 
GERMANY + 22% 
FRANCE + 59% 
USA + 57% 
JAPAN + 27% 
ITALY +107% 
UK + 97% 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, : 
I 
THIS DIFFERENCE PASSES INTO OUR PRODUCTION COSTS.j 
! 
2) IN THE EARLY PART OF THE PERIOD REFERRED TO -
IE UP UNTIL MID '77 THIS EXTRA INFLATION WAS 
OFFSET BY A WEAKENING OF THE £ STERLING TO $1.75 
AND AGAINST THE DM TO 3.85 THE FR. FRANC TO 8.6 
AND THE JAPANESE YEN TO 404. 
TODAY IS A VERY DIFFERENT STORY. THE £ STERLING IS 
HIGH} ONE POUND WILL NOW BUY $2.34, DM 4.1, F .. Fr 9.6 
. AND YEN 506 - IN SPITE OF HIGH INFLATION. THE EFFECT 
IS TO MAKE OUR PRODUCT? VERY EXPENSIVE TO FOREIGN 
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II) CONTINUED 
CUSTOMERS - AND JUST AS BAD -IF NOT WORSE - IT 
MAKES THE UK A VERY ATTRACTIVE MARKET FOR OTHERS 
TO ATTACK. 
THIS IS WHY BL IS SERIOUSLY LOOKING AT JAPANESE 
AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTSr 
FIGURES WE HAVE COMPILED SHOW QUITE CLEARLY THAT SINCE 
MID 1975 OUR COMPETITORS/CUSTOMERS HAVE BECOME 
20%-25% MORE COMPETITIVE THAN US. THERE ARE NOW 
MANY SITUATIONS IN OUR COMPANIES WHERE OUR SELLING 
PRICES INTO FOREIGN MARKETS ARE HIGHER THAN OUR 
COMPETITORS AND AT THE SAME TIME DO NOT EARN US A 
PROFIT. ALSO J IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE 
OF PASSING ON TO THOSE CUSTOMERS OUR ADDITIONAL COSTS 
IN THE FORM OF PRICE INCREASES. THE RESULT WOULD BE 
TO LOSE BUSINESS AND DEFEAT THE PURPOSE OF THE 
EXPORTING WHICH IS TO SUSTAIN OUR UK PRODUCTIVE 
CAPACITY AND PEOPLE. 
III) A FURTHER FACTOR WHICH COULD HELP TO BRIDGE THE GAP 
IS PRODUCTIVITY. IN THE MOST SIMPLE TERMS THAT 
MEANS ACHIEVING A GIVEN LEVEL OF OUTPUT WITH A 
MINIMUM OF RESOURCES. OUR RECORD HERE IS DISAPPOINTING 
WITH NO IMPROVEMENT SHOWING FOR THE LAST FIVE YEARS. 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GROUP BY ACCEPTING J 
MANAGING AND GRASPING THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES FAST 
BECOMING AVAILABLE TO US - AND OUR COMPETITORS -
MUST BE A KEY OBJECTIVE FOR ALL EMPLOYED IN THE 
GROUP. 
IV) THE COMMENTS ON COMPETITIVENESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL OUR UK BUSINESSES. WHERE 
TH::RE IS A DIFFERENCE J HOWEVER J IT IS IN THE LONG-AWAITED 
UPTURN IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY WHICH IS NOW 
. ~. 
1 
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IV) CmHIrWED 
OCCURRING. THIS IS GIVING THE AEROSPACE COMPANY 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO EARN PROFIT AND MAKE A 
CONTRIBUTION AFTER MANY YEARS OF POOR RESULTS AND 
SUPPORT FROM THE REST OF THE GROUP. ITS LONG 
UNDERUTILISED FACTORIES ARE BUSY AND PAST 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IS NOW PAYING 
OFF. 
:) 1 HAVE JUST REVIEWED THE LONGER TERM TRENDS WHICH HAVE 
BEEN AFFECTING OUR AFFAIRS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS OR 
SO AND THESE ARE STILL CONTINUING. THERE IS J HOWEVER J 
A FURTHER FEATURE TO ADD TO THIS ALREADY DIFFICULT 
ENVIRONMENT J NAMELY A WORLD ECONOMIC RECESSION •. 
THIS HAD BECOME MOST APPARENT IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS 
AND ITS EFFECT ,UPON OUR CUSTOMERS AND OUR OWN COMPANIES 
IN THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY HAS BEEN VERY SERIOUS. IT WILL 
HAVE PREVENTED US FROM HAVING A GOOD SECOND HALF TO OUR 
FINANCIAL YEAR UPON ~JHICH WE HAVE RELIED IN THE PAST. 
LET US JUST CONSIDER THE SITUATION WORLD-WIDE: 
A FEW HEADLINES [ROM THE USA -
A THIRD OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY WORKFORCE - 275,000 
IS AT PRESENT LAID OFF. AS A WHOLE J US MANUFA~TURERS 
SOLD ONLY 484,000 CARS IN MAY - 36% LOWER THAN. IN 
MAY LAST YEAR. FORD AND CHRYSLER ARE MAKING HUGE 
LOSSES. 
FORD IN 1ST QUARTER LOST $475m IN US 
CHRYSLER IN 1ST QUARTER LOST $449m IN US 
MASSEY FERGUSON IS TO SUSPEND PRODUCTION AT ITS PLANTS 
IN _CANADA AND USA FOR THREE MONTHS FROM 1ST AUGUST 1980. 
T~IS FOLLOWS A HUGE FALL IN THE SALE OF FARM TRACTORS 
AND COMBINE HARVESTERS. GENERAL MOTORS HAS REDUCED 
ITS QUARTERLY DIVIDEND. 
! 
" 
(():~T i IHJED 
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IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE : " 
THE FRENCH CAR MARKET BEGAN TO DETERIORATE IN 
LATE '79 AND CONTINUED TO DECLINE. OUTPUT WAS 
CUT BACK. CITROEN CLOSED ITS PLANTS FOR FIVE 
DAYS DURING MAY. PEUGEOT AND RENAULT HAVE ALSO 
CUT BACK. 
IN ITALY) FIAT WAS REPORTED TO BE LAYING OFF 
78,000 WORKERS TEMPORARILY BECAUSE OF A SHARP 
DECLINE IN EXPORT SALES - INTO THE FRENCH} GERMAN 
AND BRITISH MARKETS. 
IN UK 
HIGH SALES OF NEW CARS IN JAN/FEB - NEARLY SIX OUT 
OF TEN BEING IMPORTED - WAS FOLLOWED BY A SHARP 
SLUMP IN APRIL - 1~% DOWN ON THE MARCH TOTAL AND 
" ONE THIRD DOWN ON THE YEAR BEFORE. IN MAY} LOW 
SALES WERE AGAIN RECORDED - FOLLOWING THE SAME TREND. 
BL SHARE WAS 18%. 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SALES WERE ALMOST "20% DOWN ON 
LAST YEAR'S LEVEL. 
YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE SEEN IN THE NEWSPAPERS WHAT 
THIS IS DOING TO OUR CUSTOMERS AND OTHER COMPONENT 
SUPPLIERS. 
VAUXHALL ANNOUNCED A LAY-OFF OF 5,000 AT ELLESMERE 
PORT" FORD IS LAYI NG OFF 3,200 AT DAGENHAM AND HAS CALLED 
FOR 2,300 REDUNDANCIES. TALBOT IS CUTTING THE WORK-
FORCE AT LINWOOD BY A FURTHER 1,300. SHORT-T I ME WORKI NG 
ON TRUCKS HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED BYFORD" ERF AND SEDDON' 
AND OUTPUT OF AGRICULTURAL TRACTORS AND PERKINS" 
ENGINES IS ALSO BEING SHARPLY,REDUCED. BL" AS ,YOU 
KNOW" TOOK EARLIER ACTION AND LAID OFF THE WORKFORCE 
300 CONTINUED 
ON MOST MODEL LINES IN FEBRUARY. 
THE TALBOT UK COMPANY DOUBLED LOSSES IN 1979 
TO £41 MILLIONS J CHLORIDE PROFITS FELL SHARPLY 
FROM £29m TO t19m DUE TO THE VIRTUAL COLLAPSE IN 
DEMAND FOR AUTOMOTIVE BATTERIES - AND THERE WERE 
700 REDUNDANCIES IN LATE '79. 
iN SPITE OF THE RISING ACTIVITY IN THE AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRY J ROLLS ROYCE INCURRED A LOSS OF t58mIN 
1979 ON RECORD VOLUME. THIS ILLUSTRATES VERY 
CLEARLY THE HIGHLY ADVERSE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC 
COST INCREASES AND A STRONG £ - AS ROLLS ROYCE SOLD 
THE RB211 ENGINE IN FIXED DOLLAR PRICES AT A TIME 
WHEN THE EXCHANGE RATE OF $1.8 TO £ 
WHICH I REFERRED EARLIER. 
OUTLOOK FOR NEXT YEAR 
- A MATTER TO 
AS EACH DAY PASSES SO THE NEWS DETERIORATES AS THE 
RECESSION DEEPENS. OUR FORWARD LOOK IN THE UK AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR IS SHOWING THAT PRODUCTION IS EXPECTED TO BE EVEN 
LOWER IN CUR BO/81 YEAR "fHAN IN THIS YEAR - WHICH YOU WILL 
REMEMBER WAS BADLY AFFECTED 'BY THE ENGIII~ERING DISPUTE AND 
CURRENTLY BY LOW SALES - AND IS AN ALL TIME LOW. THERE . 
ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPORTS WHICH WILL GIVE SOME 
SMALL HELP IN VOLUME TERMS BUT ARE ALREADY TAKEN AT PRICES 
FAR FROM SATISFACTORY. THIS GENERAL OUTLOOK AFFECTS ALL 
OUR UK AUTOMOTIVE COMPANIES, 
'THE ONLY EXCEPTION TO THIS GLOOMY SITUATION IS LUCAS 
AEROSPACE WHERE A VERY SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SALES 
'AND PRODUCTION IS REQUIRED TO MEET CUSTOMER DEMAND •. EVEN 
- . 
HEREJ HOWEVER J THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF A WEAKENING IN 
ACTIVITY AS THE RECESSION PUTS A SQUEEZE ON THE AIRLINES. 
C 
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CONCLUSION 
WE ARE CLEARLY IN AN EXTREMELY BAD TRADING SITUATION. 
THE TASK FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS WILL BE TO SURVIVE 
THE MOST CRITICAL SITUATION WE HAVE EVER EXPERIENCED 
UNTIL THE RECESSION IS OVER. THERE WILL BE MANY COMPANIES 
THAT WILL NOT GET THROUGH BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO SUCCEED 
AS THIS IS IN THE lONGER TERM ·INTEREST OF ALL THOSE WHO 
, 
WORK FOR LUCAS. 
IT MUST BE REALISED THAT. LUCAS INDUSTRIES IS NO MORE THAN 
THE SUM OF ITS PARTS - AND THE FORTUNES OF LUCAS INDUSTRIES 
DEPEND ENTIRELY UPON THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANIES WHOSE 
PEOPLE YOU REPRESENT. 
THERE ARE A FEW VERY CLEAR ISSUES: 
WE HAVE TO TRY TO EXPORT MORE - IN SPITE OF THE 
DIFFICULTIES. 
WE HAVE TO INCREASE OUR SHARE OF THE UK MANUFACTURERS 
BUSINESS - OTHERS WILL BE TRYING TO TAKE THAT SHARE 
FROM US. 
WE HAVE TO KEEP DOWN ALL OUR COSTS - IE MATERIALS~ 
. LABOUR ,AND .OVERHEADS - BY BETTER PURCHASING~ BY PAYING 
WAGE LEVELS WE CAN AFFORD AND BY SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVING 
·OUR PRODUCTIVITY. 
IT IS CLEAR THAT IN EXPORT MARKETS THE OPPORTUNITY 
TO RECOVER INCREASED COSTS~ IF ANYTHING} IS VERY SMALL 
AND IN THE UK WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SERVED NOTICE BY 
TWO MAJOR CUSTOMERS (BL AND TALBOT) THAT THEY WILL·NOT 
ENTERTAIN PRICE INCREASES IN THE NEXT 12 MONTHS WHICH· 
INCLUDE LABOUR ELEMENTS IN EXCESS OF 7!%. THEY ~HLL BE 
SEEKING TO PURCHASE FROM THE MOST COMPETITIVE SOURCES. 
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Appendix 5. Lucas Electrical Ltd: 
Information Relevant to Redundancies Announded 4th June, 1980 
Management's response to information request submitted by TGWU 
District Official (see Appendix 3). 
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Lt:CAS EI.ECTRICAL L[~I1TED 
J!\FOR~'L.\TIO~ RE f..r::VAI\T TO REDtJ1\ D.\!'olCIF.S ANKOUNCED 4 tTl.,rXE 1980 
--
'rhc redundancy oC 3,000 stafr and hourly p:dd employee::; announced 'on 
4 June 1980 is based pure.ly on volur.:e and the need to match falling sales 
• ",-hich n~xt year (198U/81), are cxpec ted .1.0' be at least 30/~ below the 
spring 1978 peak, ~hen employees wel'e at a post-1975 maximum. These note, 
cover ",hat we regard EtS the rele .... ant details. 
Some ,-ehicle statistics rclat.i:ng to home Prl)(~li.<.:lioll ll.l'e enclosed in 
Appendix 1 together ,,'i th the Lucas Electdcal Original Equipment Harket 
Share. Our own share of the European market is well under 2% and in 
view of the fact that we have only minority shareholding in our associate 
company in France, we have discounted Europe from the considerations. 
Figures rclating to our total UK production in the manufacturing units over 
the pa~t five years are given in App~ndix 2, expressed as an output volume 
index quarterly (OVI is equivalent to standard hours). These volumes are 
~et against the total gross payroll employed in full time equivalents. We 
have also given our Ilext year's future predict jon. No-one caD for~cast 
beyond one y~a r ,,·it~ any accura~y Ul this businHss. l~rom Appendix 2 it 
""ill be seen 'tnat "-0 had peak production in February/Hay 1978 (OVI - 280) 
when we "'ere operating at around 90% of installed capacity. Total monthly 
overtime was running at 180,000 hours. It will be seen that the number of 
employees had increased by 3,600 over the 1975 le\-el. 
'l'oday, output. ]ev(d~.; a!'c r'HlI(lil'~~:1t ,~YI :-:: 210 (,}rq:Joyees 17,8(0) ~,nd E..r~ 
expected to fall to 170 -175 by the- ~ummel' of 1981. Future payroll levels 
have been calculated by the operating divisions taking ,into account the 
need to convert existing stocks of fini~hE'd units into cash and also the 
impact of dual/triple sourcing on customer~ new mo~pIs, ~or example, th~ 
Netro ar.d the Erika etc. With oveI'tim~ reduced to a rninimur.l of 50.000 
hours per month we expect tha.t no more than 15,250 employees will be 
l'equi rcd from autu:lln 198U on .. ards. 
Appendices, J, 4 and 5 inJicate the volume and employee levels of the three 
main operating divisions. 
Appendix 6 includes ciscel1aneous information which has been used in variou~ 
presentations in Luca~ and this includ~s the effects of inflation and the 
exchange nl.t~ on ti,e L'R compet.it.i\i(' J>o:,;j lion v)n-u-\'is the major vehicle 
producing countries. 
Our manufacturing IJolicy over the year's hfl~ been 'to make in' whereyer 
possible and basically this still applies. Sub-contract has been and will 
be used. to ca te r COl' 'peaks' of production an<.l h~ncp., has always bl::!en 
small ~ince we are operating at below our installed capacity. Appendix 7 
• expre~sa! the cost of ~ub-contract as a percentage of the total cost of 
production. It will be se~n that the present level is around the post-
radunrlanr.y figure of 1975/76. It should be noted that 50% of thE' sub-
contract referred to is 'routed' ie, it represents part~ of specialist 
prO~PAq"~ -for whi~h we have no facilities and is, therefore, routed outSide, 
for exum~ln, silver plating. 
The at-hE-f' major operating companies in the r.uca~ Group are sppcir.,iists 
~quipped specifically for their type of bu~in~R~, for example, braking, 
<liese 1 rue llinr" Aerospace p'oduc t ion etc. 'I'lip ["cf'ore, in terchanga on 
major work is impo!sJhle. Som~ small components are inter-changed, 
usually from 10 .. e1' to higher.tpchnology factorios hut ne\-''H' Yice-ve:~a. 
This avoids quality problems. 
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Until recently OllT' policy ",as never to accept \t'ork on a. 'contributory basis'. 
No"" because of the strengLh 01 Sterling and UK inflation much of our export 
'Work fulls into this category. Also, the major 'World producers of vehicles 
(Ford, (j~!, CIJr.n:lflr/T;dbot.) hnv!' 1l11opLp,1 world sOlln:'ing p{ll ie.i.es to benefit 
from the surplus cOl't1ci ty current ly pr€'\'uil ing in the components industry 
and this has had tlle effect of Ilepressing prices. As an example, a G:-I worl(l 
car will be made in Spain and this obviously reflects the cost of Spanish 
labour and all accessories will be sourced 'Within that country. 
There are ~pecialist skilled areas, toolrooms, NT development departments 
where spare capacity exists depending on the load arid wherever possible we 
seek ,",ork around Lucas to balance out, and for this reason the impact of 
the 30% drop in business is not directly reflected in these areas. 
}'rom a manufacturing volume consideration the' artermai'ket accounts for 
35/40~' of the ,",orkload. Over the past five years this Tfl.tio has remained 
virtually constant ie, f1.S the O'F. vol unlC has dropped, till' aftermarket has 
reduced accordingly. 
In terms of investment in basic services, plant and equipment we have spent 
a total of £46m since August 1975. Of this, £IO~ has been spent overseas 
by wholly owned subsidiaries and the remainder in the UK. The comparable 
figures for nine years ""hich have been q1,loted are £61m, £14m and .t47m 
respectively_ 
, 
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nU::>INE::lS DEVELOl'HENT DEPARTMENT' 
ECONONICS .fu~D F()f/.ECASTING 
lKFORHATIO\" 'FOR WORKFORCE REDUCTTOK DECISIO~ 
.. 
U\: \'EIIICLE PRODUCTTm! (Units OOO's) 
LUCAS ELECTRICl 
CARS CVs TRACTOHS '1'01' AL OE % 
1974/75 1355 406 167 1,928 75 
1975/76 1325 388 177 1,870 74 
1976/77 134-7 386 162 1,895 73 
1977/78 1359 404- 143 1,906 72 
1978/79 1183 414 138 1,735 71 
1979/80 Estimate 1000 395 130 1,525 70 
1930/81 P'cast 960 360 135 1,455 65-67 
Figurel.> illclude Alpine Emu Solara assembly at Ryton. 
UK CAR AND CVREGJSTRATIONS WITH INPORT PENETRATION 
197/l/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
XOTES 
CARS CVs 
REGS (OOO's) IMPORT % REGS (OOO'S) H!PORT % 
1236 32.3 241 12.1 
1236 34.8 212 11.8 
1294 42.3 221 14.9 
1495 47.6 249 19.8 
1743 54.3 291 21.9 
Estimate 1550 58.0 300 24.0 
P' cast 1400 56.0 250 25.0 
1) L~ vehicle production was virtually flat from 1974/75 to 
1977/78. In 1978/79 therf~ Wa.~5 n faU 0 r 9% with a further 
estimated fall of 12% in 1979/80. A reduction of 5~ is 
forecast for 1930/81; this iR 16% down on 1978/79 and 24~ 
down on 1977/78. 
2) UK car production Rhow~d no improvement from 1974/75 to 
1977/78 despite a 20~ increase in npw registrations. 
Production fell 13% in 1978/79, altho~gh new registrations 
increased by 17% to a record 1,743,000. Rising imports and 
falling e~ports were responsible. Car production is forecast 
to fall to 960,000 in 1980/81, 19;'~ beloW' the 1978/79 leyel 
_ new registrations c·ontrac1. in] ,'lOO,OOO. 
3) UK cOI:lrn.;!rcinl velliel€' production -remained flat from 1974/75 
to 197R/79 ('\ip.n thoul~h re[.ri!>t.r·ntion~ irlcreas€'d by 21~r.. 
CV I'ro,fucl.jort is ('''!'!'C'.lst. 1,0 rHI' t,(I )()O,O()O in 1980/81 
clue to ('ailing l·cgist.nd.ions and gr'owillv, :import penetration. 
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TIl UK VEHICI.E PIWIJtTCTIO:,\ BY HUcm N,\\l:FACTlffUm;:;(lInits O()()IS) 
IV 
AT. "FOIW VAUXHALL CHRYSLER/TALBOT 
1974/75 820 506 215 270 
197'j/76 780 602 189 175 
1976/77 808 550 209 207 
1977/78 785 597 188 225 
1978/79 706 518 189 215 
1979/80 Estimate 531 570 141 183 
1980/~1 Flcast 512 524 128 189 
Production of BL vehicles in 1979/80 is estimated to show a 25% 
decline on 1978/79 and to be 32% down on 1977/78. The 1980/81 
forecast shows a further 4% fal] on 1979/80. 
LUCAS ELECTRICAL ~~ORTS.£MILLION 
OE P&S TOTAL 
(repla~ent ) 
1974/75 8.0 N'A • 
1975/76 8.1 18.4 26.5 
1976/77 15.1 21.5 36.6 
1977/78 16.5 2).7 42.2 
1978/79 22.1 2·1. J 4(,.4 
1979/80 27.0 23.,1 50.4 
1980/81 Estimate 3l.0 21.0 52.0 
This export growth has not been sufficient to offset the reduction in 
business available in the UK. 
In volume terms there has been a drop of 40% ill replacement business 
and this reflects the drop in export of UK vehicles. 
V LUCAS EIECTR.ICAL SHARE OF UK OE HARKET 
(12 volt) 
1974/75 75.1 % 
1975/76 73.7 
1976/77 74.0 
1977/78 69.9 
1978/79 10.8 
1979/80 69 Estimate 
1980/81 65-67 Forecast 
Our .share has bt'cII fnllinG hy appr'(I':lril:JleJ.y (l11I~ pereent point. per ye:\r. 
\ 
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TOTAL 
% I~rpORTS PAHC HOHr: I HPORT 
1974 14f, 14 12 2 
1975 16 
1976 19 
1977 22 
1978 25 
1979 30 
1980 Estimate 33 
1981 Forecast 36 17 11 6 
By 1987 imports will account for over 50% of the UK car pare. 
• 
: ! 
'---I . -1.::Y~~Lf-.£'!~~ .. I-___ /~"Y.~{..·_j3~/_ I~Lf~!L:_1 ~~/_ /5:'0// 1 J:~~l 1---
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THE GROUP'S UNAUDITED RESULTS fOR THE IlALF-YEAR 
TO 31 JANUARY 1980 ARE: 
.' 
SALES TO OUTSIDE CUSTOMERS 
SURPLUS ON TRADING 
SHARE OF PROfITS LESS LOSSES 
OF ASSOCIATED COtlPANIES 
INTEREST PAYABLE LESS 
RECEIVED 
EROFIT BEFORE TAXATION 
lAXATION 
PROFIT AFTER TAXATION 
~INORITY INTERESTS 
~RQF!~ ~TTRrBUTABLF Tn 
~HAR=HOLD=RS 
EARNINGS PER ORDINARY SHARE 
DEPRECIATION CHARGED IN 
ARRIVING AT THE SURPLUS 
ON TRADING 
~ Loss of £1.8 million in the ~K. 
I-I A L F - \'[ I\fo< 
TO 
31.1.80 
. £111 LLI ON 
567.15 
16.34 
3.19 
19.53 
_7.21 
12.32 
5.67 
6.65 
1.0<1 
5.61 
5.90r> 
15.04 
j iJ"'LF-YE/~R 
TO 
31.1.79 
£fiI lLI ON 
510.1~ 
YEAH 
- TO 
31.7.79 
£t1IlLION 
1.071.66 
'---___ I CI ======::::J: I
26.87 
3.06 
.29.93 
5.84 
24.09 
5.81 
1R.'-8 
17.75 
74.41 
6.23 
30.64 
9.90 
'10.74 
17.85 
52,09 
1.86 
51.03 
___ --...a I t:i ====:1) 
13.21 
. , 
, 
0' 
54.30p 
26.05 
./ 
.- I 
.... 
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VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
EXCLUDI;\G TiV\CTORS 
MILLIONS OF VEHI~LES % 
1970 1979 . ~HANG=-
. UNITED KINGDOM 2.10 1.48 
- 30 
ITALY . 1.85 1.63 12 
WEST GERMANY 3.90 4.25 + 9 
• 
FRANCE 2.75 3.62 + 32 
USA 8.28 11.47 + 38 
JAPAN 5.29 9.63 + 82 
SPAIN 0.54 1.12 + 107 
.0 
311 . 
Al'l'r::\OIX 6 (c) 
INFLATION - PRODUCER PRICES 
ITALY 
UNITED KINGDOM 
FRANCE 
USA 
JAPI\~~ " 
WEST GERi1ANY 
MID 1975 TO MID"1980 
% INCREASE 
"107 
• 
97 
59 
57 
27 
22 
312· 
APPE\TllX G (d) 
EXCH.t\r~GE RATE !'IOVEfiENTS 
£1 STERLING = 
HID 1975 rHn 1977 MID 1980 
USA ($). 2.22 1.75 2.3~ 
5.40 3.85 4.10 
FRANCE (FF) 9.30 8.60 9.60 
JAPAN (-¥-) 660 404 506 
ITALY (L) 1,530 1,950 
313. 
LUCAS ErJ~CTRJCAL LINITED 
COST OF SUBCONTHACTOHS AS % OF COST OF PRODUCTION 
Year Subcontract c~ J::. 
Co~t £"1 
1975/76 2. }It 1.6 
1976/77 3.7·1 2.4 
1977/78 3.15 1.9 
1978/79 3.l() 1.72 
1979/80 (10 months) 2.93 1.71 
• 
1980/81 Estimate 3.44 1.71 
I 
, I 
313. 
LUCAS ElECTRICAL LIHITED 
COST OF SUBCO)iTHACTOHS AS % OF COST OF PRODUCTION 
Year Subcontract ,,~ 
.t.::. 
Co!"t ,£"1 
1975/76 2 .14 1.6 
1976/77 3.7·1 2.4 
1977/78 3.15 1.9 
1978/79 3.16 1.72 
1979/80 (10 months) 2.93 1.71 
• 
1980/81 Estimate 3.44 1.71 
, \ ~ 
; I j:rmEX I 
120 
LESS 
CQ''''Io''ETITlVE 
T~il\i~ UK 
A 110 
THE CO~BINED EFFECT OF INFLATION 
Ai\D EXCHA~!GE RATE r':OVE11ENTS 
(MID 1975 = 100) 
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